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Summary 
 
This study attempts to develop an understanding of the iterative and multi-scaled 
process involved in transforming the state from below by examining the relationship 
between two of the most politicised rights-based legislations in India: the Right to 
Information Act (RTI) and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act (NREGA).  Based on one and a half years of ethnographic and interview based 
research, and five years of working with the RTI campaign, I examine the reciprocal 
relationship between the rights to information and work, and the multi-scaled activism 
necessary to instantiate both. First, I trace different phases of the struggle for the right to 
information, beginning with the creation of alternative public spheres, Jan sunwais (or 
rural public hearings) that responded to demands for the right to work in rural 
Rajasthan. Second, as this demand culminated in a broad-based advocacy network, I 
examine the role of actors from diverse institutional arenas that succeeded in passing the 
national RTI legislation. I also look at how the same national network of activists 
introduced the public accountability mechanism of social audits, inspired by the Jan 
sunwai, into the new right to work law or NREGA. Finally, bringing the process full 
circle, I look at the ongoing efforts of the MKKS and the Suchna Evum Rozgar Adhikar 
Abhiyan (The Right to Information and Work Campaign) to implement the right to 
work on the ground in rural Rajasthan. In contrast to existing studies, I provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of the interdependent struggle for rights to information and 
work as one long iterative process to transform the state from below. I conclude with 
some reflections on the different vision of “transparency” and “accountability” 
emerging from rural grassroots struggles and what the RTI and NREGA experiences 
teach us about the possibilities for their realisation. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
State…the vexed institution that is the ground of both our freedoms and unfreedoms. 
– James C. Scott (1999: 7) 
 
It is a dry hot day in central Rajasthan, and I am in Bardliyas panchayat, with a 
team of ten other volunteers. We are carrying out a social audit of public works funded 
by the new Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (from here on 
NREGA). The Act guarantees 100 days of manual work a year at minimum wage to 
rural households. This social audit is organised by the state government in collaboration 
with a grassroots organisation, Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), and the 
Rajasthan-based Right to Information and Work campaign (Suchna Evum Rozgar 
Adhikar or SR Abhiyan). For five days prior to the final hearing of the social audit, an 
unused classroom in a primary school in Bardliyas has served as our office and living 
space. Every morning before school starts, we leave the premises to do the rounds of 
Bardliyas inspecting works undertaken in the previous year in the panchayat: gravel 
roads, wells, and trenches for storing rainwater. 
We have with us copies of official NREGA records, such as construction muster 
rolls (a list of labourers), measurement books, and bills and vouchers for materials like 
gravel and cement. Until recently we would have had to use India’s Right to 
Information Act (2005) to access such records. In order to curb corruption and ensure 
transparency, however, the intervention of MKSS and NCPRI activists helped to insert 
the right to information into the new employment guarantee scheme. NREGA 
guidelines mandate that all information necessary to conduct a social audit must be 
provided within seven days of a request.  
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Government records in hand, we physically inspect works and verify their 
quality. We match our findings with entries in the official records. We then identify 
individual NREGA workers from the muster roll and go door to door asking workers 
how many days they worked, the name of the worksite, and the total wages they 
received. The testimonies are tallied with entries on the muster roll, and we record any 
discrepancy. We also look for evidence that the panchayat staff and block level public 
officials have followed the proactive disclosure guidelines mandated by the Act: 
transparency boards, displayed at all worksites, must contain information related to the 
details of public works undertaken: the names of workers, the funds allotted to them, 
and the details of expenditures on labour and material. These boards, painted in bright 
yellow, are supposed to help villagers identify ongoing works in their panchayat and 
force panchayat officials to publicly disclose the details of each work. We also visit the 
local material supply shops, from which gravel has been purchased, and inspect 
invoices and entries registered in their bill books. After five days of talking to villagers 
and gathering data, we are ready for the social audit. A social audit principally entails 
placing the findings from the preliminary investigation into the public domain where it 
can be publicly confirmed and/or challenged by villagers. On 10 October 2009 we 
assemble under a tent in an open maidan (field).  
Public officials and elected representatives from the panchayat sit on a raised 
platform at the front. Upper caste men of the village sit on chairs to the left of the 
platform. They have no role in NREGA but have come to voice their frustration with 
the state of affairs in their village and, in particular, the poor functioning of the 
panchayat office. The middle caste, lower castes (mostly members of the Raegar sub-
caste), and especially the women who have worked on NREGA sit on the floor facing 
the public officials. The supporters of the elected representative, or sarpanch, and the 
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panchayat secretary or gram sewak are scattered amongst the crowd. Below the 
platform, on another table on the right, next to a microphone, stands the social audit 
team. An experienced social auditor and member of SR Abhiyan from Chittorgarh 
district in Rajasthan leads the social audit proceedings. He reads out the names of 
NREGA funded public works, the quantity of material used, the names of workers, and 
the wages received. After each reading, he pauses and asks the villagers: ‘is this 
correct?’  
This is a new event for most villagers, and things begin slowly. There is some 
discontent over delays in the payment of wages and the quality of works. This is 
expressed not individually at the mic, but in a chorus-like manner from the floor. Public 
officials take written notes of the complaints. As the details pertaining to road works are 
read out, the exchange begins to heat up. Within days of laying gravel roads, villagers 
claim, the roads turned into dust tracks and the gravel disappeared. They look at the 
gram sewak and ask: ‘what happened to the roads?’ The NREGA Director for 
Rajasthan, a senior civil servant from Jaipur, immediately takes the microphone and 
summons the gram sewak to the front of the tent, demanding a response. In chorus, the 
villagers shout back:  ‘he can not tell us anything, he never went to the worksite’. The 
gram sewak ignores the allegations. He tries to explain himself, suggesting that the 
findings of the social audit team are misleading. He insists that the team did not visit the 
particular roadwork under dispute. Immediately, the director sends a senior engineer 
(from the public works department in Jaipur) to the disputed worksite. The gram sewak, 
two villagers who worked on the road, and two members of the social audit team 
accompany the engineer. Meanwhile, the social audit proceedings continue. 
The executive engineer returns from the worksite and confirms the allegations 
made by villagers. The gram sewak however, persists there is no discrepancy. Doubtful 
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of the gram sewak’s intent, the director visits the worksite himself. He returns without 
the gram sewak, who reappears a half-hour later carrying a cheque for one hundred and 
thirty one thousand rupees, which he hands to the director. Next, the director summons 
the junior technical assistant who certified the roadwork. We learn that the junior 
technical assistant has fled from Bardliyas. The director asks me to draft a first 
information report (FIR) against the junior technical assistant, quoting the relevant 
sections of the Indian Penal Code. He signs the FIR and hands it to the police officer. 
The gram sewak is suspended until further notice. The social audit gram sabha comes 
to an end. 
This remarkable process and outcome in Bardliyas panchayat stands out as an 
uncommon inversion of the pattern of citizen-state relations in rural India. It illustrates a 
new mode through which ordinary citizens, in this case, rural peasants and workers, are 
opening up or transforming parts of the Indian state: the social audit.  The foundation 
for the social audit was laid with the creation and use of the Jan sunwai (public 
hearing), which eventually led to a demand for legal right to information. I argue that in 
addition to a national law guaranteeing a citizen’s right to know, the ability of ordinary 
citizens to ensure state accountability is significantly enhanced when accompanied by 
the use of decentralised deliberative platforms, such as the Jan sunwai and social audit. 
In this study, I will show how this emergent form of citizen-state engagement that I 
describe above has been made possible by the multi-scaled activism for rights to 
information and work.  
The vision of transparency and accountability that has informed this activism 
contrasts with the more middle class activism against corruption embodied in the recent 
India Against Corruption (IAC) campaign. Fanned by the Indian media, IAC leaders 
cast grave doubt on existing institutional avenues and tools, including the right to 
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information law, available to remedy endemic corruption in India. According to the IAC 
Campaign, which emerged in response to the financial scandals implicating the 
Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition government, curbing 
corruption demands a central ombudsman, or ‘lokpal,’ that would have unlimited powers 
to pursue corruption in government. In this vision, an all-powerful authority is needed 
to purge the state of its sins. 
In contrast, MKSS and the National Campaign for People’s Right to Information 
(NCPRI), pioneers of the Right to Information and NREGA social audit, see 
transparency and accountability as inextricably linked to social justice and seek to 
democratise the state for those who need it most. Transparency and accountability do 
not have the same meaning to all classes of citizens. As expressed in the most widely 
used RTI slogan—‘the right to know, the right to live’—MKSS and NCPRI understand 
the right to information as a right to have other rights, such as rights to work, food, and 
education. For poor peasants and farmers working on drought relief works, their vision 
of transparency and accountability is directly linked to their daily struggle to earn a 
livelihood. That is, denial of information is synonymous with denial of minimum wages 
and their right to work.  
Existing studies have focused on the initial stages of the struggle for the right to 
information, its relation to the struggle for the enforcement of minimum wages, the role 
of MKSS, its innovative strategies to confront the state administration (Jenkins and 
Goetz 1999a, 1999b, 2003; Mander, 2003; Mishra, 2003), and the organisational 
strategy of the NCPRI to enact a national RTI law (Baviskar, 2007; Singh, 2007, 2011). 
In contrast to these existing studies that focus on isolated sequences of the struggle for 
the right to information, this dissertation focuses on the entire trajectory of the rights to 
information and work, drawing attention to the iterative and multi-scaled process 
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involved in trying to achieve enduring transformation of the Indian state. Such a focus 
suggests that these isolated sequences have meaning in the ‘long arc’ (Houtzager and 
White, 2010) of activism that can only be captured by extending observation over time 
(Burawoy, 2009). Based on sixteen months of ethnographic and interview-based 
research conducted after five years of working with the RTI campaign, I examine the 
reciprocal relationship between the rights to information and work, and the multi-scaled 
activism necessary to instantiate both.  
This dissertation views the rights to information and work as interdependent 
rights and examines the struggles for them both as a single trajectory of activism aiming 
to “open up” the Indian state. This activism is shaped by the pragmatic difficulties 
posed by an Indian state that is multi-layered and whose different layers are 
differentially embedded in society. As I will show, the interdependent struggle for rights 
to information and work evolved through iterative attempts to engage and resist 
different levels of the Indian state, strategically shifting levels at crucial moments to 
overcome blockages at one level or take advantage of openings at others. The trajectory 
of this ‘long arc’ of activism, taken as a whole, illustrates both the possibilities and 
challenges that face grassroots groups as they try to bring about a more democratic, 
accountable, and egalitarian Indian state. 
 
THE ‘LONG ARC’ OF MULTI-SCALED ACTIVISM  
Writings about the right to information in India have MKSS and the National 
Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI) as their focus. What has been told 
has come in journalistic accounts (Dogra and Dogra, n.d.; Bakshi, 1998; Mishra, 2003; 
Khaitan, 2009), documentaries, and writings of prominent activists (Roy and Dey, 2001, 
2002; Roy, 1996; Kidambi, 2008; Sampat and Dey, 2005; Mander and Joshi, n.d.; 
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Singh, 2007, 2011) as well as scholarly work. The early analyses draw attention to 
MKSS’s innovative campaign strategies, which include: 1) the development and use of 
‘popular audits’ (i.e., the Jan sunwai) to combat corruption and to confront the local 
level of the state (Jenkins and Goetz, 1999a, 1999b; Mander, 2003; Mishra, 2003; 
Corbridge et al, 2005) and, 2) NCPRI’s strategy of seeking out state actors to build a 
broad-based coalition for a national law (Baviskar, 2007). 
 These existing studies on the right to information can be categorised under                                             
two broad theoretical approaches—the accountability framework (Jenkins and Goetz, 
1999a, 1999b, 2003; Mander, 2003; Mishra, 2003) and the social movements 
framework (Singh, 2007; Baviskar, 2007; Mander and Joshi, n.d.). The first approach 
(accountability and transparency) draws out the implications of the MKSS-led struggle 
for human rights, participatory development and anti-corruption (Jenkins and Goetz, 
1999a). For instance, Jenkins and Goetz (1999a) first analysed MKSS-led Jan sunwais, 
which they call ‘popular auditing’. They note that the Jan sunwai was an effective tool 
to combat corruption, and it contrasts sharply with other participatory development 
techniques that are less confrontational. 1 Further, they explain why MKSS, unlike other 
civil society actors, has been successful in combating forms of corruption that impact 
the poor (Jenkins and Goetz, 1999b; see also Jenkins, 2006, 2007). While I agree with 
Jenkins and Goetz, about the implications of MKSS’s right to information struggle for 
human rights, participatory development and anti-corruption; my goal is somewhat 
different. In the case of local-level activism I am interested in explaining how the Jan 
sunwai and, more specifically, MKSS’s communicative action leading up to the Jan 
sunwai converted it into what I call an ‘alternative public sphere’, a contentious site 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Additionally, Jenkins and Goetz (1999a) note that the MKSS led struggle for right to 
information draws attention to the ‘false dichotomy’ between civil political and other resource 
rights, such as to basic necessities: healthcare, shelter, food, and education (1999a: 608-612). 
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where a connection between denial of minimum wages and information was made 
through deliberations between villagers, government officials and activists. I build on 
Jenkins and Goetz’s (1999a) observations and examine how the Jan sunwai operated as 
an alternative public sphere that articulated the demand for right to information. Further, 
I am interested in explaining what the trajectory of right to information and work tell us 
about the limits as well as possibilities for groups of poor people to transform everyday 
practice of state agencies (rather than simply combat corruption), and in turn what that 
tells us about the nature of the Indian state. As such, the Jan sunwai, as this study 
shows, was the first stage in a much broader campaign to democratise the Indian state in 
the service of greater distributional justice. 
When it comes to explaining the legislative trajectory of the right to information 
Baviskar’s (2007) analysis of the National Campaign for Right to Information (NCPRI) 
offers a point of departure. In an important article, Baviskar (2007) explains the success 
of the national RTI law as, in part, a product of NCPRI’s unusual organisational 
strategy—namely, of ‘cultivating links’ with state actors—and its effective mobilisation 
of the ‘intelligentsia’.2 This NCPRI strategy, Baviskar notes (2007:16), was inspired by 
a similar MKSS strategy to seek out state actors during its struggle for the enforcement 
of minimum wages. I share Baviskar’s (2007) focus on NCPRI’s broad-base coalition 
strategy, but conceptualise it somewhat differently. While Baviskar (2007) identifies 
NCPRI’s organising strategy to seek out state actors, I elaborate on Baviskar’s argument 
by giving attention to an aspect of this strategy that has not received significant 
attention in studies of rights-based campaigns in India that prefer to focus on subaltern 
agents: the role of what I call, “eminent activists” and their symbolic capital. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Additionally, she identifies other factors: an evolving international trend for enacting 
transparency laws, and a paradoxical domestic context, where expansion of citizenship rights 
has occurred alongside the rapid expansion of neoliberal economic policies that call for a 
reduced state role (2007:17-21). 
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This dissertation builds on Baviskar’s (2007) useful analysis of NCPRI’s 
organisational strategy first by further developing the important role of “eminent 
activists” and their symbolic capital in the campaign for a right to information 
legislation. More broadly, however, it places this stage of the campaign into the larger 
arc of activism of which it is a part, beginning with the local Jan sunwais (public 
hearings) that the MKSS organised in the rural villages of Rajasthan in the 1990s and 
ending with the social audits of the last few years. Examined within this larger arc, the 
legislative campaign for the RTI appears as one stage of a multi-pronged strategy that 
begins and ends with grassroots local organising. It is only the difficulties encountered 
at the previous stage of activism (the Jan sunwais examined in Chapter 3) that one can 
make sense of the decision to embark on a legislative strategy (Chapter 4); and it is the 
limits of this legislative strategy that have prompted the subsequent return to grassroots 
organising to implement social audits at the local and state level (Chapter 5). 
In analysing the way in which the campaigns for the rights to information and 
work have evolved in this way, this dissertation also contributes to our understanding of 
the Indian state. In contrast to Marxist and Weberian views of the Indian state as unitary 
(Vanaik, 1990; Chatterjee, 1998; Kaviraj, 1991; Bardhan, 1984, 1989; Kohli, 1987, 
1990a, 1990b; Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987), in chapter 2 I build on two different 
approaches that recognise the fragmentation and complexity of the Indian state (Migdal, 
1994, 2001; Fuller and Harriss, 2000) to illuminate how the state appears to social 
movements trying to “open up” or transform the Indian state. This dissertation shows 
that when you examine concerted bottom-up efforts to challenge existing state practices, 
what comes into view is a stratified state whose different levels are differentially 
embedded in society. It is this differential embedding of the various layers of the Indian 
state that has forced the iterative multi-scaled activism pursued in the inter-connected 
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campaign for the rights to information and work. By studying the latter through all of its 
stages, this dissertation calls for a more nuanced and disaggregated view of the Indian 
state—one that is better able to elucidate the levers and strategies available to social 
movements that are trying to transform it. 
Empirically, this dissertation traces three distinct phases in the campaign for the 
rights to work and information and shows how they evolved strategically in relationship 
to different levels of the Indian state. Drawing on Habermas’s (1998 [1989]) notion of 
the public sphere, I first examine how the MKSS’s efforts to implement drought relief 
schemes in rural Rajasthan led to the creation of the Jan sunwai (public hearing), which 
acted as an ‘alternative public sphere’ that produced the initial articulation for the right 
to information. Second, I show how MKSS tried to overcome blockage at the local and 
state level by broadening out of central Rajasthan to form a national network of diverse 
individuals and organisations to advocate for a national RTI law. Applying Bourdieu’s 
(1986, 1991) notion of symbolic capital, I examine the specific role of the national 
network—called the National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI)—
and, in particular, its “eminent activists” in achieving legislative success.  Finally, I 
direct attention to the most recent—and as yet unstudied—phase of the campaign: the 
attempt to institutionalise the Jan sunwai as a “social audit” mechanism within the 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), and to enforce its 
implementation at the local level. I thus examine the entire trajectory of the right to 
information, beginning and ending with the right to work, and traversing multiple levels 
of the Indian state beginning and ending at the local state. An understanding of the 
entire trajectory of the multi-scaled activism that led to the partial realisation of rights to 
information and work, can, I believe, contribute not only to our scholarly understanding 
of transparency, social movements, and the state, but also to the strategic understanding 
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of many groups in civil society. In particular, the lessons illuminated in this dissertation 
can benefit those movements who aim to strengthen those parts of the state to which the 
interests of the poor are closely tied.  
 
MKSS’S MULTI-SCALED ACTIVISM: DEFENDING THE STATE 
I draw on Hung (2011) to differentiate between MKSS’s ‘state-resisting’ and 
‘state-engaging’ strategies. 3 Operating with a tacit theory of the state, MKSS engages 
where it finds space, resists where it gets blocked, and opportunistically alternates levels 
of the state to overcome intractable blockages. This multi-scaled process of opening up 
the state by combining resistance and engagement, I argue, is in part a response to the 
fragmented and stratified nature of the Indian state.  
At each stage of the struggle for rights to information and work, as I will show, 
while resisting the (local) state activists continuously looked for openings within the 
state; where none could be found or pried open, they either switched scales or created 
parallel institutions. This strategy propelled MKSS to use an iterative set of tactics, 
basing its multiple maneuvers on the varying responses from different state levels and 
often successfully playing one part of the state against another. While Hung (2011) 
categorises movements as either state-resisting or state-engaging, MKSS continuously 
moves between the two, alternating between peaceful resistance and strategic 
engagement to extend the welfare functions of the state and expand citizenship rights. 
This oscillation is not unique to MKSS, and is deployed by other rights based struggles 
in India; however MKSS differs from other rights-based struggles because what it is 
seeking to achieve is quite different.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Also see, Tilly (1978) for a discussion of reactive and proactive movements. 
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Similar to other rights-based struggles in India, MKSS is not vying to capture 
state power (Mohanty, 2010; Nigam, 2005; Kothari, 1984; Sheth, 1983). Rather its 
resistance and engagement strategy, like other rights-based struggles, entails calling 
upon the state to guarantee rights and freedoms it is ostensibly committed to; however 
MKSS’s ability to oscillate between tactful resistance and engagement strategies are 
sustained by its vision for a more egalitarian state and its core demand: to expand good 
state capacity and make it work for the poor. It contrasts with other rights-based 
struggles that take an anti-state stance to prevent infringement of existing rights 
(including armed struggles that seek to overthrow it) and with those that seek 
depoliticised forms of collaboration via voluntary and non-government organisations as 
a way to substitute the state. MKSS’s focus is achieving new rights, and embedding new 
legislative gains into actual practices of state agencies. Rather than taking an essentially 
defensive stance to prevent encroachment on existing rights, or shrink the state by 
handing over their responsibilities to private and non-governmental actors. This will 
become clearer in the comparison between MKSS and the Campaign for Forest Rights 
Act to which I return in the conclusion. 
The relationship between MKSS/NCPRI activists and state actors, however, 
should neither be mistaken as ‘trust’, ‘faith’ in, nor ‘dependence’ on the state; nor is it a 
kind of ‘soft resistance’ to the state. Rather as this study will illustrate, because of its 
radicalising potential, this interaction with the different parts of the state represents a 
protracted struggle to institutionalise substantive changes inside the different levels of 
the state. In this process, we will see that, majority of state actors remain unwilling 
collaborators; but the compulsions of electoral politics and the shifting power relations 
between different levels as well as parts of the bureaucratic, and political state draw 
them to seek alliances with reformists and/or civil society actors. Thus, in a 
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Bourdieusian sense, MKSS views the Indian state as an ‘additional’ site of struggle, and 
its activism signifies an attempt to ‘defend the state’ (Bourdieu, 1998) from the interests 
of ruling elites (at the local and national levels) while it steers the state toward more 
egalitarian interests.  
A focus on the MKSS type of activism, then, is not meant to single out a certain 
type of activism and hold it up as a successful ‘advocacy model.’ Such an exercise 
would be futile and hopelessly undermine the diverse and vibrant tradition of ‘non-
party’-political activism in India.4 However, I hope to draw attention to an important 
distinction between rights-based campaigns that are arrayed against the different arms 
of the state and are appropriate for their purposes. 5  While scholars have focused 
attention on social movements in India that resist the coercive arm of the state and are 
framed as defensive/conflict struggles (Omvedt, 1993; Brass, 1995; Ray and 
Katzenstein, 2005; Dwivedi, 2006; Menon and Nigam, 2007; Sundar, 2011; Kumar and 
Kerr, 2012), rights-based campaigns to strengthen the welfare arm of the state remain 
understudied.   
 
ENGAGED SOCIAL SCIENCE 
The research for this dissertation utilised multiple methods, including participant 
observation, interviews and archival research. Apart from interviews and archival 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Non-party political formation is a term first theorised by Rajni Kothari (1984), to explain the 
broad spectrum of people’s movements and rural-based organisations that emerged in the 
1980’s, and emphasised ‘the local’ as a key site for democratising the state (see also Sheth, 
1983). 
5 I draw on Bourdieu’s (1998) distinction between the left arm (ministry of social welfare, 
housing) and right arm (ministry of finance) of the state to distinguish between the different 
arms of the state that movements in India resist: coercive arm of the state, by which I mean, 
departments and ministries, including the police and armed forces that infringe upon existing 
rights of citizens; and the welfare arm or the ministry of rural development and women and 
child welfare. 
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research (conducted at the Social Work Research Centre in Tilonia, and the Nehru 
Memorial Museum and Library in New Delhi) that helped to reconstruct the history of 
the campaigns, the majority of my fieldwork comprised what is variously known as 
‘engaged ethnography’ (Schepher-Hughes, 1995), ‘locally based activist ethnographic 
work’ (Lyon-Callo and Hyatt, 2003), ‘public sociology’ (Burawoy, 2007),‘observing 
politics in action’ (Auyero, 2006) or ‘activist anthropology’ (Maeckelbergh, 2009).  
In order to observe first hand and in minute detail the kind of state-society 
interaction involved in MKSS’s activism, I embedded myself with the campaign for 
most of my fieldwork. The great strength of this approach was that it provided an up-
close look at the iterative and dynamic strategies of the campaign as it responded to 
successive openings and blockages at different levels of the state. Situating myself in a 
particular village or trying to reconstruct events solely through interviews would have 
obscured the intricacies and dynamism of this interaction.  Being a participant and 
observer with the MKSS also had its challenges, particularly since I had worked with 
the campaign for five years before deciding to research it as a graduate student.  
As an activist, I had to balance my research interests with my responsibility to 
give back to the campaign, having obtained much—both personally and politically—
from it. Over the years as an RTI activist, my skills—drafting letters, rules, preparatory 
notes for meetings with public officials, press releases; filing right to information 
applications; inspecting official documents to extract relevant papers and culling out 
relevant portions from RTI responses—had developed in dialogue with, and through a 
process of mutual education with, fellow activists. More importantly, the complex 
reality that I was trying to simplify, and the sustained effort at achieving a different 
vision of transparency and accountability that my PhD seeks to explain, was closely 
intertwined with the everyday lives of many villagers. Thus, my ‘fieldwork’ required 
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both ‘personal engagement and political commitment’ (Schepher-Hughes, 1995:419). I 
felt accountable to the Campaign for RTI, and decided, therefore, to make myself 
available to the MKSS during the course of my fieldwork.  
By the time fieldwork for this study began, in September 2009, the RTI Act 
(2005) had existed for four years and had acquired a life of its own. Different classes of 
citizens were using the law actively,6 but the law also faced potential threats in the form 
of government amendments seeking to dilute its strength. In its initial conception, this 
study was to be focused solely on the right to information, how it was created, and how 
it was currently being used. Within a month of starting fieldwork, however, the link 
between right to information and the right to work, or NREGA, became the concrete 
empirical reality that drove my inquiry in the field as MKSS began to fight for the 
implementation of social audits in NREGA. Watching the concrete attempts to 
transform the right to information back into the right to work convinced me that instead 
of focusing on a particular stage of the campaign, I should focus on the nature of the 
long-arc of activism that connected different stages of MKSS’s activities.  
Following the trajectory of the rights to information and work meant making 
different choices throughout my fieldwork regarding what to focus on and what 
methods to utilise. Continuous travel between Delhi and Rajasthan led me to undertake 
multi-sited ethnography to understand and explain the current struggle over the NREGA 
social audits in Rajasthan, which became the focus of my activity. Within Rajasthan, 
my interest in the formation of Jan sunwai led me to divide my time between the state 
capital, Jaipur, and three other districts of central Rajasthan—Ajmer, Bhilwara and 
Rajsamand. Bhilwara district can be called a default selection. It remains one of the 
districts where MKSS works. The last Jan sunwai of the initial phase between 1994-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 A good source of the early successes and challenges of the RTI Act (2005) is a study of ten 
states including Delhi. See, RaaG and NCPRI (2008). 
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1995 was held in Dhapada village (Bhilwara district) in April 1995. Therefore, 
Bhilwara was one of the districts that I included in my sample. What made it central to 
my fieldwork however, was its selection for the state sanctioned NREGA social audit in 
October 2009, in which I also participated. Apart from embedding myself with MKSS, I 
engaged protesting panchayat functionaries, who candidly shared their predicament 
with me. I was also able to converse with senior politicians, who keenly explained and 
attempted to justify the erratic stance of the state government (on social audits) that 
resulted from trying to appease both its own people and societal pressure groups. Thus, 
during my fieldwork, I encountered both the ‘pace of political action’ and the ‘plight of 
political actors’ (Auyero, 2006: 258).  
As Maeckelbergh (2009:24) notes, being an activist is ‘taking 
action…everywhere.’ Thus, during my ‘fieldwork’ as ‘activist’ and as PhD candidate, I 
often doubled up as a designated notes taker for various government meetings. This 
facilitated my entry and access to high-level government appointed working groups, 
such as the working group on improving transparency and accountability in NREGA, 
constituted by the Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India. On another 
occasion, I took minutes of meetings of the working group on transparency and 
accountability constituted by the National Advisory Council (MKSS activist Aruna Roy 
chaired both working groups). I also remember sitting across from the Chief Minister of 
Rajasthan in his office taking notes energetically as MKSS and SR Abhiyan activists 
discussed the contentious developments after the Bhilwara social audit. My furious note 
taking and silent participation was explained to a puzzled Chief Minister, to whom I 
was presented as both an activist and a PhD candidate.  
As the designated notes taker at various government appointed working groups, 
and, at the same time, as participant-observer, I was able to study villagers, activists, 
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reformists, typical civil servants, and engaged academics in ‘their own time and space, 
in their own everyday lives’ (Burawoy, 1991: 2). Observing and participating in a 
process through which public policies are informed and changes in law are negotiated, 
produced and contested, allowed me to soak up the ‘nitty-gritty details of politics’ 
(Auyero, 2006: 258), of transparency and accountability. I was privy to debates over 
each clause, coma, and full stop—apart from the obviously more substantive issues like 
changes in amendment notes, rules, and even legislative texts. At times, however, 
especially in Rajasthan, it was not easy for me to gain access to high-end IAS officials. 
As ‘activist’ close to senior MKSS activists, IAS officials were sometimes reluctant to 
give me an interview.7 At other times, I was seen as a transmission belt. That is, 
protesting panchayat functionaries spoke to me about their predicament because they 
wanted me to convey to MKSS activists their dissatisfaction over the sustained 
campaign for the NREGA social audit in the state.  
My affiliation with MKSS also facilitated my travel to Andhra Pradesh, where I 
observed state-led social audits and interviewed IAS and mid-level public officials in 
charge of overseeing NREGA and implementing social audits. I also travelled to 
Kerala—on the invitation of the State Planning Board—along with other MKSS 
activists to help organise a social audit of NREGA works in Trichur district. Curiously, 
Kerala—with its acclaimed people’s planning process—has yet to implement social 
audits. Prior to the panchayat elections (held in 2011) the state government organised a 
social audit training in May 2010 to ‘send a message’ to aspiring panchayat presidents. 
While I do not attempt full interstate comparisons, observing the more state-led process 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 I sought an interview with the Commissioner of NREGA who insisted that ‘I knew more about 
what was going on with NREGA and social audit in the state, than he could tell me’. I had to 
convince him that it was important for me to ‘get his (the government’s) perspective’. 
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of social audits in Andhra Pradesh helped to illuminate the more civil society-led 
process I was observing in Rajasthan.  
My ethnography was supplemented by interview-based research in three states: 
Delhi, Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh. I conducted 51 in-depth open-ended personal 
interviews with activists of MKSS, the National Campaign on RTI (or NCPRI), the 
state wide campaign for right to information and work in Rajasthan (SR Abhiyan) and 
villagers from central Rajasthan who participated in Jan sunwais. I also interviewed 
IAS officials in Delhi, IAS and state civil servants in Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh, 
politicians in Rajasthan, panchayat staff in Rajasthan, development practitioners, and 
engaged academics in Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Delhi. To gather information on 
the early years of MKSS led struggles for enforcement of minimum wages, living in 
Devdungri village (Rajsamand district), where MKSS is based, I travelled to 
neighbouring panchayats such as, KotKirana, Umarwas, Janawad, Dhapada and 
Vijaypura, in Rajsamand and Pali districts to interview villagers. In addition to these 
interviews, having observed the ongoing struggle for the implementation of social 
audits in NREGA, I had to trace back from present struggles to early struggles for 
enforcement of minimum wages and the development of the Jan sunwai. For this, I 
conducted archival research at the Social Work Research Centre (SWRC) in Rajasthan 
and at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New Delhi, where I examined old 
video recordings as well as MKSS and NCPRI reports, journalistic accounts, 
correspondence and articles about the struggle written by prominent activists.  
To the various shared spaces to which I gained access, I found myself ideally 
situated to observe different levels of the state in action, both with itself and with 
distinct societal actors. Thus, all that I observed and absorbed over the course of sixteen 
months of fieldwork, through my various spatial interactions on the ground, as an 
	   27	  
activist with MKSS, in my interactions with the ‘everyday state’ (Fuller and Harriss, 
2000), and as a PhD scholar at the high level government working groups, or 
‘commanding heights’ (Migdal, 2001, 1994), shaped my understanding of the on-going 
state-society interaction and of the attempt by civil society groups to open up the Indian 
state from below. 
 
THESIS STRUCTURE  
This study shows that the emergence of the right to information and work are 
closely linked and should be understood as having been profoundly shaped by activists’ 
creative and pragmatic engagement with an Indian state that, rather than being 
monolithic, is stratified and differentially embedded at local, state, and national levels. 
In Chapter 2, I argue that views of the Indian state, as well as views about grassroots 
activism, can be nuanced by understanding the need for a singular (multi-scaled) 
strategy that takes into account the stratified nature of the Indian state. Therefore, as 
noted earlier, I attempt to explain movement choices and strategies in close relation to 
the nature of the Indian state. Additionally, I draw on the different theoretical 
concepts—the notion of an alternative public sphere (Habermas, 1998 [1989], 1984a, 
1984b), the notion of symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1986, 1991), and law as an arena of 
struggle (Thompson, 1975; Hunt, 1993, 2002; Cotterrell, 2007; Epp, 1998, 2008; 
Houtzager, 2001)—to conceptualise the three elements of the entire trajectory of the 
right to information. In chapters 3, 4 and 5, using concrete examples from the trajectory 
of the right to information and work, I illustrate how different levels of the Indian state 
advance or limit the possibilities for a grassroots group like MKSS to transform it or to 
open up its different levels. 
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In Chapter 3, I examine the emergence of the right to information in local 
struggles over the enforcement of minimum wages or the right to work in rural 
Rajasthan. The two rights—to information and work—I argue, evolve in a reciprocal 
relationship to one another. That is, the right to information grew out of struggles for 
the right to work, and the innovative advocacy strategies—such as the Jan sunwai, or 
what I call the ‘alternative public sphere’—developed as a vehicle through which the 
demand for right to information was articulated. Drawing on critiques of Habermas’s 
(1998 [1989]) bourgeois public sphere (Fraser, 1990; Calhoun, 1992; Eley, 1992; 
Somers, 1993; Chandhoke, 2005), I show how the MKSS created the Jan sunwai as an 
alternative public sphere that led to the collective articulation of the demand for the 
right to information.  
If poor people in rural villages initiated and energised a process that over the 
course of fifteen years resulted in a national legislation guaranteeing right to 
information (Dogra and Dogra, n.d.; Khaitan, 2009; Baviskar, 2007; Singh, 2007; 
Sampat and Dey, 2005; Mishra, 2003; Roy and Dey 2001, 2002; Mander, 2003; Mander 
and Joshi, n.d.; Roy, 1996), in Chapter 4, I ask, how was this local demand translated 
into a legislative guarantee? I trace the advancement of the struggle for right to 
information to higher levels of the state. I use Bourdieu’s (1986, 1991) theory of 
symbolic capital to examine the role of a broad-based national advocacy network that 
succeeded in passing national legislation. I focus in particular on how eminent activists, 
largely from the Indian middle class, advanced the right to information by using their 
symbolic capital to collectively press forward the demand for national legislation in the 
national media, the public bureaucracy, political parties, and in Parliament. While such 
forms of cross-class alliances are a widely recognised phenomenon in social movement 
activism in India (Baviskar, 2005, 2007; Katzenstein et al, 2001), foregrounding the role 
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of eminent activists in the struggle for right to information adds to the more studied 
activities of the MKSS in rural Rajasthan to shed light on the contribution of educated 
middle class activists in this struggle. It also helps us understand why a multi-layered 
state, with its legislative and judicial arms, leads societal actors to adopt diverse 
strategies for engagement and resistance.  
Finally, in Chapter 5, I draw on my observation and participation in the ongoing 
struggles over NREGA social audits in Rajasthan—an as yet unstudied phase of the 
campaign—to examine the process through which activists try to embed the right to 
information and work into the actual practices of local panchayats. Such a focus 
suggests that rights or legislative reforms are not automatic guarantees but only the first 
step toward transforming or opening up the state and making it work for the poor. This 
chapter also, however, illuminates the resistance that the efforts to implement national 
legislation have faced on the ground. Through an account of the counter-mobilisation by 
the sarpanches and gram sewaks that followed the first state-supported NREGA social 
audit in Bhilwara district, in 2009, I analyse how the lower and middle bureaucracy ‘re-
interpret’ legislative victories (Houtzager and White 2010: 181), such as the NREGA 
social audits, in order to resist efforts seeking to open up the local state. By examining 
the blockages these groups have created to the implementation of social audits under 
NREGA, I draw lessons about the challenges to institutionalising legislative victories at 
the local level. 
 Drawing on ideas from law and society scholars (Epp, 1998, 2008; Hunt, 1993; 
Thompson, 1975; Houtzager, 2001; Cotterrell, 2007; White and Perelman, 2010), I 
conceptualise law as an arena of struggle rather than as a site of one-time achievement. 
This reinforces the dissertation’s central argument that the achievement of legislation 
must be seen within a larger arc of activism aimed at expanding citizen control over the 
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state, and which must continually overcome the opposition of those who would restrict 
it. The dissertation concludes with some reflections on: 1) what the examination of the 
entire trajectory of the rights to information and work tell us about the nature of the 
Indian state, and 2) the particular vision of transparency and accountability that the 
struggles for the rights to information and work signify, and the opportunities and 
challenges for their more thorough realisation.  
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Chapter 2. Understanding The Multi-Scaled Trajectory of the Rights to 
Information and Work 
 
 
In this chapter, I provide a framework for understanding the multi-scaled 
trajectory of the rights to information (RTI) and work in India. This trajectory, from 
MKSS struggles in rural Rajasthan to its partial realisation in national legislation, has 
been shaped by the interactions of various social actors with different levels of the 
Indian state. While existing studies on the right to information have examined isolated 
sequences and strategies of the struggle for right to information—whether the early Jan 
sunwais (Jenkins and Goetz, 1999a, 1999b, 2003) or the national campaign for RTI 
legislation (Baviskar, 2007)—these studies do not analyse how these various sequences 
cohere into a larger arc of activism. This dissertation argues that by examining this 
larger trajectory in its entirety, we gain some additional insight into the character of the 
activism that has succeeded in partially realising these rights in India. It thus links local, 
state, and national phases of the struggle to explain how the right to information and 
work emerged in India through multi-scaled activism that continually oscillates between 
resistance and engagement. By providing a comprehensive analysis of the full trajectory 
of the right to information and work, I am able to show the complex and iterative state-
society interaction that advanced the rights to information and work in India. 
This study, moreover, suggests that this trajectory has been shaped by the 
fragmented nature of the Indian state itself. I argue that studies of the Indian state 
should direct more attention to the contentious relations between different parts of the 
state, and how they interact with (and can be used against) each other. The two-decade 
old campaign for the rights to information and work reveals that the Indian state is 
highly fragmented and stratified by class, status, privilege, and power.  This 
stratification has greatly shaped the trajectory of this struggle, as activists have 
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pragmatically responded to obstacles and opportunities created by this fragmentation. In 
order to explain how a fragmented and stratified Indian state shaped the trajectory of the 
right to information and work, I draw on state-society scholars such as Migdal (2001, 
1994) and scholars of the ‘everyday state’ (Fuller and Harriss, 2000) in an effort to 
differentiate between the local and the national state and the bureaucratic, and political 
state. Furthermore, within the bureaucratic state in India, I distinguish between two 
contrasting levels: the civil servants from the Indian Administrative Services (known as 
the IAS), and the middle and lower level bureaucracy in charge of day-to-day 
functioning that most Indians experience (Gould, 2011; Oldenburg, 2006; Fuller and 
Harriss, 2000). Similarly, the political state has three parts, the members of parliament 
(known as MPs), the members of state legislative assemblies (known as MLAs) and the 
local elected representatives at the block-level or zilla pramukhs and the sapranches at 
the panchayat-level. These elected representatives belong to different political parties. 
Like the middle and lower bureaucracy, most Indians access the state through their 
local-level elected representatives. Each of these different parts of the Indian state are 
embedded in society—that is, tied into various social classes and interests—to varying 
extents. This shapes their responses to efforts to transform or open up the state’s 
different parts. This fragmentation and stratification presents barriers to—while also 
creating opportunities for—making the Indian state more democratic, accountable, and 
egalitarian. This dissertation will show how activists responded to this fragmentation 
through three distinct phases of the struggles for the right to information and work. In 
what follows, I present a theoretical framework for understanding each phase and its 
role in the larger arc of activism that it represents. I will then conclude with the 
implications of this analysis for our understanding of the Indian state. 
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MULTI-SCALED ACTIVISM: THE THREE PHASES OF THE TRAJECTORY 
OF THE RIGHTS TO INFORMATION AND WORK 
 
 In order to explain the trajectory of the right to information and work, I focus on 
three main phases: the development of the Jan sunwai, which I call an ‘alternative 
public sphere’, at the local (panchayat) level; the formation of a national activist 
network that utilises what I call ‘eminent activists’ in a legislative strategy; and finally, 
the indeterminate social struggle to embed legislative victories into the local state 
through the use of social audits. In the following sections of this chapter, I develop a 
framework for examining the three sub-components of the multi-scaled trajectory of the 
right to information and work in India.  
 
An Alternative Public Sphere 
The Jan sunwai has been central to existing analyses of the right to information 
(Jenkins and Goetz, 1999a, 1999b, 2003; Roy and Dey, 2002; Mander, 2003; Mishra, 
2003; Corbridge et al, 2005; Pande, 2008). It has been conceived as an effective 
‘popular auditing’ tool to combat corruption by exposing misuse of public funds meant 
for rural development (Jenkins and Goetz, 1999a, 1999b, 2003; Mander, 2003). My first 
contribution to the existing knowledge on the right to information is in reframing our 
understanding of the Jan sunwai as an ‘alternative’ public sphere, and highlighting its 
specific role in articulating the popular demand for right to information in India. I 
advance existing interpretations of the Jan sunwai as a an alternative public sphere by 
distinguishing the five steps of a Jan sunwai: obtaining, converting, sharing, auditing 
and publicly validating information related to rural development. Together these five 
steps constituted the construction of alternative public spheres in which a new form of 
deliberation led to the articulation of the right to information and thus led to the second 
phase of the campaign. 
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To conceptualise the Jan sunwai as an alternative public sphere, I draw on 
critiques of Habermas’s conception of the ‘bourgeois public sphere’ and its claims to 
open access, participation parity, and social equality (Fraser, 1990; Eley, 1992; Somers, 
1993; Chandhoke, 2005). In contrast to Habermas’s conception,8 the Jan sunwai is an 
alternative public sphere that fosters what Fraser (1990: 67, 68) calls  ‘subaltern counter 
publics,’ which challenge (though do not necessarily eradicate) participatory privileges. 
Unlike, the bourgeois public sphere, an alternative public sphere is open to broader 
participation9 and discursive relations take the form not of ideal (powerless) speech 
situations (Habermas 1998 [1989]), but of contestations and deliberations that seek to 
transform social roles and the power attached to them (Eley, 1992: 324).  
The notion of the alternative public sphere, then, is useful in understanding the 
role the Jan sunwai played in creating a new kind of deliberation between citizens and 
state officials, and catalysing the struggle for a new right. While the Jan sunwais existed 
outside formal representative institutions such as panchayats, and thus formed a 
subaltern or alternative public spheres that Habermas did not acknowledge, Habermas’s 
notion of ‘communicative rationality’ and its emancipatory ideals remains useful 
(Habermas, 1984b; see also Calhoun, 1992). For Habermas, communicative action was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The cafes, (news) papers, reading clubs, coffee houses, and salons of the early Enlightenment 
that constituted Habermas’s public sphere were ideal situations, where power (administration) 
and money (economy or market) were suspended, and ‘people’ communicated their ideas to 
each other in a rational context. With the rise of capitalism and the modern state, however, the 
public sphere was transformed from a site of rational critical debate ‘into an arena for 
advertising.’ Though new publics joined, the public sphere suffered a ‘literal disintegration’ 
with the loss of a ‘notion of general interest, and the rise of consumption orientation’ (Calhoun, 
1992: 25-26). 
9 One of the fundamental historical criticisms of Habermas (1998 [1989]) is that not everyone, 
but only restricted citizens participated in open-deliberative rationality (as opposed to calculated 
or purposive rationality). ‘The people’ were really white propertied men, not women, 
minorities, or working classes (Fraser, 1990; Somers, 1993). Thus, despite the claim to 
openness and accessibility, the bourgeois public sphere made it only possible for some of the 
citizenry to hold the state accountable, by partaking in a specific type of unrestricted discussion 
on public matters (Fraser, 1990). Habermas nevertheless, demonstrated the emancipatory 
potential of the public sphere as well as critiqued bourgeois society by elucidating the public 
sphere’s transformation and, indeed, degeneration (Calhoun, 1992). 
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the coordination of human life through speech/deliberation that is free from coercion, 
and not via norms or rules of efficiency and power.10 While the Jan sunwais in rural 
Rajasthan were not free from power relations amongst those taking part, they did create 
a space in which those relations of power—between members of the village, and 
between members of the village and local state authority—could be challenged through 
public dialogue. The Jan sunwais, then, represented an alternative public sphere that, 
while not free of power, mobilised dissent against the practices of social and political 
elites. Chapter 3 will show how these alternative public spheres launched the campaign 
for the rights to information and work. Chapter 4, however, shows that when this 
campaign became thwarted at the state level, it prompted MKSS activists to switch 
scales and move from local and state-level resistance to national engagement. 
 
Scaling Up the Demand for a New Right 
At the national level, the trajectory of the right to information went from 
organising subaltern public spheres in Rajasthan to forming a network of prominent 
individuals advocating for a national legislation. Baviskar (2007) helpfully identifies the 
MKSS and NCPRI strategy of seeking out state actors, along with other social actors 
(especially the intelligentsia), as a widely recognised tactic of social movement activism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Communicative rationality, or mutual interaction, led Habermas (1984b: 344-47) to critique 
both capitalism and big government. For instance, Habermas (1984b: 361, 262, 363) argues that 
the Welfare State disciplines people, especially the poor populations, on the basis of procedures 
that are opaque: care or welfare was highly conditioned, and people being cared for had, 
literally, no say. Habermas (1984b: 372-373) was not against welfare, but proposed a un-
Weberian alternative: that is, the procedures that determine who gets what (under a welfare 
state) must be based on public debate or communicative action rather than on standardised, 
predictable, and calculable rules, or instrumental rationality. As Calhoun (1992: 28) notes, 
Habermas argued not for a return to the bourgeois public sphere, but for a search for forms of 
‘democratic public discourse that can salvage critical reason in an age of large-scale institutions 
and fuzzy boundaries between state and society.’ 
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in India.11 Even though the literature on social movement activism sees social 
movements as representative of different classes (Brass, 1995; Omvedt, 1993; Ray and 
Katzenstein, 2005; Menon and Nigam, 2007), it says little about the role of 
predominantly middle class ‘eminent citizens’ in supporting grassroots struggles 
originating from more subaltern classes.  However, this undertheorisied role of middle 
class activists remains quite significant in helping social movement demands get 
traction at higher levels of the state. 
To fill in this void, I devote analytic attention to ‘eminent activists’: prominent 
people in public life such as government officials, academics, artists, journalists, judges, 
and lawyers who support social justice cause. In order to theorise the role of eminent 
activists, I use Bourdieu’s (1986, 1991) notion of symbolic capital, of which eminent 
activists, almost by definition, have significant endowments. In the case of RTI, these 
eminent individuals belong to diverse institutional arenas and have substantial social 
standing and credibility within their professional fields.  
Bourdieu (1986) notes that different types of capital constitute power in 
different social fields. In addition to the traditional Marxist focus on economic capital, 
Bourdieu advances the notions of social capital (power exercised through unequal 
individual networks (Harriss, 2001)), cultural capital (power conveyed through 
education or expertise) and symbolic capital (power derived from honour and prestige).  
IAS officials as well as journalists, judges, lawyers and academics are well endowed 
with all three forms of capital. This allows them to enjoy distinction and exercise social 
domination; but it also can make sympathetic elites useful allies in struggles to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For instance, Katzenstein et al (2001) fail to recognise this. They differentiate between issue 
and identity movements by specifying the arenas of the state in which they operate. While 
identity-based movements operate in the electoral arena, issue movements operate specifically 
in the bureaucratic and judicial arenas and are connected to national networks that facilitate 
their access to those arenas (Katzenstein et al, 2001); see also Mohanty (2010). 
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institutionalise change within the state. Having symbolic capital, which I will focus my 
attention on, bestows upon these ‘eminent activists’ recognition and legitimacy by other 
actors in their respective fields, as well as in the political field more generally 
(Bourdieu, 1991; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). It is difficult for the state to easily 
dismiss demands backed by these eminent persons because of their symbolic capital, or 
prestige.  
The majority of these eminent activists come from the Indian middle classes. As 
Deshpande (2003: 144) notes, they are, on the one hand without property, nurtured by 
the developmental state and dependent on ‘education, cultural capital and professional 
careers that these promised.’ On the other hand, with the advent of globalisation, a 
significant section of that class has ‘distanced itself from the state and the task of 
national building in pursuit of their perceived self-interests’ (Deshpande, 2003:148). 
Many of the eminent activists that I write about belong to the middle class of the 
Nehruvian years. With their professional skills and expertise (cultural capital) as 
lawyers, judges, IAS officials, journalists, and academics, they constitute an important 
support base of campaigns/movements, and act as strategic messengers that have 
privileged access to different parts of the state (social capital). They understand the 
architecture and inner workings of the state and use their skills and expertise—
recognised by people inside the state and society at large—to make a space for social 
movements’ demands inside the state. These eminent activists are valuable allies of 
movements who would otherwise find it difficult to access higher levels of the state. 
They are thus called upon from time-to-time to access those parts of the state and build 
support for movement demands.  
The role of urban middle class elites in translating grassroots demands into 
policy and/or legislation is widely acknowledged and sometimes criticised, but rarely 
	   38	  
analysed in a significant way. While many middle class activists constitute the core of 
several people’s movements in India, the specific role of many of these middle class 
activists remains poorly understood. My account of the specific role of eminent activists 
in the struggle for a national right to information legislation in Chapter 4 uses 
Bourdieusian notions of capital to advance our understanding of the role of an important 
sub-set of the urban middle class in India’s social movement activism. It suggests that 
sympathetic individuals within—or connected to—different parts of the state form an 
important resource and source of leverage for social movement activism, particularly 
when they seek to pass legislation. 
 
The Ongoing Struggle for Social Audits  
 
Studies of the struggle for the right to information conclude with the enactment 
of the national legislation (Baviskar, 2007; Singh, 2007). 12 An important goal of this 
dissertation is to extend the analysis into the post-legislative phase and illuminate the 
larger arc of activism of which the national legislation was only a part. In particular, I 
analyse the ongoing efforts to instantiate some of the gains of the right to information in 
the implementation of the right to work (the original concern that gave rise to the RTI). 
I therefore tell the untold story about the post-legislative struggle for institutionalising 
social audits in NREGA and thus the interconnections between the rights to information 
and work. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 There are also studies undertaken in the post-legislative period, after 2005, that focus on how 
the RTI Act was enacted and its use to tackle corruption. For example, Webb (2011) examines 
the use of the right to information in anti-corruption activism in Delhi; Puddephatt (2009) 
compares the India case with Bulgaria, Mexico, South Africa, and the United Kingdom and 
explores the role of civil society in formulating and adopting access to information laws. And 
Calland (2010), like Puddephatt (2009), highlights the role of civil society organisations like 
MKSS in creating legislation that has teeth. 
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While the relation between the right to information and the right to work 
(enforcement of minimum wages) is stated in existing studies, it is not systematically 
explored and is mostly focused on how the right to information emerged from concerns 
with the right to work.13 After also covering that initial connection in Chapter 3, in 
Chapter 5, I illuminate the return to the right to work after passage of the Right to 
Information Act in 2005. I show how activists were able to institutionalise important 
parts of the right to information into the NREGA legislation and have since then fought 
to implement it on the ground in Rajasthan, bringing the campaign full circle.14 A focus 
on this ongoing (albeit indeterminate) phase of the struggle advances our understanding 
about the interactions between social movements, law, and social change.  
This section of the dissertation builds on debates within the ‘law and society’ 
literature on the role of law in social change.15 The tussle or pulling of law in different 
directions over the implementation of NREGA social audits by gram sewaks, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In turn, writing about NREGA focuses on the political process that led to the passage of the 
national right to work law (Nayak, 2012; Khera, 2011; Chopra, 2010; Drèze and Khera, 2009), 
its implementation (Drèze and Oldiges, 2011, 2007), women’s participation in NREGA (Khera 
and Nayak, 2011; Sudarshan, Bhattacharya and Fernandez, 2010) as well as threats to NREGA 
activists (Vanaik, 2008; Shah, 2008). There are other studies that do not make an explicit 
connections with the right to information campaign, but assess the impact of the accountability 
mechanism of NREGA: social audits (Aiyar et al, 2011; Singh, 2010; Shankar, 2010; Gopal, 
2009; Afridi, 2008; Shah and Ambasta, 2007; Aakella and Kidambi, 2007a; 2007b), or the 
impact of local politics on implementation of NREGA (De Neve and Carswell, 2011; Vivek, 
2010). For an anthology of research studies on NREGA, commissioned by the Ministry of Rural 
Development see, Ministry of Rural Development (2012). 
14 See also, Chopra (2011: 155-165) for an analysis of the four domains: parliamentary, 
executive, party political and civil society that examines the specific role of different actors in 
state and society in the formulation and enactment of the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act. My focus however, is the transparency and accountability components of 
NREGA, or social audits, which I argue is modelled on the Jan sunwai that was developed 
during the struggle for right to information. 
15 Law and society scholars are divided on the impact of law on social change. Scholars such as 
Epp (2008, 1998), interested in social movements that use litigation strategies, emphasise the 
effectiveness of ‘judge-made law’ in influencing social change (see also Gauri and Brinks, 
2008). Critical legal studies scholars however, argue that litigation is not effective in 
establishing rights and guaranteeing social change (Scheingold, 2004: 5). On the other hand, the 
proponents of ‘rights without illusions’ (Hunt, 1993: 228) have actively countered the liberal 
‘myth of rights’ as put forward by scholars such as Schiengold (2004). And view rights and 
accompanying legal strategies as one of many movement strategies (McCann, 2004, 1994; 
Thompson, 1975; Hunt, 1993). 
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sarpanches, members of the legislative assembly (MLAs), and societal actors that I 
analyse resonates with a view of law as an ‘arena of struggle’ (Hunt, 1993: 236) or 
‘arena of conflict’ (Thompson, 1975: 245-269). Viewed in this way, actors in state and 
society negotiate with one another over the ‘construction, use, and experience’ of law 
(Houtzager, 2001). 16 This relationship between laws, social movements and social 
change, as Coglianese (2001) notes, is seldom ‘unidirectional.’ My analysis of this final 
phase of the right to information trajectory suggests that legal mobilisation strategies, 
whether they involve litigation or drafting legislation, are necessary components of 
promoting social change; however, they do not guarantee that legal change will 
generate that social change. Legal changes can shift the terrain of struggle, but they do 
not obviate the need for further struggle. 
The attempt to implement social audits of public works under NREGA, as I will 
show in Chapter 5, unleashed new struggles between those with an interest in “opening 
up” the state to broad public scrutiny and those whose interests lay in its restriction. The 
political battle over social audits involved multiple and contending interpretations of 
legislative guarantees. Different social actors interpreted the NREGA social audits 
according to their interests. For activists and villagers struggling to access work, the 
struggle over social audits was a part of a long-term process to counter the unrestrained 
power of village elites. The counter position, held by gram sewaks and sarpanches, was 
that NREGA social audits were undemocratic and “anti-panchayat”: in other words, 
they ran counter to the constitutional devolution of powers to local governments. These 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Cotterrell (2007: 61) also notes that law is influenced by a ‘long-term process of negotiation 
of attitudes and perceptions of interests. Irrespective of the indirect effects of laws in 
influencing social change (creating legal duties, providing an institutional framework, shaping 
social institutions that can influence change, etc.), the contestation over law—between 
upholders of law as well as those who stand to benefit most from it—further shapes the use and 
understanding of that law in different ways (Cotterrell, 2007).  
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two sets of actors strategically and opportunistically invoked provisions of NREGA, 
which they interpreted to suit their interests in either advancing or restricting the scope 
of the social audits.  
So while successful national-level advocacy resulted in the creation of legal and 
institutional platforms for opening up the state (such as the RTI Act and social audits in 
NREGA), the lower bureaucracy has tried to block this opening.  In emphasising the 
barriers that the lower bureaucracy posed to the struggle to open up the state in 
Rajasthan, I am not necessarily arguing that the local state is more corrupt in 
comparison to the higher levels of the state in India. More importantly, I highlight the 
nature of a recalcitrant lower bureaucracy to reveal the contentious relations, not only 
between state and society, but also between the different levels of the state (Migdal 
2001: 122). Thus, Chapter 5 shows how MKSS’s return to the local level to 
institutionalise national legislative gains has encountered strong resistance from the 
lower bureaucracy in Rajasthan, forcing it once again to look for new strategies and 
levers to overcome this obstacle. It is the nature of the Indian state—fragmented among 
its branches and scales, and also containing supportive and recalcitrant individuals—
that shapes this shifting of scales and oscillation between engagement and resistance. 
 
EXAMINING PERSPECTIVES ON THE STATE IN INDIA  
The trajectory of the right to information, as this study argues, has been shaped 
in contradictory ways by different levels of the Indian state. We must ask, then: what do 
we understand by ‘the State?’ Weberian and Marxist scholars alike have tended to view 
the Indian state as a unitary structure or and ideological project (Kohli, 1987, 1990a, 
1990b; Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987; Vanaik, 1990; Chatterjee, 1998; Kaviraj, 1991; 
Bardhan, 1984, 1989; see also Evans, Rueschemeyers and Skocpol, 1985; Mitchell, 
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1999; Abrams, 1988). The consequence is that they fail to recognise the significance of 
looking at different levels of the state when assessing its relationship to, and degree of 
“autonomy” from, society (Migdal, 1994, 2001). Anthropological studies of the Indian 
state (Fuller and Harriss, 2000; Gupta, 1995; Jeffrey, 2000; Robbins, 2000; Parry, 2000; 
Oldenburg, 2006; Corbridge et al, 2005; Webb, 2011), meanwhile, have critiqued such 
approaches and turned their attention to the everyday experience of corruption at the 
local level.  
This study consequently builds on two different approaches to the Indian state 
that recognise this fragmentation and complexity. The first is that of Joel Migdal (1994: 
15, 2001: 116-123), who aims to disaggregate the state by speaking of an ‘anthropology 
of the state.’17 The second is that of Fuller and Harris (2000), who call for further 
analysis of the ‘everyday state,’ thus focusing attention on what the state ‘variously 
means’ and ‘does’ for ordinary people in India.  
The trajectory of the campaign for the right to information and work helps to 
illuminate the inner-working—competing rationales, logics, and set of practices—of 
different levels of the Indian state. In a similar vein as Migdal, I call attention to a 
disaggregated view of the state, which rejects deterministic assumptions such as that 
there exists a ‘smooth interlocking relation’ (Migdal, 2001: 16) between different parts 
of the state. I will illustrate, rather, how the absence of a “smooth interlocking relation” 
between different parts of the state helps to explain social movement activism that seeks 
to transform it. And how it is the very tensions and differences between various parts of 
the Indian state that have most profoundly influenced the trajectory of the right to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For Migdal (2001:116) a differentiation between different parts of the state seeks to draw 
focus away from top echelons of the state, and the ‘all-pervading will’ of state elites to explain 
state activities or conduct. As Migdal (1994, 2001) observes, each of these different levels of 
the state performs different functions, they interact and conflict with each other, and with other 
social forces. Thus, the state embodies an ‘on-going dynamic of changing set of aims, as it 
engages social forces’ (2001: 112).  
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information. I argue, consequently, that in contrast to the view of a unitary state where 
all power and authority flows from a central core (Migdal 1994, 2001), we have to view 
different levels of the state as potentially in contradiction with each other; and that this 
contradiction creates opportunities for social movements.18   
 In this study, as noted earlier, I differentiate between the bureaucratic and 
political state. By the political state I mean elected representatives of the Parliament, 
state legislators, elected members of the zilla parishad (district councils), and the 
panchayats (village based local bodies) as well as the roles of political parties. Within 
the bureaucratic state, I differentiate between the elite civil services, or the Indian 
Administrative Service (IAS), the middle level bureaucrats, and the karmacharis, or 
personnel that constitute the lower level bureaucracy. Pedersen (1992: 620) notes that 
many accept ‘the strength, independence and self-serving nature of Indian bureaucracy 
that places it on par, if not above, the propertied classes in the private sector.’ However, 
I argue that there are two sharply contrasting faces of the Indian bureaucratic state. At 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This is in contrast to Weberian, Marxist and modernisation theorists that view the Indian state 
as unitary. Focused on the elite bureaucracy and political parties, as if they alone are the state, 
modernisation theorists were preoccupied with, and sceptical about India’s ability for achieving 
economic and social change. For example, scholars such as Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) and 
Kohli (1990a, 1990b, 1987) in their attempts to assess the state’s autonomy and responsiveness 
conclude that the post-independent Indian state ‘failed’ to pursue the twin tasks of being 
responsive to its citizens and achieving socio-economic development. This inability to 
accommodate the demands of fragmented societal forces ‘weakened the capacity of the state’ 
(Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987) and over the years led to a ‘crisis of governability’ (Kohli 1990a) 
that, made the Indian state ‘incapable’ of directing economic development as it tried to 
accommodate the various societal demands. On the other hand Marxists such as, Chatterjee 
(1998), Kaviraj (1991), Vanaik (1990) and Bardhan (1984, 1989) view the Indian state as an 
‘instrument’ of the dominant classes—typically industrial capitalists, large farmers, the elite 
bureaucracy, though now also the Indian middle classes. This view of the state implies a 
collusion of interests between top political leadership, the bureaucratic apparatus and the 
existing social order that is embedded in structural inequalities of caste, gender and status or 
class. Thus, the post-independence years were characterised by what Manor calls the ‘politics of 
accommodation’ (1990) that failed to meet the commitment for social justice and redistribution. 
In short, whether scholars chose institutions or class as their explanatory variables, ‘the State’ is 
either a unitary structure or a fixed ideological entity. These views, however, are silent on the 
significance of looking at different parts of the state as disaggregates. The suggestion of some of 
these scholars is that, from the top to the bottom, the will of the leaders is ‘recreated faithfully’ 
(Migdal, 2001: 115; see also Brass, 2006). 
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the top of the bureaucratic state sits the elite Indian Administrative Service, a small but 
influential part of the public bureaucracy at the national level, and constituted by the 
highest officials (District Collectors) at the district level. Each Indian state has its own 
state level administrative services, which are the mirror image of the IAS though not 
equivalent in status, rank, or privileges. These high status national IAS officers and state 
level civil servants are the decision-making authorities in core departments and 
ministries at the national and state levels.  
Historians such as B.B. Misra (1977) have traced the evolution of the 
administrative culture in India to the image of the British-run Indian Civil Services. 
Under British rule, the middle class base that formed the All India Specialised Service 
was envisaged as source of ‘political security,’ an ‘instrument of infrastructural social 
change’ that acted as a ‘counterforce to the status-bound aristocracy’ (Misra, 1977: 310-
317). Others, like Joshi (2001), trace the middle class base of the Indian bureaucracy to 
a ‘colonial public sphere,’ where educated men and later women discussed and debated 
issues related to ‘education and social reform’ (Joshi, 2001: 30).19 After Independence, 
the IAS became synonymous with ‘career service immune from political commitment 
and known for intellectual achievement and total security’ (Misra, 1977: 385).  
The post-1947 bureaucracy, on the one hand, tried to shelter itself from politics 
and, in the process, became largely status driven, self-serving, and less accessible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The bureaucracy in India expanded under the British during the colonial period with the rise 
of a new social class, the Indian middle classes. The members of this new class, in north India, 
came from families that were financially well to do, however not rich enough to not work, well 
respected but did not have influence in arenas of politics and economy similar to the ‘hereditary 
landlords and indigenous aristocracy’. They belonged to the upper-caste Hindus (Kayasthas, 
Brahmins, Khatris or Banias) or highborn Muslims (Ashraf) (Joshi, 2001: 7). However, these 
men and women did not limit themselves to forming civil associations and used their ‘new 
education’ to ‘improve the lives of the less privileged caste’ and for the ‘moral upliftment’ of 
India (Joshi, 2001: 29). This colonial public sphere was the ‘site of class formation for middle 
classes’ in north India, however, unlike the Habermasian public sphere (1998 [1989]), this 
colonial public sphere in north India drew the support of some state institutions that seemingly 
promoted ‘the idea of a public-ness’ (Joshi, 2001: 18: 31). 
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(Potter, 1996). However, between the 1960s and 1980s the bureaucracy in independent 
India became significantly politicised, especially in the years following the 
“deinstitutionalisation” of the Congress Party (Kohli, 1990a; Rudolph and Rudolph, 
1987), and the Emergency during which the political state increasingly intervened into 
the bureaucratic arena. Over the years, then, public officials became less able to 
circumvent the interference of political elites in day-to-day government functioning. 
While IAS officials often submitted to political demands (as they continue to do so 
today) in order to advance individual careers,20 a few others attempted to change the 
system from within by asserting their autonomy from political elites.21 Only a rare few 
ever leave the elite IAS service to push for change from the outside. Nevertheless, as 
Chapter 4’s analysis of the National Campaign for People’s Right to Information 
illustrates, the IAS does still contain some islands of public minded bureaucrats who 
can occasionally serve as allies for social movements. Through their pragmatic 
activism, social movements have evolved a view of the state that consequentially 
distinguishes not only between different levels of government, but between sympathetic 
and recalcitrant individuals and sections within levels. Scholars can profit from this 
analysis. 
 When we shift focus away from national and state ministries and departments in 
the capital cities, we encounter the local state. The middle and lower bureaucrats, or 
karamcharis, are the other face of the Indian bureaucratic state. At these levels of the 
state we find a mix of permanent as well as contract-based employees such as technical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 For discussions on the constraints to bureaucratic integrity see, The Special Issue on 
Contemporary Administrative Culture in India. The Indian Journal of Public Administration 
Vol. XXXVI, No. 3 July-September 1990. 
21 Such officials are either reprimanded for not following the political line or at times 
punished—that is, they are transferred or suspended. The recent suspension of a woman IAS 
officer from the state of Uttar Pradesh is a case in mind, who was suspended for taking action 
against illegal sand mining within her jurisdiction (Khan, 2013). 
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assistants, junior engineers, clerks, panchayat secretaries, postmen, and patwaris (land 
record keeper), who are in charge of implementing government policies and who are 
deeply embedded in political processes at the local level. In its everyday form, the local 
state is less rule-bound, more embedded in society than the elite IAS and prone to 
subverting intentions of higher levels of the state (Fuller and Harriss, 2000; Kaviraj, 
1991; Gupta, 1995). In a stratified society like India’s, inequalities of caste, gender, and 
class are compounded by the power that lower level officials and panchayat 
functionaries, including elected representatives or sarpanches, exercise over the bulk of 
the population that does not have privileged access to the system. This fact is 
highlighted ethnographically in Chapter 5, where these lower level bureaucrats attempt 
to appropriate power from the very state-mandated social audits that were intended to 
curb their power. 
Recent anthropological interventions explain this subversion of power by the 
local state by writing about its practices of corruption. For instance, apart from their 
obvious functions as implementers of various government programmes and services, 
Oldenburg (2006: 186) notes, these karamcharis at the block and panchayat level are 
also ‘gatekeepers’ who demand bribes and act as ‘intermediaries’ between citizens and 
administrative bosses (see also Reddy and Hargopal, 1985). Local level officials, Gupta 
(1995: 384) explains, ‘blur the boundaries’ between state and society when they 
‘collapse the distinction between their role and styles of operation as ‘public servants’ 
as opposed to ‘private citizens.’  Thus, as Kaviraj (1991: 91) rightly points out, the idea 
that the Indian state or its massive public bureaucracy corresponds even moderately 
well with the Weberian rationality (Evans 1995) is ‘wrong,’ since many policies and 
programmes of the Indian state are implemented by a lower bureaucracy and, at this 
level, are ‘reinterpreted beyond recognition’.  In fact, the anthropological and 
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ethnographic studies that focus on the state in India as seen from below, tell us that 
different parts of the state in India have different social constitutions that do not 
conform to the standardised, predictable, calculable rules of Weberian rationality when 
executing government functions.22 
 By focusing on the state agencies and personnel below the central and state levels, 
ethnographies of the ‘everyday state’ tell us about the impact of its practices—that is, its 
institutions, personnel, policies and programmes—on the lives of people and about the 
interaction of citizens, demanding the state meet their basic needs, with the people in 
positions of authority (Fuller and Harriss, 2000).23 In an implicit contrast to the Marxist, 
Weberian, and Modernisation views of the Indian state that look at the state as unitary— 
Weberians and modernisation theorists are concerned about it being autonomous 
enough to direct national development (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987; Kohli, 1990a, 
1990b, 1987) and Marxists assess the degree to which it is captured by different classes 
(Vanaik, 1990; Kaviraj, 1991; Chatterjee, 1998; Bardhan, 1984, 1989)—the ‘everyday 
state’ literature argues that there is a disjuncture between the national state and the 
‘everyday state’. In particular, the studies on corruption (Wade, 1982; Gupta, 1995; 
Fuller and Harriss, 2000; Jeffrey, 2000; Robbins, 2000; Parry, 2000; Oldenburg, 2006), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22See also Kaviraj (1991: 85) who notes, the colonial period saw a ‘discursive division’ in 
Indian society between those ‘who made the world they inhabited intelligible via modernist 
discourse and those who did not. This division ran decisively between the Indian elite and the 
lower orders.’  After independence, ‘by overstretching, the state has been forced to recruit 
personnel from groups that speak and interpret the world in terms of the other discourse’ (1991: 
91). 
23 For example Jeffrey’s (2000) ethnography shows how the agrarian elite (specifically the 
upper caste Yadavs) in Uttar Pradesh access the state police force by placing relatives in it. Also 
in Uttar Pradesh, Oldenburg (2006) tells us, it is common to mobilise high-end politicians and 
‘invest’ (bribe) thousands of rupees in order to secure the ‘prestigious’ job of a village 
postmaster. Parry (2000), in his ethnography of the Bhilai Steel Plant examines ‘low level 
routine corruption or everyday experience’ through the role of dalals (brokers)23 in securing 
public sector jobs. Corbridge et al (2005: 20, 21) focus on how differently poor people, 
differently see the state in India, and tell us about the ‘multiple sites of poor-state encounter’ to 
better understand what it means to encounter or see ‘the state’ in India.  
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local governance and ‘governmentality’ (Corbridge et al, 2005), the ‘shadow state’ or 
networks between the bureaucracy and local agents in the informal economy (Harriss-
White, 2003), local state practices in cities (Manor, 1993; Tarlo, 2000, 2003), and 
government functioning and right to information activism in Delhi (Pande, 2008; Webb, 
2011) illustrate a common feature of the local Indian state: it is a site of dispute and 
competition (Fuller and Harriss, 2000), where much depends on people’s uneven 
abilities to manipulate the political and bureaucratic system to their advantage. They tell 
us how different classes of citizens penetrate the different layers of the state and create 
opportunities for some citizens to access the state (Fuller and Harriss, 2000). This 
literature, then, is a point of departure for this study. While these anthropological 
studies elucidate how the (corrupt) practices of state agencies and their personnel 
impede the daily lives of poor Indians, this literature does not examine the implications 
of state fragmentation for attempts to transform the state. This study, thus tries to add 
another perspective of the ‘everyday state’; that of social movements trying to change it.  
 
 
SEEING THE STATE LIKE A SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
 
 In the pragmatic effort of activists to transform the state, the various phases of the 
right to information and work campaigns illustrate a differentially embedded state—that 
is, one that is differentially autonomous from societal actors at different political 
conjunctures, across levels, and even within levels. This provides a somewhat more 
dynamic and complex view of the state than the simple bifurcation between a relatively 
‘Weberian’ state and an everyday one. Each chapter will illuminate how different parts 
of the Indian state created different kinds of challenges and opportunities for the 
grassroots activists trying to transform its functioning. 
 In Chapter 3, we will begin at the local level, where organising around the 
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concrete livelihood issue of access to work led activists and villagers to raise basic 
governance issues such as the misappropriation of panchayat funds and, ultimately, to 
the demand for a right to information. Naturally, the local bureaucracy counter-
mobilised against the Jan sunwais to protect its interests and the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(or BJP) state government remained ambivalent to demands of activists and villagers to 
confront corruption in the implementation of rural public works. However, in its 
attempts to appease rural voters in an election year, the political leadership in Rajasthan 
agreed to disclose panchayat records. Even though the different parts of the state in 
Rajasthan produced contrasting responses, these responses do not suggest that one part 
of the state was more collaborative than the other. Indeed, the Rajasthan government 
agreed to grant access to panchayat records because it wanted to stall Jan sunwais. The 
more or less recalcitrant responses from the different parts of the state in Rajasthan, as I 
will show, became rallying points for activists and laid the foundation for a demand for 
national law guaranteeing citizens right to information. This indicates that challenges to 
mundane or everyday power relations will meet resistance, compelling groups of poor 
to engage higher levels in order to pressure local, and even state government actors into 
compliance; hence the need to engage higher levels of the state.24 However, the logic is 
not unidirectional—as we will see in Chapter 5, there are also occasions when activists 
are blocked at higher levels and must return to grassroots struggles at the local level. 
The primary goal of NCPRI/MKSS activists was parliamentary intervention for 
a national law, which, in part, was influenced by the difficulties in engaging the BJP 
state government to enact a state right to information law. Therefore, activists engaged 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Additionally, in India’s federal system, where many social policies are centrally funded, and 
implemented by state governments, access to higher-levels of the state is useful to the extent 
that the dynamics of federalism can be used to exert pressure from the Central government on 
State governments. Further, activists must engage the state at the national level for legislative 
interventions in areas that do not fall within the domain of state governments, such as 
government transparency. 
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higher levels of the bureaucratic cadre and the political leadership at the national-level 
to build legitimacy for a national right to information law. The apex state, at the national 
or central-level is, in many ways, relatively coherent and has the high-level civil service 
and parliamentarians. This does not mean, however, that they are supportive of change. 
But it does somewhat increase the chance that activists will find sympathetic allies 
there. The campaign for the RTI relied strongly on such sympathetic elites (inside 
government or connected to it by various forms of capital) to institutionalise changes in 
law. These elite social segments are, however, more or less supportive—and more or 
less able to exercise their influence—at different political conjunctures. In Chapter 4, 
we will see that, MKSS/NCPRI activists reached out to sympathetic bureaucrats over its 
decade long campaign, and they were successful in passing legislation only after the 
Congress Party came to power. Within this relatively more sympathetic political 
context, eminent activists were able to infiltrate parts of the bureaucratic, and political 
state and build legitimacy for the RTI Act. Some of the eminent activists attached to 
people’s movements/campaigns were invited to advise the national government on 
social policies. Strong political support for societal demands, then, provided the 
Congress party led United Progressive Alliance with the much needed public relations 
boost for its election promises. And enlisting political support at the top allowed NCPRI 
activists to use the political arm of the state to counter the opposition from the 
bureaucratic arm. The enactment of the right to information law was thus aided by the 
political conjuncture of the 2004 General Elections, which made the upper levels of the 
political state an effective counterweight to bureaucratic recalcitrance. 
With the RTI Act passed, MKSS and NCPRI activists managed to 
institutionalise parts of the right to information into the new right to work legislation or 
NREGA: the social audit.  With RTI and NREGA passed, the public audit model in 
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Rajasthan was put to the test. How effective was the independently developed audit 
model in reducing corruption and making NREGA work? Could that kind of 
transparency be institutionalised? In Chapter 5, we will see, government-directed social 
audits did not quite work and MKSS had to return to autonomous ‘public audits’ of the 
Jan sunwai variety. This, however, created a powerful and reactive backlash by the 
local level officials that caught the state government and activists off guard. It forced 
activists to redirect their attention at the state government to stop it from succumbing to 
the opposition of reactionary sarpanches. This time, it became more difficult for the 
state government in Rajasthan to pressure local level actors as the balance of power on 
the ground had shifted. This struggle over NREGA public audits in Rajasthan is as yet 
indeterminate. But by analysing its dynamic, we can further see the iterative movement 
across levels and between resistance and engagement that the nature of the Indian state 
forces upon its would-be transformers.  
This dissertation suggests that the way social movements “see” the state is 
somewhat more complex than the dichotomy between the view of the state as a singular 
entity by Weberians and Marxist scholars, and the bifurcated state posited by the 
everyday state literature. In other words, movements have evolved a view of the state 
through their opportunistic attempts to transform it (they see the state 
opportunistically)—they find opportunities in different arms of the state at different 
times, across levels, divides, and even individuals. While generally they move higher to 
find leverage to overcome local blockages (consistent with the everyday state’s view of 
the local state as less Weberian and socially embedded), there is a constant oscillation 
across scales and also across the bureaucratic and political state. Higher levels are often 
used to pressure lower levels, but they are not always supportive—this also changes 
with the balance of political forces at different conjunctures. But activists are always 
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reading these conjunctures, looking for sympathetic levers in the state (across its 
different levels), and they leverage parts of the state against each other. By its practice, 
then, the Campaign for rights to information and work illustrates a less than coherent 
state whose incoherence provides opportunities for advancing its goals. Moreover, even 
once progress has been achieved nationally through legislation, activists still must 
return to the local and instantiate those gains over local resistance.  
In the following chapters I delve into the iterative and multi-scaled interactions 
between actors in state and in society that lies behind the trajectory of the rights to 
information and work. This is an effort to build our understanding of how groups of 
poor people resist and engage the state to make it work for them. In the conclusion, I 
draw out the implications of this trajectory of the rights to information and work for our 
understanding of social movement activism more generally. 
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Chapter 3. Jan Sunwai in Rajasthan 
 
This chapter conducts an analysis of the Jan sunwai, or “public hearings,” 
developed by MKSS in rural Rajasthan in 1994. A Jan sunwai is a public forum in 
which villagers ask questions and seek clarifications regarding the implementation of a 
range of rural development and welfare schemes from panchayat officials, such as the 
elected head of a village, or sarpanch, and the secretary, or gram sewak. For instance, in 
a Jan sunwai, activists/arbiters read aloud government information contained in 
construction muster rolls (labourer lists), measurement books, and invoices for 
construction materials, and workers testify to their accuracy. In the previous chapters I 
have introduced a distinction between MKSS’s state-resisting and state engaging 
strategies, the Jan sunwai as I will show was a resistance strategy to confront the local 
state and collectively interrogate its words and actions. In this chapter, I will present a 
history of the Jan sunwai, explain how it functioned as an “alternative public sphere” 
that allowed ordinary villagers to hold the local state accountable, and explain its place 
within the larger trajectory of MKSS’s activism.  
This chapter draws on archival and interview-based research on Jan sunwais that 
MKSS organised in villages across four districts of central Rajasthan between 1994-
2002. The subject of these Jan sunwais included employment relief, land, health, and 
the public distribution system (PDS). Through interviews conducted with villagers and 
MKSS activists I present a vignette of the first Jan sunwai held in KotKirana panchayat 
(Pali district) in December 1994. In KotKirana MKSS activists, with the help of a 
sympathetic IAS official, first laid hands on government records. Five years after 
struggling for the enforcement of minimum wages, activists found an issue—the right to 
information—around which to agitate and mobilise villagers, which also had the 
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potential to attract the interest (and support) of all classes of citizens (MKSS, 1996). 
The initial experimental phase began in 1994 with MKSS organising five Jan sunwais 
within a radius of fifty kilometres across four districts of central Rajasthan (Pali, 
Rajsamand, Ajmer, and Bhilwara). Of these initial five Jan sunwais, the first four were 
organised within one month (December 1994) and the fifth one was organised 
immediately before the panchayat election in January 1995.25  
After presenting this history of the Jan sunwai, I turn to a fine-grained 
examination of its structure and then theorise its role as an “alternative public sphere” 
that became the initial step in the campaign for the right to information.  
 
ENFORCING MINIMUM WAGE: THE INITIAL STRUGGLE IN RAJASTHAN 
The Jan sunwai emerged as a response to systematic corruption and under-
payment of wages in government-sponsored drought relief schemes in Rajasthan. Under 
these rural public work programmes, the state provides employment relief during 
periods of drought. These schemes typically fall under the category of ‘rural 
development’ that Oldenburg (2006: 185) calls the ‘mixed bag of state government 
administration and central government programmes.’ The desert state of Rajasthan 
suffers from famine more frequently than other states in India. Thus, it has a long 
history of organising massive public work programmes. Famine relief policies date back 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25Simultaneously, in order to use the momentum created by the initial Jan sunwais, MKSS also 
organised three public meetings to: galvanise support from intellectuals, middle class citizens, 
and to build a broader campaign on the emerging demand for a right to information at the state-
level. These meetings were held at the block head quarter Bhim (Rajsamand district), and the 
state capital Jaipur and in Udaipur city. 
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to British rule during which a range of ‘public works’ were carried out to mitigate the 
effects of drought and famine.26  
Initially, the department of public works in each state, during famine years, 
started relief schemes that involved road construction, earthwork, and repair work on 
village wells and ponds to collect rainwater.27 Although these relief schemes are 
centrally sponsored, the discretion of the lower level state officials, like the gram sewak 
(panchayat secretary), junior engineer, and the elected sarpanch (village head), 
influence the availability and access to employment relief and the amount of wages.28 In 
the late 1980s when MKSS began work in Rajsamand district in central Rajasthan, 
ghost (fake) workers and works—through which sarpanches, gram sewaks, and block 
level officials siphon public funds—were a common occurrence in the implementation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26For example, for a discussion of chief measures of famine relief in ancient India see, Maloo 
(1987); and for a discussion of the chief measures of relief used by the British see, Tucker 
(1900). 
27In the early 1970s semi-pucca (permanent) works like canals and check dams were also 
included. In 1977, under the Fifth-Five Year Plan (1974-1979), Food for Works Programme 
was introduced at the panchayat level in order to meet the need for work of the rural poor, 
particularly in slack and empty periods (Government of India, 1974). According to Jayal (1994), 
since the early 1980s the central government has made repeated attempts at poverty alleviation 
via a number of social welfare schemes and programmes. These welfare schemes and 
programmes, she argues (1994: 20, 21), are part of its interventionist response to provide 
minimum basic needs and not necessarily to enhance or maximise welfare. The Government of 
India also introduced, starting with the Sixth and Seventh Five Year Plans, wage employment 
through two programs: National Rural Employment Program (NREP) and Rural-Landless 
Employee Guarantee Program (RLEGP) in its efforts to alleviate rural poverty (Government of 
India, 1979, 1983). Relief works were incorporated into the Government of India sponsored 
rural work programmes for drought prone areas as a permanent solution to the problem of 
scarcity (Kachhawala, 1992). Since the early 1980s in Rajasthan, corruption in public work 
programmes was usually manifested in the denial of payment of minimum wages and 
misappropriation of public funds by the lower bureaucracy. 
28There is a fixed legal minimum wage for unskilled manual labour, which varies across states. 
All wages for unskilled work under public works programmes in Rajasthan are calculated on a 
time rate, that is eight hours work per day (there is also a piece rate that is made on the basis of 
the total task allotted).  However in Rajasthan despite the upward trend in payments, minimum 
wages continue to be seen as maximum wages. Complaints of non-payment of full wages or 
delayed payments and harassment of workers were common as far back as 1939, the year of one 
of the worst famines, ‘chhapania kal’ (the great famine) (Kachhawala, 1992). ‘Leakages’ or 
‘diversion’ of drought relief (funds), as Jodha (1975: 1611) also notes, is one of the most 
common ‘uses’ of drought relief in Rajasthan and is not only well recognised but also 
considered ‘unavoidable.’ 
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of drought relief schemes in Rajasthan (as in other parts of the rural countryside in 
India).29 It consequently became one of the first issues that the MKSS took up. 
 
The Harmada Andolan (movement) 
The three core activists who later went on to form MKSS got involved in the 
early struggle for the enforcement of minimum wages while working at the Social Work 
Research Centre (SWRC) located in Tilonia village, close to Harmada village (Ajmer 
district). The Harmada andolan (movement) began when a Dalit woman, Naurti Bai 
and a worksite supervisor (mate) opportunistically saw and took possession of labour 
lists (muster rolls) and refused to return them until workers were paid their full wages.30 
In 1981, as workers refused to take less than the minimum wage, and Naurti Bai refused 
to part with the muster roll, the Social Work Research Centre (SWRC), based in nearby 
Tilonia, supported her struggle. SWRC members provided moral support and strength 
of numbers, pre-empting physical assaults or threats on Naurti Bai.  
Villagers from Harmada, despite protesting, were eventually compelled to take 
below minimum wages. Later however, the muster roll from Harmada was used as 
evidence in a Public Interest Litigation (PIL), which was filed in the name of the 
Director of SWRC.31  The decision on the PIL came two years after the Harmada 
andolan began and held that denial of minimum wages under drought relief was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29Chunni Singh, MKSS activist, interview with author. Phaluna, Rajasthan. 26.12.09. 
30Ram Karan, member SWRC and SR Abhiyan, interview with author. Tilonia, Rajasthan. 
06.04.10. 
For a discussion of the role of the Harmada andolan in the women’s movement in Rajasthan 
see, Jeitrli (2006). 
31In the mid 1970’s an activist judiciary, introduced the Public Interest Litigation (PIL) as a way 
for marginalised groups to access the judiciary. In the early 1980’s every day several cases to 
secure the proper wages were being brought to the courts for litigation (Joshi 2007; see also 
Joshi and Moore 2000). 
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equivalent to state sanctioned ‘forced labour’.32 This legal victory was an early lesson in 
the power of obtaining control over official records, and it pointed towards the 
importance of taking the struggle over the heads of corrupt local (panchayat) officials. 
 
The Formation of a Collective 
 Nine years after the Harmada andolan, the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan 
(Workers and Peasant Power Collective) was formed in 1990. For a farmer and workers 
collective, it was only natural that the group took up the issues of enforcement of 
minimum wages and access to village commons.33 In other districts of central 
Rajasthan, like in Harmada, smaller struggles were being waged on a personal scale. 
Local peasants and farmers working on drought relief were demanding full wages on 
drought relief works. However, in these confrontations with sarpanches and gram 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32After Harmada, the Director of SWRC and other MKSS activists had written to a senior judge 
and architect of the Public Interest Litigation (PIL), Justice P.N. Bhagwati. Justice Bhagwati 
sent a lawyer to inquire into the matter, who returned to Delhi with copies of the labour list. 
With the lists as evidence, a PIL was filed in the Supreme Court. In a historic decision two years 
later the Supreme Court ruled, ‘no person shall be required or permitted to provide labour or 
service to another on payment of anything less than the minimum wage and if…minimum wage 
may not be paid to a workman employed in any famine relief work, it would be clearly violative 
of Article 23 of the Constitution’ [of India]. As Drèze and Oldiges (2007) note, ‘it is in the 
context of relief works in Rajasthan that the Supreme Court delivered a landmark judgment 
stating that employing labourers without paying the minimum wage is “forced labour” insofar 
as it amounts to ‘[taking] advantage of the helpless condition of the affected persons’ (Sanjit 
Roy vs. State of Rajasthan 1983, SCC (1) 525) more than 20 years after this indictment, the 
problem persists.’ 
33Between 1987-1990, Aruna Roy, Nikhil Dey, and Shankar Singh, who moved to Devdungri 
village together with a local farmer, Lal Singh, from Sohangarh village, undertook a successful 
struggle against a local upper-caste landlord in his village. The struggle resulted in the village 
commons being transferred to a women’s cooperative that was charged with monitoring the use 
of the commons for collective grazing and gathering of forest produce. The defining moment of 
the struggle was the physical violence by the upper caste landlord and his aides on two MKSS 
activists in order to prevent the cooperative from being set up. To protest the violence, the entire 
village marched to the block office and organised a daylong sit-in demanding a police complaint 
to be lodged against the violent beating of two MKSS activists. Lal Singh, MKSS activist, 
interview with author. Sohangarh, Rajasthan. 17.03.10; Mohini Bai and Bhanwar Singh, 
interview with author. Sohangarh, Rajasthan. 16.3.10; see also Kidambi (2008); Sampat and 
Dey (2005). Soon after, on 1st May (Labour Day), MKSS was formed. A Mazdoor mela 
(Workers fair) in Bhim block of Rajsamand district is organised annually on May 1st to mark the 
anniversary of MKSS and to reflect on its struggles, celebrate victories, and discuss the way 
forward; see also Gill (2010). 
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sewaks, these local actors were typically alone and, more importantly, lacked 
information to reasonably argue why underpayment of wages was unjust and arbitrary.  
As I was told by a local farmer and MKSS activists from Phaluna village 
(Jawaja panchayat), ‘we all knew the sarpanch put his family members on the muster 
roll; they never came to work, but got full wages. On the other hand, we were not sure 
how much [wages] we were entitled to [receive]’.34 As another MKSS activist and 
resident of Surajpura village, told me, ‘[the] majority [of] workers had not seen muster 
rolls until 1992.’35 Workers were thus forced to take what was handed to them, which 
was sometimes nothing. False assurances from the gram sewak or sarpanch and local 
state officials, in the absence of adequate and appropriate information, gave them little 
to work with.  
 To their pleasant surprise, however, activists did occasionally encounter what they 
explain as ‘anti-establishment’ sentiments amongst the residents of the Rajsamand, 
Ajmer, Pali and parts of Bhilwara districts (the Mangra region).36 As Shankar Singh, 
founder member of MKSS, said to me, ‘before we sat on our first hunger strike for 
minimum wages, Chunni Singh (another founder member of MKSS) and I, along with 
two hundred men and women from Bhim block, gave a spur-of-the-moment dharna 
(sit-in) outside the office of the sub-divisional magistrate in Bhim. The dharna was a 
response to the SDM’s sly tactics to abandon his office and ignore the villagers who had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34Chunni Singh, MKSS activist, interview with author. Phaluna, Rajasthan. 26.12.09. 
35Author field notes, Jawaja, Rajasthan. 30.12.09. 
36The Mangra region was never under the control of princely Rajputs or upper caste thakurs. 
The social bandits, largely from the intermediate caste (Rawats), lived in the Mangra hills. They 
pillaged goods that were transported through the area that connected Mewar (Bhilwara, 
Udaipur) and Marwar (Jodhpur) regions. When the British arrived in Rajasthan, this region was 
given to them, and they set up an army cantonment in Todgarh, named after the British officer 
Colonel Tod. The British army recruited several villagers into its army from the region. 
However, the history of social banditry also led several people in the region to resist the British. 
Thus, the anti-establishment sentiment over the years survived and occasionally MKSS got a 
glimpse of this tendency. Shankar Singh, MKSS activist, interview with author. Jaipur, 
Rajasthan. 03.07.2012. 
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gathered at his office to demand their wages. We were surprised and enthused by the 
way women prevented the clerk from closing the SDM’s office by sitting down in the 
middle of the doorway. They demanded to be heard. We eventually camped out at the 
SDM’s office for the night, and the next day workers got their wages. We were 
encouraged by the experience and became hopeful about organising villagers on the 
issue of minimum wages.’ 
 In Rajsamand district in central Rajasthan where MKSS is based, the struggle for 
enforcement of minimum wages finally gathered momentum when a dalit couple from 
the nearby Tadai village refused to take anything less than the minimum wage.37 As 
Aruna Roy, founder member of MKSS, said to me, ‘for us [MKSS] it was reapplying 
what we had learnt about minimum wages in Harmada,’ and MKSS took up the issue 
with relative ease.38 At the Dadi Rapat worksite, MKSS activists tried to convince 
approximately 100 workers who were building a levee to complete the full task allotted 
to them, assuring them that they would receive their full wages. Approximately 60 
villagers agreed to the task. The rest were pessimistic that their full wages would be 
paid; they were certain about receiving the same wages irrespective of completing their 
work.  
 The mate or worksite supervisor tried to play the two groups of villagers against 
each other. On one hand, villagers that did not agree to the activists’ suggestion—to 
complete their tasks—received more wages (Rs. 9.50) (less than half dollar per day), 
even though they had done less work. This was, in any case, less than the legal 
minimum wages (Rs.11 for Rajasthan).  On the other, villagers who completed their 
work and refused to take less than the minimum wage were paid even less (Rs. 7) than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37Mohan Ba, MKSS activist, interview with author. Tadai, Rajasthan. 16.03.10; Chunni Bai, 
MKSS activists, interview with author. Tadai, Rajasthan. 16.03.10. 
38Aruna Roy, MKSS activist, interview with author. Tilonia, Rajasthan. 17.10.09. 
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the other villagers. Along with several women and men who worked on the Dadi Rapat 
worksite, MKSS chose a familiar mode of struggle to protest this arbitrary system of 
payment of minimum wages. 
 
Civil Disobedience for Minimum Wages 
MKSS and villagers from Rajsamand district now entered struggle mode. Two 
hunger strikes, one in 1990 and another in 1991 became turning points in the struggle 
for the enforcement of minimum wages. The interdependence of the rights to 
information and work also became apparent with the response of the state to the hunger 
strikes. MKSS had learnt about the relevance of official information from the struggle 
in Harmada. The state government’s response (or lack thereof) to the hunger strikes 
sharpened the need for a new approach to advance the struggle for enforcing minimum 
wages; access to information became integral to the struggle.  
Drawing on their existing repertoire of non-violent civil disobedience, MKSS 
activists organised the first of its two hunger strikes outside of the sub-divisional office 
in Bhim (Rajsamand district) in 1990. The second one would be organised a year later 
in 1991 along with villagers from Brar panchayat (Rajsamand district). Through the 
hunger strikes, workers and activists sought to target the lowest level of the state, the 
panchayat staff, by exerting pressure on them via higher levels of the state apparatus, 
namely the block and state administration. During the first hunger strike, however, 
neither the villagers nor MKSS had the political leverage or the strength of numbers to 
grab the attention of the higher levels of the state and were ignored. The first hunger 
strike in 1990 did not produce concrete results and ended with false assurances from the 
block office.  
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The second hunger strike, however, became a critical turning point for MKSS. 
Representatives from five districts of central Rajasthan in 1991 went on a second 
hunger strike in support of eleven workers from Brar panchayat (Rajsamand district). 
To the extent that it was successful, because MKSS was able to scale up the struggle to 
the central government. Here, it is important to note that one of the core MKSS 
activists, Aruna Roy, was a former IAS official. In a sense, she came out of the state 
and, therefore, her insights into the functioning of the bureaucratic state were useful for 
scaling up the struggle.   
Payments were finally made, but only after the Secretary for Rural 
Development, Government of India (an IAS official unknown to MKSS activists), acted 
on a letter from MKSS activists that drew the Central government’s attention to the 
faulty implementation of drought relief schemes in central Rajasthan. As is common 
practice, the Central government dispatched a fact-finding team, which submitted a 
report confirming the grievances reported by MKSS. The Secretary of Rural 
Development categorically told the state government of Rajasthan to pay the minimum 
wages or face withdrawal of all central funds for drought relief. 39  
The combination of pressure from the hunger strike and a reformist IAS official, 
that created a sympathetic opening proved effective in this case, especially since it was 
a centrally sponsored scheme. 40  However, there were also other factors at play. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39S. R. Sankaran former Secretary of Rural Development, Government of India (rtd.), interview 
with author. Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. 20.05.10; see also Jodha (1975: 1611) who notes, on 
leakages and diversion of drought relief (funds) ‘erring governments have often received strong 
strictures from central fact-finding teams.’ 
40Many wage employment or public work programmes come under the category of centrally 
sponsored schemes (CSS), which the Government of India designs and partly or wholly funds 
but whose implementation is the sole responsibility of state governments. State government 
budgets are seldom adequate, thus states remain dependent on the Centre for finance, especially 
in the case of CSS that are attractive, despite the discretionary elements attached to them, which 
state governments may not find favourable but which are insufficient to compel them to give up 
large amounts of central funds for politically popular schemes (Dasgupta, 2001). Drought-relief 
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hunger strike was also planned, though not deliberately, during an election year. In 
order to prevent losing rural votes to the Congress Party, the ruling Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) government’s immediate concern became putting an end to the hunger 
strike. This concern was reinforced when villagers at the hunger strike waved black 
flags in protest over government apathy as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Chief 
Minister Bahiron Singh Shekhawat arrived in Bhim during his election tour. Denial of 
minimum wages could have provided the Congress party with an opportunistic platform 
to win rural votes. The strike had to end, and the BJP government responded by 
physically detaining those on hunger strike. This desperate effort by the government to 
end the strike backfired and attracted outside support for the struggle.41 The next day 
eleven workers from Brar panchayat were paid their remaining wages when hundreds of 
people gathered outside the district collector’s office to protest the arrest of activists, 
and refused to leave until the workers were paid.  
 
In Search of an Alternative 
The second hunger strike, although successful at implementing full wages in one 
panchayat, nevertheless made clear to activists that it would be very difficult to enforce 
minimum wages across the state of Rajasthan. Each panchayat would require a similar 
localised effort and a commitment by villagers to accept nothing less than the minimum 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
schemes constitute the ‘multiple uses of drought’- one of which is “obtaining increased resource 
transfers from the Centre” (Jodha, 1975:1617). With these transfers, of course, come 
opportunities for leakage and diversion at various levels, particularly by the local-level officials 
who are responsible for implementing the various schemes.  
41Even as the CM publicly assured villagers they would get their wages, the district Collector 
(acting on the CM’s orders) got rid of striking villagers over night. MKSS activists, through 
their own sources amongst local intelligence officers as well as the press that were sympathetic 
to their demands, were informed of a night raid planned by the local police with specific orders 
to break the strike. Activists and villagers were loaded into trucks and transported to closest jail 
in Udaipur district. News spread about the arrest of activists and, the next day over one 
thousand people gathered at the dharna site in Bhim to protest against the raid. Nikhil Dey, 
MKSS activists, interview with author. Devdungri, Rajasthan. 01.05.10; Shankar Singh, MKSS 
activists, interview with author, Devdungri, Rajasthan. 14.02.10. 
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wage. Accepting less meant, in a sense, a withdrawal of the principal demand—full 
wages for full work (pura kaam, pura daam). There was also no guarantee of prompt 
intervention by the state government. Tactically, moreover, MKSS began to feel that 
hunger strikes increased the dependency of activists on the state. That is, the concerns 
regarding the health of hunger strikers often led to a dilution of their principal demands 
and weakened their position when engaging different levels of the state.  
New strategies thus had to be devised in order to resist the actions of the state at 
the local (panchayat) level. At the same time activists had to figure ways to draw the 
attention of the higher—state and national—levels. Early on, MKSS learned the 
important lesson from the Harmada andolan of taking the struggle over the heads of 
local panchayat staff, but questions persisted within MKSS about the lack of tangible 
options beyond hunger strikes. This problem led to a search for an alternative mode of 
protest.  
MKSS also realised the difficulties of building a campaign focused solely on the 
right to work and minimum wages for the informal or casual workforce. MKSS 
assessed that there were few state or national constituencies (including organised trade 
unions or farmers movements) prepared to lend support to such a struggle.42 They 
therefore put on hold plans for a large-scale mobilisation on the minimum wage issue.43 
Activists realised they needed an issue that would draw broader public while still 
advancing the main issue of rural livelihoods. Meanwhile, the inextricable link between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42Although in 1995, a year after the first five Jan sunwais, a writ petition was also filed in the 
Supreme Court by MKSS, 40 Trade Unions, Voluntary Agencies and Human Rights 
Organisations as co-petitioners. The Supreme Court transferred the petition to the High Court of 
Rajasthan. Nikhil Dey, MKSS activist, interview with author. Devdungri, Rajasthan. 01.05.10. 
43In part after a discussion with S. R. Sankaran (the IAS official from the Ministry of Rural 
Development, who had intervened in the second hunger strike), MKSS learned that the 
government of India did not plan to allocate more resources for rural employment programmes. 
The central government was also under pressure from the World Bank to waive the protection 
of Minimum Wages Act for employment programmes. Nikhil Dey, MKSS activist, interview 
with author. Jaipur, Rajasthan. 15.12.10. 
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information and enforcement of minimum wages had become clear. The result of this 
conjuncture was the first Jan sunwai in December 1994. The Jan sunwai was MKSS’s 
rural innovation, inspired by the experiences of activists who had participated in public 
hearings in cities (Delhi and Bangalore). 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE JAN SUNWAI 
 Nathu Singh from the village of KotKirana was sure he had not been paid his 
wages from his last period of work on the Rajasthan government’s public employment 
scheme, and suspected that the sarpanch had reduced the total number of days he had 
worked. He sought out Harinder, a young MKSS activist and an aspiring primary 
schoolteacher in December 1994. MKSS drafted a written complaint on behalf of Nathu 
Singh and brought it to the notice of the block development officer (BDO) when he 
came to visit Devdungri village, where MKSS is based. The BDO, Nirmal Wadwani, 
had met Shankar Singh at the Indian Administrative Services (IAS) training academy in 
Mussorie where Shankar, along with Aruna Roy (also a former IAS official), had given 
a lecture. After his posting to Raipur (Pali district), Wadwani came to Devdungri, to 
visit an ex-IAS officer Aruna Roy (who had voluntarily resigned from the service). He 
wanted to see where she lived and worked. 
 The MKSS at the time had been trying to find ways to obtain official records 
related to drought relief. The BDO’s visit presented the activists with an opportunity to 
obtain access to official records for KotKirana. Therefore, Shankar Singh mentioned 
Nathu Singh’s case to Wadwani, and the BDO promptly agreed to investigate the 
matter. Nathu Singh had the fortune of encountering the BDO, a new recruit of the 
Indian Administrative Services (IAS). Wadwani was posted as a probationer (IAS in 
training) at the sub-divisional level in the block office in Raipur (Pali district).  Making 
	   65	  
most of the opportunity, Shankar Singh suggested to the BDO that he should come to 
KotKirana and bring the related official records with him. Wadwani agreed to come 
with the official records.  
 Shankar Singh recalls, ‘I don’t think he (Wadwani) understood [that] what he was 
about to do was quite unprecedented and even dangerous for a new recruit.’44 A few 
days later Wadwani brought the records to KotKirana to inquire into Nathu Singh’s 
complaint. He arrived at the panchayat building (bhavan), with his team including an 
accountant, a junior engineer, and the gram sewak was also summoned. With the arrival 
of these officials, several people gathered around the panchayat bhavan. Shankar Singh, 
Harinder, Nathu Singh, and others were also present.  
 Wadwani turned to Shankar Singh and asked what was to be done. When it was 
suggested that muster rolls be read out, he handed the muster rolls to Shankar Singh and 
asked him to read them out. Shankar Singh did not know how the villagers who had 
gathered around would respond. But no more than two or three names had been read 
when an ex-army soldier interrupted: ‘sir what are you saying? My wife has never 
worked on drought relief works. I was in the army and she has always lived with me 
where I was posted. How did her name get in to the muster roll, and who has taken the 
payment?’ Shankar Singh told me, ‘I was surprised by the response but continued to 
read more names and was interrupted again by people asking me bemused which (kaun 
sa) muster roll I was reading. Villagers clarified that the names of persons I had just 
read, did not live in the village.’45    
 Wadwani promptly stood up and assured the small crowd that had gathered that he 
would conduct an inquiry. Shankar Singh requested if he could also read out some of 
the bills for the materials used on some of the works. As soon as the first bill for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44Shankar Singh, MKSS activist, interview with author. Devdungri, Rajasthan. 14.02.10. 
45Ibid. 
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materials purchased for the construction of the revenue building (patwar ghar) were 
read, people laughed out loud. They asked the BDO and Shankar Singh to turn around 
to see that the windows and doors of the patwar ghar, for which bills had been 
submitted and payments made, actually did not exist. Shankar Singh recalls that 
Wadwani promptly closed the files and repeated, ‘we will investigate this further.’46 
Later, Wadwani and his team decided to visit the individual who had supplied the 
materials. His name and address were on the bill. After interrogating the supplier, 
Wadwani confiscated his bill books and noted his statement that he had not supplied 
any doors and windows for the patwar ghar and had fabricated the bills. 
 As they were leaving KotKirana, Shankar Singh, who was a little perplexed by the 
BDO’s pursuance of the case, requested him to provide him with copies of the official 
records and offered to assist him with the inquiry. Wadwani once again promptly 
agreed. On the way back to the block office, as they were dropping off Shankar Singh, 
Wadwani was told by his accompanying junior officials that as per the law—the 
Official Secrets Act 1923—he was not permitted to give photocopies of these records. 
Wadwani turned to Shankar Singh and asked him to come to his office (which was 
approximately 45 kilometres away from the village). ‘The next day I arrived at the 
BDO’s office, and Wadwani took me aside and said to me that my request for copies of 
records had generated a great deal of protest amongst the staff. I have been told I cannot 
give you photocopies, Wadwani said. So I asked him if I could copy them by hand, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46Ibid. 
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Figure 3.1. First Jan sunwai in KotKirana in Pali District, Rajasthan (1994).  
Courtesy Social Work Research Centre, Tilonia, Rajasthan. 
 
he agreed.’47 Thus, the information needed to conduct the first Jan sunwai was obtained 
with the help of the BDO.  
 Residents of seven villages in KotKirana panchayat and four villages of Bagdi 
Kalaliya panchayat attend the Jan sunwai, which was conducted in an open field 
adjacent the KotKirana panchayat office (figure 3.1). The former Deputy Speaker and 
member of the Rajasthan state assembly (MLA), hearing of the intended plans, camped 
out in the village. His presence instilled fear. In the preparatory days leading up to the 
Jan sunwai, very few villagers assisted the activists. If nobody from KotKirana had 
supported the Jan sunwai, it would have been aborted. Threats and attempts to bribe 
villagers followed in order to prevent them from testifying at the Jan sunwai. The 
accused public officials, with the support of the MLA, made offers of money to 
villagers to change their statements. Three women from Kot village were taken to 
another panchayat and made to sign false affidavits. When the activists resolved to carry 
out the Jan sunwai, despite the opposition from the MLA, the sarpanch plotted to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47Ibid 
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Figure 3.2. The room behind Harinder's (left) house where MKSS activists took  
shelter the night before the public hearing, in KotKirana. Photo by author (2010). 
 
intimidate and dissuade the activists. Harinder and few adolescent boys from the village 
constituted the local support for the MKSS. 
 One night, some of the boys heard of a plan being hatched by the sarpanch and 
supported by the MLA to attack the activists. The activists were living in a school 
building during the period of the preliminary verification before the final hearing. 
Harinder was informed by a group of boys of the probable attack. As he recalled to me: 
‘I moved them [MKSS activists] into a small room behind my house’ (figure 3.2), and, 
pointing to the stairs leading into his house, explained, ‘the next morning we walked 
through the courtyard of this house, down these stairs and through the village carrying 
several files. I felt all eyes in the village were on me; but I was sick and tired of the way 
things were and felt I had to stand up.’48 
 The Jan sunwai was organised under an old military parachute that was borrowed 
from a retired subedar of the Indian Army. Despite restrictions from parents, who had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48Harinder, former MKSS activist, interview with author. KotKirana, Rajasthan. 14.02.10. 
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been intimidated by the sarpanch and the MLA to boycott the Jan sunwai, the youth 
enthusiastically helped to set up the tent and closely watched the proceedings.49 A 
professor of political science from Rajasthan University, a Gandhian social activist from 
Jaipur, and the Director of the Social Work Research Centre in Tilonia (Ajmer district) 
constituted the informal panel of experts, or eminent citizens, at the first Jan sunwai. No 
government officials participated.  
 Activists read out names from muster rolls, and an MKSS document from the time 
recalls what happened next: 
...[O] utraged people came and testified that they had never gone to those work 
sites, that false signatures had been used and that there were names on the muster 
rolls of people dead and gone, and others unheard of. The finger was pointed at 
the retired teacher Moti Singh who had entered the names, the Gram Sewak who 
made the payment, and the Junior Engineer who had certified that the work was 
done and payments made in his presence. The people fearlessly spoke against the 
former Deputy Speaker of the Rajasthan, Vidhan Sabha, who had camped in the 
village prior to the hearings, intimidating the villagers to change their statements 
against the accused. When bills and vouchers of the unfinished Patwar Ghar were 
read out, the people learnt that they had a ‘complete’ Patwar Ghar—at least on 
paper. The bills for materials used for the roof, doors and windows, when read 
out, elicited a great deal of laughter for there was no roof and there were only 
holes for doors and windows. When the laughter died down, there was 
consternation, anger and eventually a First Information Report (FIR).50	  
 
The FIR or official police report was lodged against the junior engineer and gram sewak 
for forging accounts worth approximately fifty eight thousand rupees. The panchayat 
officials: that is, the junior engineer and gram sewak who were accused of fraud thus 
attempted to garner support from the local MLA, and he helped to subvert a full 
departmental inquiry against the erring officials, who got off relatively lightly: The 
gram sewak was temporarily suspended and the junior engineer was assigned to a 
neighbouring panchayat. 
 Meanwhile, a group of village elders were convinced to organise a meeting at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49Author field notes, KotKirana, Rajasthan. 14.02.10 
50MKSS (1996). 
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village temple in KotKirana to ask the gram sewak, the schoolteacher, and the junior 
engineer to tender a public apology. This apology, however, was not tendered in front of 
the entire village, as in a Jan sunwai. Rather, the gram sewak and junior engineer 
apologised to five religious elders of the village. These elders (based on their own 
notion of punishment) decided to fine the accused an insignificant amount (less than 2% 
of the total funds embezzled), and donated it to repair works of the village temple 
(Mishra, 2003). Thus, in KotKirana, MKSS achieved moderate success in tackling 
corruption in the employment relief scheme. However, in doing so they had evolved a 
new strategy for their activism. 
 
The Diffusion of the Jan Sunwai  
 With the KotKirana Jan sunwai, MKSS learnt the power of information. 
According to MKSS activist Nikhil Dey, it was ‘power which was realised when we got 
the information in our hands’ (shakti jo ahsas hui jab suchna haath me aayi).51 He said 
to me, ‘we knew without information, Jan sunwais could not take place. They 
(sarpanches, gram sewaks, block level officials) understood what giving access to such 
information meant.’52 Thus came about the shift to the demand for a right to 
information. Over the next six months (December 1994-April 1995), MKSS organised 
four more Jan sunwais in quick succession across Rajsamand, Ajmer and Bhilwara 
districts. Of the four Jan sunwais after KotKirana, three took place within a month: in 
Vijaypura (7th December 1994), Bhim (17th December 1994), Jawaja (4th January 1995), 
and, finally, Thana (25th April 1995) panchayats.  
 The gram sewaks reacted defensively to the rapid development and use of the Jan 
sunwai. At the time of the fourth Jan sunwai in Jawaja (Ajmer district) the district’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51Nikhil Dey, MKSS activist, interview with author. Devdungri, Rajasthan. 01.05.10. 
52Ibid 
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gram sewaks went on strike.53 MKSS activists had obtained orders from the district 
administration to access official records to conduct the Jan sunwai. The gram sewaks 
refused to comply with the orders of the District Collector, and refused to give activists 
and villagers’ access to panchayat information. In fact, the gram sewaks staged a 
dharna (sit-in) outside the District Collectors office to protest against the order, stating 
that they would only cooperate on a government audit. (In Chapter 5, we will see how 
gram sewaks deployed similar counter-mobilisation strategies against legally mandated 
social audits). 
 The gram sewak opposition to the Jan sunwai in Ajmer district (1995) soon 
turned into a state-wide protest.  A delegation of gram sewaks from across the state met 
with the Development Commissioner in the state capital, Jaipur.54 Alongside the 
opposition, the local demand for transparency in development expenditure was also 
shaping into a state-wide call for a right to information legislation. The Jawaja Jan 
sunwai was organised despite the opposition by the gram sewak. Even without access to 
official information, people from seven panchayats in Jawaja block attended and 
testified. 
 Three senior lawyers from the Rajasthan High Court and a professor from the 
National School of Drama in Delhi attended as independent observers. As I will explain, 
the Jan sunwai derives its legitimacy primarily from the people. At the Jawaja Jan 
sunwai the ‘authenticity of the testimonies,’ despite the lack of official information, 
produced results (D. Priya, 1996: 84). The irregularities and discrepancies that were 
publicly stated were speedily redressed. As Mishra (2003: 14) notes, five Dalit families 
of Jalia Peethawas (dalits) openly stated (at the Jawaja Jan sunwai) that their gram 
sewak had taken ‘a cut of Rs.1500 (approximately $25) from each of them from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53D’Monte (1996). 
54D. Priya (1996). 
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total grant money of Rs.9800’ (approximately $150) for the Indira Awas, or housing 
scheme, and they ‘got the amount back within forty-eight hours of the hearing.’  
 At the Jawaja Jan sunwai, MKSS activists also issued a call for a mass agitation 
outside the District Collectors office to demand copies of official records, thus 
articulating the demand for a right to panchayat held information. Sandwiched between 
the gram sewak protests and mounting public pressure, the District Collector of Ajmer 
district turned to the state government in Jaipur. Three months after the Jawaja Jan 
sunwai, the Chief Minister (CM) of Rajasthan made a public announcement in the state 
assembly granting all citizens the right to information—that is, access to copies of 
officials records related to development works carried out at the panchayat level. 55  
 The CM’s announcement was an expected rhetorical pronouncement by the 
political leadership; such pronouncements are ‘normal for contending political leaders 
in their attempts to placate defecting groups’ (Piven and Cloward, 1979: 17). In this 
case, the ruling BJP leadership pre-empted the opposition Congress Party, preventing it 
from capitalising on the momentum created by the Jan sunwai. When the CM’s 
announcement to provide a right to information did not result in any concrete state 
action, activists turned the CM’s announcement on access to information into a political 
plank. They did this by mobilising villagers from central Rajasthan for two dharnas (sit-
ins). The subsequent executive order, which came in the initial days of the first dharna 
in Beawar, in 1996, and a year before the Rajasthan state assembly elections, bolstered 
the MKSS and protesting villages. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55This decision, as the Chief Secretary of Rajasthan government at the time explained to me, 
was not influenced by MKSS. In fact, he asserted that while these people [MKSS] were 
protesting—to use his words, as ‘Aruna sat on a dharna (rhymes well)’ the state government 
made the promise ‘suo-moto’ (on their own). However, he also noted, MKSS activists came to 
meet him during election year: ‘they thought it was the right time to pressurise the government; 
but the government made the statement in a public body to which it is accountable, i.e., the state 
legislature. We were not going to backtrack’. M.L. Mehta, former Chief Secretary of Rajasthan, 
interview with author. Jaipur, Rajasthan. 14.04.10. 
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 Within a year of the CM’s announcement, MKSS embarked on a 40-day dharna 
(sit-in) in Beawar, and a month later extending the dharna to the state capital, Jaipur to 
scale up the demand for a legal right to information at the state level. Activists also 
galvanised a range of actors from across institutional arenas into a national campaign 
for a national right to information legislation, to be discussed in Chapter 4. Thus, what 
began as the creation of alternative public sphere to gain panchayat-level information in 
Rajasthan ballooned into a national RTI campaign. We will turn to this next stage in the 
following chapter. But first let us examine in more detail the structure of a Jan sunwai 
to understand its effectiveness as an alternative public sphere. 
 
THE STRUCTURE OF A JAN SUNWAI  
A Jan sunwai has five steps: obtaining government information, converting or 
simplifying that information, reviewing or auditing public works, motivating people to 
testify, and conducting the final hearing. A Jan sunwai thus consists not only of a final 
daylong public hearing but also the preliminary week to ten days of preparatory auditing 
and mobilising activities. Since not everyone can be covered in the preliminary 
activities, the final day of the Jan sunwai is an opportunity to bring—as far as 
possible—the entire panchayat together to collectively discuss and debate, but, more 
importantly, to question and assess how development programmes have been carried 
out in their villages.  
 
Step 1: Gathering Information 
The first step of the Jan sunwai is to gather information. While the government 
controls the flow and exchange of information, in order for the Jan sunwai to provide an 
equal knowledge base amongst villagers and panchayat functionaries, access to relevant 
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public records (government information) is imperative. Until 2001 in Rajasthan (and 
many other states across India), public access to such records was legally prohibited by 
the Official Secrets Act 1923. This meant that even MKSS activists had no means of 
accessing government information related to drought relief works.  
Therefore, in order to organise a Jan sunwai, obtaining government records was 
a critical hurdle. Once information was obtained, activists had to convert it in order to 
facilitate person-to-person verification. Prior to 2001, activists relied largely on public-
spirited officials at the block and district level or honest sarpanches, like the one in 
Dhapda village, to access such information in central Rajasthan.  
 
Step 2: Converting Information 
Once villagers and activists access government information, it has to be 
converted so that it can be shared with villagers in an idiom that they can easily 
understand. This is the second step of the Jan sunwai. The majority of villagers who 
work on drought relief in Rajasthan are illiterate. They are unable to read entries in the 
muster rolls that are usually filled out by the mate (worksite supervisor, usually an aide 
of the sarpanch). For example, key official records of drought relief works, such as the 
muster rolls, record the daily attendance of workers. It is therefore necessary that such 
records be read out—one form of conversion—so that villagers know how their wages 
are calculated.  
Some villagers are semi-literate and can sign their names, and reading out names 
in front of villagers enhances the possibility of identifying fake or ghost entries. For 
example, in a village in Kushalpura panchayat (Rajsamand district), where activists 
were verifying muster rolls on a worksite, a villager asked to see the muster roll from 
which activists had read out his name. In the muster roll the villager saw a thumbprint 
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against his name. This suggested that—as per the official record—he had dug earth for a 
canal work, and received wages. According to the worker, however, he did not apply for 
work under drought relief that year. He issued a witty response, ridiculing the official 
record, ‘this is not a thumbprint. I can sign (ye angutha nahin hain, hum sign karte 
hain).’ Then placing his thumb over the thumbprint on the open muster roll, the villager 
said, ‘This is a fingerprint…’(ye ungli laga rakhi hain…), suggesting the sarpanch had 
not even bothered to use his thumb, and carelessly used his index finger to forge the 
entry (knowing he would not be caught).56 
Another key government record is the measurement book, which contains 
technical details related to the work allotted and completed by workers as well as the 
quantity of materials purchased for a work. Attached to the measurement books are bills 
and vouchers indicating the price for materials purchased for building roads, schools, 
and community halls. A measurement book, however, has a specific format and is not 
easy to read. This means entries are made in a specific style, using technical language 
only understood by trained professionals, in this case engineers. During an official 
inquiry the engineers are readily available to explain their entries to senior officials. 
However, villagers are not privileged with the same readiness when they seek 
clarification about why they are paid less. Thus, the conversion of measurement books 
is necessary so that villagers can ascertain official entries.   
By converting a measurement book, I mean translating eight cubic feet of 
cement, as recorded in the measurement book, into six bags of cement. Villagers are 
generally aware of what happens in their village, and they can validate whether six or 
sixty bags of cement were brought into their village. However, what they are unaware 
of is what the official records contain. An illustration will further explain the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56The Right to Know, The Right to Live. 2000. Directed by Anurag Singh. 
 
	   76	  
significance of a measurement book for a Jan sunwai. In the pre-Jan sunwai 
verification, in 1998, one worker became agitated, after being asked several times by an 
activist whether he had dug earth for a canal in Lassani village (Rajsamand district). 
The villager denied working on the canal and categorically stated it did not exist (neher 
bani hi nahi hai!). However, in the measurement book, from which activists later read 
out loud at the final hearing at the Jan sunwai, project engineers had shown the same 
canal had been built and measured seven hundred and fifteen feet long and two feet 
wide.57 The canal did not exist. These examples of sharing converted information with 
villagers bring us to the third step of a Jan sunwai. 
 
Step 3: Motivating People to Testify 
A Jan sunwai requires mobilising local people to participate, which involve 
concerted organising and publicity. Borrowing from the existing repertoire of education 
and communication strategies deployed by other rights-based groups, MKSS developed 
its own style of generating publicity and mobilising villages. Activists use puppetry, 
folk songs, prabhat and sandhya pheris (morning and evening processions), and 
meandering through galis (lanes) to publicise their presence and purpose in the village. 
Nukad nataks or street plays are also performed and incorporate a pedagogic element 
(figure 3.3). The themes of these plays and songs, written and enacted by local villagers 
and activists, weave in the socio-economic realities of villagers—repeated droughts, 
forced migration, non-payment of wages, apathy of state agents and corruption in public 
work programmes. In addition to these activities, activists camp out in the village for 	  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57Ibid. 
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Figure 3.3. MKSS activists performing a play at night in Thana village, Bhilwara district, Rajasthan 
(1995). Courtesy Social Work Research Center, Tilonia, Rajasthan. 
 
the duration of the Jan sunwai. Over the week-to-ten days leading up to the final 
hearing of the Jan sunwai, activists exchange and share information with villagers 
regarding the implementation of a range of schemes such as employment relief, 
pension, and free housing. 
Often, activists also make a peculiar request to villagers by asking one 
household to feed an activist—that is, after a public meeting or once activists have 
finished sharing the converted information, they make a request for food. This is a novel 
way to win the trust and support of villagers, especially Dalits. For instance in 2001, 
this practice of singing songs and enacting plays as well as asking for food from 
villagers was used by the sarpanch to insult activists and portray them as ‘beggars’ who 
were trying to mislead the people of Janawad panchayat. However as an MKSS activist 
told me, in fact it was this practice of ‘asking for food that turned things in our favour, 
because we were not merely asking to be fed, but through it also entering people’s 
homes, sitting with them and connecting with people.’58  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58Sowmya Kidambi, former MKSS activist, interview with author. Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. 
22.05.10. In 2006, after a similar exercise of sharing information on a hot day in Udaipur 
district, I was humbled by the offer of several households in Udaipur district who fed us daab (a 
drink made of corn kernels and yoghurt) and leftover roti (bread) and fried chillies from the 
morning meal. 
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This form of generating publicity is different from the ‘propaganda or techne’ 
commonly associated with the state that lack ‘integral or continuous engagement with 
the lifeworld but are involved merely with the production of truth-statement’ 
(Mukhopadhyay, 2005: 5467). Touring bureaucrats from district offices and state 
capitals rarely interact with villagers or recipients of old age or widow pensions. They 
do not visit worksites or inspect houses sanctioned under the free housing scheme. In 
fact, a lot of manpower and public resources are dedicated to separating the public 
official from the public. This ensures public officials reach out to village elites, in 
particular sarpanches, and rely on them to complete cursory evaluations of government 
programmes and schemes. The MKSS, in contrast, preceded each Jan sunwai with a 
period of concerted organising and outreach in the villages. Only once members of the 
village were mobilised, and information in hand, did they proceed to review the public 
works. 
 
Step 4: Auditing Public Works 
The fourth stage of a Jan sunwai is the auditing of public works with villagers 
with the use of converted information (figure 3.4).  Such a social audit—what Jenkins 
and Goetz (1999a) call ‘popular auditing’—goes beyond the annual financial audit 
usually undertaken by the government. A financial audit looks for whether money was 
correctly spent and focuses on bookkeeping errors. A social audit, in contrast, also 
looks at whether the spending was justified and made a difference for the village. It 
performs a dual function: it assesses performance and unpacks how decisions are made 
at the panchayat and block level. This kind of public corroboration of official 
information is a vital step of the Jan sunwai. 
 
	   79	  
 
Figure 3.4. MKSS and SRWC activists verify muster rolls with women workers, and inspect an ongoing 
work near Tilonia village, Ajmer district, Rajasthan. Photo by author (2010). 
 
Official routine inquiries made by touring bureaucrats require villagers to make 
time for visiting senior public officials. Usually, the elected head, or sarpanch, mediates 
such exchanges between villagers and public officials. Sometimes a small meeting is 
called by the sarpanch along with the gram sewak; a ward panch and one or two 
women (usually supporters/family members of the sarpanch) are present. The meeting 
serves a symbolic purpose: to record the visit and its participatory nature.59  
 In contrast to official inquiries, in a social audit there is no fixed place where 
activists share converted information with villagers. It can take place anywhere in a 
village, wherever people happen to be present: at a village chaupal (a community 
building or space), near hand-pumps where women fill water, in the fields or even at an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59Also see, Breman (1985: 1044) for his account of the interaction between a government labour 
officer and villagers, ‘from the road he beckons to labourers working in the field. If they dawdle 
as they come over… he urges them irritably to hurry up.  Right from the beginning the 
conversation is conducted on a footing of inequality and takes the form of an interrogation.’   
There are rare occasions too, as the one I happened to be privy to during the course of my 
fieldwork in Bhilwara district, in 2010. I joined a group of state civil servants from Jaipur who 
were investigating specific cases of corruption under the employment guarantee scheme in 
Reechra panchayat. Prior to their arrival the District Collector – an IAS official that heads the 
district – had ordered the sarpanch to stay away from all worksites. Along with assessing 
NREGA works, these officials also took photographs, randomly selected houses and spoke to 
villagers to record testimonies, and only towards the end interacted with the sarpanch and other 
elected members of the panchayat.  
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Figure 3.5. SR Abhiyan activists verifying muster rolls with villagers, in Jhalawar district, Rajasthan.  
Photo by author (2008). 
 
on-going worksite. Sharing and verifying converted information is at the core of the 
social audit that places great emphasis on the convenience of villagers in validating 
official records (figure 3.5).   
 Very often, the sharing of such information also occurs at night, individually 
when people are at home, or collectively in meetings organised in the part of the village 
inhabited by lower caste groups. MKSS often seeks out lower caste or Dalit inhabitants 
living in segregated parts of the village. This is done in order to reach out to people who 
are most dependent on welfare programmes such as drought relief. They are also most 
likely to be excluded in favour of family and friends of the village sarpanch. If and 
when lower caste villagers are included they are most vulnerable to the corrupt practices 
of the sarpanch and gram sewak. That is, they are often denied full wages and 
compelled to act according to the dictate of upper and dominant caste groups. Yet very 
often those who speak out at a Jan sunwai are Dalit or Bhil (Schedule Tribe or ST) as 
well as women.  
 No conclusions, however, are drawn from such preliminary activities during the 
social audit. Rather, on the basis of what villagers communicate in response to the 
converted information that is shared with them, they are encouraged and motivated to 
publicly testify on the final hearing of the Jan sunwai. After the social audit, activists 
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remain in the village, collating the information they have gathered for a public 
presentation at the final hearing, which is the fifth step of the Jan sunwai.  
 
Step 5: The Hearing 
 Activists maintain a presence in the village and continue to motivate villagers to 
testify up until the final hearing. As they do so, sarpanches are also hard at work 
devising ways to subvert the Jan sunwai. They intimidate people or attempt to buy their 
silence. The sarpanches usually provide large quantities of alcohol to men in 
expectation that they will be absent from the final hearing the next day.  
Bribes, however, incur a huge personal expense, and it is not feasible to bribe 
the entire village. For instance, women, who constitute at least 50% of workers on 
drought relief, cannot be bribed with alcohol. They are usually intimidated, indirectly 
via threats through their husbands. Lower caste men, especially, are often threatened to 
ensure their wives do not testify. Villagers intimidated and bribed by the sarpanch are 
pitted against others who the sarpanch cannot influence or buy out. Activists struggled 
to counter these strategies and maintain village morale and commitment to testifying. 
Finally, a public hearing is organised in a public place, such as, an open field, 
outside the panchayat office or sometimes at the block level (sub-divisional 
administrative unit), outside the block development office. The logic behind the choice 
of a place is its proximity and accessibility for ordinary villagers, as much depends 
upon the participation/attendance of villagers.  
At the public hearing, all the findings of the social audit are placed before the 
participating publics. Findings are read out loud and villagers who have agreed to testify 
are called forward to the microphone to speak. Sarpanches and gram sewaks also 
attempt to hijack the proceedings by planting their aides at the front of the gathering at 
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the final public hearing. These aides are tasked with the responsibility of speeding up 
the Jan sunwai by providing quick affirmations, sometimes in a chorus like manner to 
the accuracy of official records, thus attempting to prevent others from speaking.  When 
the back and forth interaction on a particular work heats up, the sarpanch’s aides 
attempt to derail the interaction. One of the ways in which the derailment occurs is by 
creating a tense environment, in anticipation that it leads to scuffle. Disruption of law 
and order thus becomes an easy way to stop a Jan sunwai. While MKSS activists 
facilitate Jan sunwais, they cannot organise it without local support. This is due to a 
general unfamiliarity with the district or panchayat, but also due to the unfamiliarity 
with the village politics. Villagers who collaborate with activists lend legitimacy to the 
process and make it difficult for social and political elites to subvert the Jan sunwai on 
the grounds that outsiders impose it on poor illiterate villagers in order to misguide 
them. The primary concern for activists, then, is that the contesting actors and what they 
say do not disrupt the final hearing. Even though MKSS activists conduct and monitor 
the proceedings at the final hearing, they do not control or steer it in any one direction.  
At first glance, a Jan sunwai resembles a typical outdoor event in India where 
people gather under a tent shelter (shamiana). Villagers usually meet the cost of hiring 
the shamiana. Additional resources for a microphone and sound system and 
photocopies of official records are raised through donations. Villagers also contribute 
token amounts during the preliminary publicity-generating activities, and the rest is 
raised by MKSS activists through appeals to middle class citizens living in cities. There 
is no arrangement for food or drinks, in part to de-incentivise the uninterested, but, also 
to some extent, because there is often a shortage of funds.  
From afar, a Jan sunwai resembles a meeting organised by a political party—a 
regular feature during elections—or a religious gathering. Once curious onlookers 
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approach a Jan sunwai, however, they do not hear political speeches or sermons from a 
high-perched platform. Rather, people witness fellow villagers engaged in a discussion 
of village affairs that typically happens in homes or maybe at chai stalls, but rarely in 
public before the entire village. The Jan sunwai often creates a novel excitement when, 
for the first time, what Scott calls the ‘hidden transcript’ is spoken ‘directly and publicly 
in the teeth of power’ (Scott, 1990: xiii). 
As noted earlier, not everyone who attends the Jan sunwai testifies. Many come 
just to observe, and some are drawn in by curiosity not knowing what to expect. 
Usually, women sit together on the ground (away from the men) in the front of the tent 
(with their veils drawn over their faces) facing the activists and other villagers who are 
conducting the Jan sunwai. Upper caste men sit on chairs on the side towards the front 
of the tent. Lower caste or Dalit usually sit towards the back of the tent on the ground. 
On the right hand adjacent to the presenters sits the independent panel of eminent 
citizens and local journalists. This not because MKSS arranges the Jan sunwai in that 
way, but because that is how people are accustomed to segregating themselves. Though 
these entrenched forms of segregation persist the Jan sunwai is an attempt to organise 
public forums differently. 
The Jan sunwai usually begins with activists announcing the name of the 
panchayat, details of financial year and the list of works to be discussed one by one. 
Flipping through sheets of paper from numerous files containing copies of official 
records activists reiterate the second step of the Jan sunwai—that is, conversion—as 
they take the microphone and read out aloud: names of works, names of villagers in 
several muster rolls pertaining to each work, number of days worked, and the amount of 
wages paid. Each detail that is read out is followed up by a question to authenticate the 
official record: has this work been carried out (kya gaon mein ye kaam hua)? Have 
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wages been paid (kya bhuktan hua)? Other lists containing details of pension 
payments—that is, names and amount of money—or names of selected villagers 
eligible for free houses are also read out. As names and details of works and 
accompanying remunerations are read out, and as questions are posed, the silence is 
gradually broken. 
At first, responses come from the floor in a chorus: ‘he died seven years ago’, or 
‘he lives in the city’ or ‘she is 80 years old, she could not have dug ditches’ or ‘the 
levee you are talking about does not exist’. Gradually villagers, who previously agreed 
to testify publicly, take the microphone. For instance, at the Kuker Kheda Jan sunwai, a 
villager took the microphone and said, ‘during the period when the work under 
discussion was underway, I was at another worksite. The bullocks and cart that were 
hired are a total fabrication (bilkul farjiwada hai); I don’t own any’.60 Soon the 
sarpanch’s aides simultaneously shouted down others, referring to the whole process as 
a conspiracy by the opposition (vipakshi saajish) against the sarpanch. Chaos ensued, 
the villagers watched silently but intently. Soon, some order was established and 
activists assured contending speakers that they would get an opportunity to speak.  
Jan sunwais could provide the opportunity for lower-caste villagers and women 
to challenge the claims of the (often) upper caste men who controlled local government. 
In 2001, the Congress Party state government attempted to organise three Jan sunwais, 
one of which was organised in Nathdwara district. In one panchayat, Panotia, 
sarpanches and gram sewaks had successfully managed to prevent people from 
testifying by threatening them with physical violence. According to MKSS activists, the 
Jan sunwai was a ‘complete washout’. The testimony of a Bhil (adivasi) in another 
panchayat (Jhalon ki Madar) however, broke the resistance of the Brahmin sarpanches. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60The Right to Know, The Right to Live. 2000. Directed by Anurag Singh.  
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In the presence of the Brahmin sarpanches, ward panches, Kalu Tekka Bhil testified 
that none of the Bhils from his village whose names were in the muster roll had actually 
worked on the worksite.61 Sometimes then, Jan sunwais are an opportunity for the 
lower castes to counter the power of the upper castes that usually control the delivery 
and implementation of public works.  
The Jan sunwai is clearly not a panacea for solving the many problems of class, 
caste and gender domination that characterise rural India. However, its 
accomplishments also should not be dismissed. Having provided an overview of its 
basic structure, in what follows I argue that the Jan sunwai operated as ‘an alternative 
public sphere,’ which created a space for public dialogue on these issues in a way that 
was novel for many villages. It is from these dialogues, moreover, that the demand for 
the right to information emerged.  
 
JAN SUNWAI AS AN ALTERNATIVE PUBLIC SPHERE 
The ‘public sphere’ as articulated by Jurgen Habermas (1998 [1989]) is a sphere 
of the lifeworld in which all citizens can interact, form public opinions, and confer in an 
unrestricted manner on matters of general interest. 62 The interactions within the public 
sphere are based on what Habermas (1984a, 1984b), in his Theory of Communicative 
Action, calls communicative rationality. This communicative rationality, according to 
Habermas (1984a: x), is based on presupposed norms through which people relate to the 
world and make claims regarding the truth being spoken, the moral validity of reasons 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61Sowmya Kidambi, former MKSS activist, interview with author. Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. 
22.05.10. 
62Habermas (1984b: 310) developed a two level concept of society that integrates on one hand 
the system – bureaucracies and market forces – that function on instrumental purposive 
rationality, where actors communicate by following a government directive or in pursuit of 
profit or money. On the other hand he develops the idea of the life world, which constitutes the 
realm of the informal that works on communicative rationality. 
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for saying what actors say, and the sincerity or authenticity of speech acts. These claims 
are open to criticism, dispute, and revision (Ibid).  Mutual interactions, as Habermas 
(1992: 252, 444) tells us, generate ‘communicative power’ that assert the ‘practically 
oriented demands of the lifeworld’, and can ‘influence’ and ‘impact’ the logic of public 
bureaucracies.  
However, one of the fundamental critiques of Habermas’s concept of the public 
sphere is its presumed guarantee of universal access and neglect of other public spheres 
(Calhoun 1992). For instance, Fraser (1990) examines how the bourgeois public sphere 
excluded women and the working class. One of the assumptions of Habermas’s public 
sphere, Fraser argues (1990) is the bracketing of social differences by its interlocutors.  
Additionally, Habermas did not account for popular social movements that 
constituted other public spheres in conflict with the bourgeois public sphere. According 
to Fraser (1990: 61) there was never the public but rather a plurality of ‘contending 
publics’ that ‘contested the exclusionary norms of the bourgeoisie public through their 
alternative political behaviours, alternative norms of public speech’ (see also Eley, 
1992). In response to these criticisms, Habermas (1992) later revised his view of setting 
aside the variant of the liberal public sphere, or what he called the ‘plebeian public 
sphere.’  
Chandhoke (2005) also makes an interesting argument about the public spheres 
being multilingual to explain how Habermas’s public sphere has historically functioned 
as a vehicle of exclusion and, therefore, of power. Her argument is instructive for 
understanding the critical role of the Jan sunwai in expressing a demand for right to 
information. For instance, Chandhoke (2005: 334-344) argues, the public sphere is 
embedded in languages—legal as well as bureaucratic—that signify the power of the 
state. Anything that contradicts the language of ‘politics and modernity’ is disqualified. 
	   87	  
Thus, one language—that of the state—does not acknowledge the other language as a 
‘free and equal partner in a debate’—for instance, the language of an adivasi (tribal) 
threatened by displacement due to big dams (Chandhoke, 2005).  
My conception of the public sphere is based on such critiques of Habermas’s 
bourgeois public sphere as restrictive, and exclusionary. I do not accept Habermas’s 
conception of the public sphere and communicative action in its entirety. My analysis of 
the Jan sunwai as an alternative public sphere follows the work of other scholars who 
critically analyse the concept of the public sphere. Drawing on these critiques I analyse 
the Jan sunwai as an alternative public sphere. 
The Jan sunwai has been conceptualised as a ‘popular auditing’ tool to ‘combat 
corruption’ (Jenkins and Goetz 1999a, 1999b, 2003; Mander 2003), and as one of those 
‘highly visual spaces that deconstruct the state’s description of itself,’ that reveals how 
the state is seen by poor people in India (Corbridge et al 2005: 225). The important 
analysis I make examines how MKSS’s activities, or strategies for communicative 
action, turn the Jan sunwai into an alternative public sphere. The five steps of the Jan 
sunwai discussed earlier together are based on a type of communicative action that 
juxtaposes two different realities—the daily experience of villagers and the reality 
contained in official records that the state controls. These realities rarely intersect, but at 
the Jan sunwai, they are brought together into confrontation through speech and action 
that, while not free of power, is usually free from coercion. 
The villagers, via their reflexive questioning about the arbitrary implementation 
of rural development programmes, and, in particular, about the payment of wages (or 
lack thereof), openly contest the implementation of such programmes. In doing so, they 
transform the Jan sunwai into a site for ‘agitational activities’ (Fraser, 1990:68) and into 
a vehicle for mobilising ordinary villagers as well as ‘wider publics’ for social justice 
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and equality. Viewed in this way, the Jan sunwai is a site of power and contestation 
(Somers, 1993; see also Benhabib, 1992) drawing multiple actors—lower-caste and 
women workers, as well as upper caste men, sarpanches, public officials—into a public 
discussion and accounting of the practices of local government. Despite its limitations, 
the Jan sunwai offers the potential for inclusion and leverage for the interests of 
women, the elderly, and dalits that often does not exist in the formal public sphere of 
the local panchayat.  
For instance gram sabhas or village assemblies that, in principle, embody the 
ideal of universal participation in practice circumvent participation by excluding women 
and lower caste groups. Such village assemblies tend to be dominated by men from the 
upper and dominant castes. Even more exclusionary are the caste panchayats, informal 
arbitrating local bodies that are restricted to members of a particular caste. In practice, 
these caste panchayats function as an agent of social and moral control. They are 
organised and run by men who maintain all customary powers of decision-making 
concerning the social and political life in the village. Thus, neither the formal public 
sphere of local panchayats nor the informal caste panchayats permits an equal and free 
interaction amongst different social categories of villagers.  
In organising the Jan sunwais, MKSS found that women and dalits, who rely the 
most on drought relief and other employment relief schemes in Rajasthan, are often 
eager to redress the issue of the non-payment of wages. However, they are also the most 
vulnerable, and thus less likely to testify in public. Nevertheless, the Jan sunwais did 
succeed in getting such individuals to speak publicly about their grievances, which they 
assuredly would not have done in the traditional public spheres mentioned above. Take 
for instance, the case of Pyari Bai (a dalit widow), who testified against a gram sewak. 
As a young widow Pyari bai was an unusual choice for a permanent sterilisation 
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operation (social norms prohibit widow remarriage). The gram sewak, in a bid to 
complete his assigned official target, was confident nobody would find out, and he gave 
her false assurances. He convinced Pyari bai to undergo the operation and, in return, he 
promised to get her approved for a free housing scheme. After the operation however, 
the gram sewak told Pyari bai she was not eligible for the free housing scheme, because 
she was not listed as a ‘below poverty line household.’ Afraid of the villagers’ reaction 
to her decision to go through with the surgery, she could not tell anyone about the gram 
sewak’s conduct. During the pre-Jan sunwai activities, MKSS activists met Pyari Bai 
who was on their list of beneficiaries of the free housing scheme. She denied receiving 
any payment and told the activists about her agreement with the gram sewak. At the Jan 
sunwai in Dhapda village (Bhilwara district), Pyari bai made a public statement about 
her agreement with the gram sewak.  
 In 1999, another dalit, Pyarchand Khatik who worked in the neighbouring state of 
Gujarat, was compelled by upper caste thakur in his panchayat (Umarwas) to abandon 
his work in Gujarat and contest the panchayat elections on a reserved dalit seat. The 
dalit sarpanch had no choice but to become a front man for the thakur—also a ward 
member—of his village. Frustrated by his plight, he approached MKSS to help him 
organise a Jan sunwai.63  The activists cautioned Pyarchand that he would be arrested 
for fraud and embezzlement of public funds since he had signed all the documents.64  
Pyarchand was resolute, and he told the activists he was willing to testify that he had 
been forced to contest the panchayat elections and was tricked into becoming a 
sarpanch. He was unwilling to undergo further humiliation and ridicule.65 On the day of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63Pyarchand had heard about MKSS from a relative who was a bonded labourer, and had been 
relieved with help from MKSS activists. 
64Sumir, former MKSS activist, interview with author. Devdungri, Rajasthan. 01.05.10. 
65The thakur and his aides made all the decisions over disbursements of funds allocated for the 
panchayat. And Pyarchand signed cheques and put his official seal, even as the thakur siphoned 
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the Jan sunwai, Pyarchand received overwhelming support by other dalits in his village. 
Many of them knew he was a puppet in the hands of the upper caste men, and at the Jan 
sunwai, a few members of his caste publicly acknowledged that he was indeed a victim 
of the upper caste who had manipulated the reservation system and used him.66  
 During the pre-Jan sunwai activities in Umarwas panchayat Nain Singh the upper 
caste thakur, showed off his gains to activists who were verifying works in the 
panchayat. On display was a community centre built inside his house using 
development funds meant for the village. Two other rooms and a toilet were also 
constructed inside his house using money from the free housing scheme. In the same 
village, activists also met a Bhil (scheduled tribe or ST) widow with three children, all 
less than ten years old, who had not heard of the free housing scheme or of the widow 
pension that she could avail.67 
Beyond a few heroic individuals, the Jan sunwai also provided the opportunity 
for marginalised groups to participate in the relative safety of a large group, simply by 
verifying whether or not they received wages and worked the number of days recorded 
in muster rolls.  Such participation, while seemingly simple, cumulatively could have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
off money from the free housing scheme and employment relief. Any opposition by Pyarchand 
was met by threats to repay the money he owed the thakur—money that had been spent on 
Pyarchand’s election campaign without his knowledge; but Pyarchand nevertheless was paying 
back the thakur from panchayat funds. As he told me, ‘each time I signed a cheque I was made 
to squat on the ground while the upper caste men sat on chairs. Being a Dalit, I was ‘not 
allowed to interact with them as an equal,’ even though I was sarpanch. Thus, I decided to 
‘challenge’ the upper caste thakur, and give up my position as sarpanch. Pyarchand Khatik, 
former sarpanch Bori village, interview with author. Umarwas. Rajasthan. 07.01.10. 
66On the day of the Jan sunwai, Pyarchand received overwhelming support by other Dalits in 
his village. Many of them knew he was a puppet in the hands of the upper caste men, and at the 
Jan sunwai, a few members of his caste publicly acknowledged that he was indeed a victim of 
the upper caste who had manipulated the reservation system and used him. Also see, Mander 
(2001). 
67Indira Awas Yojana is meant for the poorest of the poor and the beneficiaries have to be 
approved in a gram sabha; see The Right to Know, The Right to Live. (2000). Directed by 
Anurag Singh. 
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large effects, exposing the corruption of powerful local officials in front of not just the 
village but also outside observers. 
As Chandhoke (2005: 333) argues, the idea of communication in the public 
sphere is related to a ‘referral.’ That is, a proposition made by one participant—in this 
case, activists reading out from muster rolls or measurements books—must be added to 
or subtracted from, or agreed and disagreed upon by other participants (villagers and 
sarpanches and gram sewaks). Thus, at the final hearing the process of reading out 
information from official records and verifying entries in the presence of and with the 
participation of villagers has a powerful effect. First, for social and political elites 
implicated in the corruption, such publicity of their dishonesty is inconceivable. They 
are flummoxed and attempt to respond in haste. Second, at the Jan sunwai two realities 
persist: the reality constructed in the information of the official records stands in tension 
with the lived experiences of villagers as they are brought out into the open. Their 
accuracy is hotly contested and debated in an open hearing. It is in this sense that we 
can see the Jan sunwai as an alternative public sphere: a form created outside the formal 
public sphere that allows everyone, including the marginalised, to air grievances, 
challenge or corroborate the ‘truth statements’ of public officials, and thereby subject 
authority to communicative reason. 
This raises an important question: if the Jan sunwai exists as an alternative 
public sphere outside existing formal institutions, who or what grants it legitimacy to 
function as such? For understandable reasons, sarpanches, gram sewaks and other 
officials (junior engineers, technical assistants) are generally ambivalent about, if not 
hostile to, the legitimacy of the Jan sunwai. They believe they know how to manage the 
government. Moreover, they fear having to mount a public defence of their actions in 
front of the entire village, and they are aware that a large public gathering is difficult to 
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manipulate. If they choose to participate, the collective acts of probing and questioning 
forces them to explain their actions. Dishonest deals (andaar ki saudebaazi) struck 
between social and political elites become public knowledge in a Jan sunwai. 
Sarpanches and gram sewaks are thus compelled to publicly defend their actions. 
Diverting minimum wages or panchayat funds meant for constructing a school or 
community building in the village is publicised and transformed via the publicity into 
an act of public shame. In the process, individuals who project themselves as immandar 
log (honest people) are show to be pilfering individuals.  
For the state government, which often chooses to be absent from the Jan sunwai 
or relies on the feedback of sarpanches and gram sewaks, the legitimacy of the Jan 
sunwai is considerably less. However, the presence of ‘eminent citizens’ counters the 
easy dismissal of the Jan sunwai and extends some legitimacy to the proceedings in the 
eyes of the state. The open contestation between villagers and sarpanches and gram 
sewaks takes place in the presence of an independent panel of eminent citizens, or 
people of eminence in public life from diverse institutional arenas: law, public 
administration, journalism and academia (see Chapter 4). This panel of eminent citizens 
most often sits behind or on the side of where the questioning, clarifying, testifying and 
often arguing publics engage one another. These eminent citizens however, do not 
deliver judgments or make an assessment of right or wrong actions. They use their 
symbolic capital to publicise their observations and opinions of the Jan sunwai. The 
publicity, on their behalf, is generated through the submission of written reports on the 
Jan sunwai to the state government and through statements to the press.   
The ultimate legitimacy of a Jan sunwai, consequently, comes from the villagers 
themselves. Once they overcome their fear, and with some encouragement from 
activists, they see the enhanced role they can play in a Jan sunwai compared to the 
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restrictions and marginalisation they often encounter in other local public spheres. 
Villagers are able to collectively defy local elites and express dissent by questioning and 
probing the role of elites in core areas of their daily lives. For the average villager, the 
open and public interaction between other villagers and upper caste elites, sarpanches, 
and gram sewaks at a Jan sunwai profoundly alters the legitimacy and relevance of 
other public spheres such as gram sabhas and jati panchayats. As noted earlier, these 
formal and informal institutions are founded on unequal social structures that, in the 
case of formal panchayats in any case, are legitimised by the state apparatus. At the Jan 
sunwai, the villagers, through their testimonies and their public contestation (or 
approval) of government information and actions, isolate the sarpanch and gram sewak 
and expel them from their positions of authority.  
In an interesting discussion of what he calls ‘popular justice,’ Foucault (1980: 8-
9) argues that masses try to ‘punish’ or ‘re-educate’ their enemies. For this they rely on 
their own ‘experiences, sufferings, wrongs done, [and] oppression’, rather than on some 
‘universal abstract idea of justice.’ The state apparatus does not back up the decisions 
they arrive at, the masses simply carry out their decisions (Foucault, 1980). Similarly, 
the legitimacy of the Jan sunwai for the villagers lies in their ability to momentarily 
suspend other forms and institutions of social, moral, and political control, and alter the 
terms of exchange between villagers and representatives of the local state. Here, aside 
from the symbolic role of the ‘eminent panel,’ there is no third party that is assessing 
right or wrong. By publicly challenging official information with their own experiences, 
villagers assert their truth.  
While public testimonies are crucial for the final hearing of the Jan sunwai, not 
everyone who attends the Jan sunwai is required to publicly testify; many villagers 
simply come to watch and observe. As Scott (1990: 65) notes, people may be 
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emboldened by the ‘act of massing’ itself as well as the ‘visual impact of collective 
power’ if accompanied by a ‘measure of anonymity.’ The Jan sunwai viewed in this 
way is a mechanism for mobilising dissent by creating a different kind of deliberation 
about the everyday practices of local-level public officials. It is also qualitatively 
different from participatory techniques, development aid projects, or existing 
government reform and decentralisation policies, which as Mosse (2005) explains 
require ‘enlisting participants’ and ‘enrolling different interests’ for the purpose of 
mobilising consent for predetermined projects/policy goals and/or objectives. The 
qualitative difference of a Jan sunwai—namely, its ability to mobilise dissent—is 
relevant in so far as an outsider can be responsive to a demand from villagers for 
dissent.  
In this case, that outsider role is fulfilled by MKSS. Even though the Jan sunwai 
is dependent on MKSS facilitating the process, the activists on their own cannot 
organise a Jan sunwai without local support. The process has to be initiated by the 
villagers—that is, a Jan sunwai is asked for by villagers, rather than imposed upon a 
village. MKSS agrees to organise a Jan sunwai in collaboration with villagers, who 
have to agree to collaborate on all five steps of the Jan sunwai. Thus, MKSS’s role as 
‘convening authority’ (Houtzager and White 2010: 184-185) at the village level allowed 
activists to embed persons and groups relevant to focused contestation into the local 
political process. It did this without imposing a plan but by ‘bringing power holders and 
interested groups into deliberative dialogue to produce inventive campaign strategies’ 
(Houtzager and White, 2010: 184-185).  
The question arises: did this create several backlashes for those who 
participated? In KotKirana, people told me there was no backlash. While local 
politicians threatened residents of KotKirana to prevent them from testifying at the Jan 
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sunwai, there was an absence of coercive response from those whose power was 
challenged via the Jan sunwai. In Jhalon ki Madar too, the Bhil who testified was not 
physically harmed or threatened after the Jan sunwai. As Vikram, from KotKirana, 
recalled, ‘because of our support for the Jan sunwai, on the cycle yatra in 1996, to join 
the Beawar dharna some roadside chai/food stalls refused us water.’68 Others such as, 
Pyarchand Khatik, the Dalit sarpanch, told me he was not physically attacked or 
harmed. Villagers in Janawad panchayat told me that the Jan sunwai had changed 
things a little. For instance, the sarpanch lost the next elections, but was also ridiculed 
and publicly insulted in front of the entire village. So while pre-existing forms of power 
and domination did not disappear after Jan sunwais, there does not appear to have been 
violent and punitive reprisals. 
So while I do not suggest that this kind of public shaming puts an end to 
corruption or local inequalities, it does reveal the potential of decentralised deliberation 
platforms like the Jan sunwai to create new kinds of spaces in which authorities are 
subjected to the power of communicative reason and to, perhaps, gradually alter power 
relations at the local level. 
 
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
In this chapter I have explained how the Jan sunwai evolved from attempts to 
enforce minimum wages and curb corruption in public works projects in rural 
Rajasthan. I have described the five steps of a Jan sunwai and analysed how this 
process constituted an alternative public sphere at the local level. While I show the Jan 
sunwai could at least momentarily offset caste and gender inequalities, I do not suggest 
that these Jan sunwais brought an end to corruption or eradicated social inequalities in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68Author filed notes. KotKirana, Rajasthan. 14.02.10. 
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the panchayats where they were organised. Rather the Jan sunwai was a resistance 
strategy that set into motion processes of accountability at the local level and was able 
to mobilise dissent to create a different kind of deliberation about the arbitrary 
implementation of the drought relief programme.  
While a new practice of accountability was generated, there were also hidden 
costs. The process that MKSS began with the Jan sunwai in the mid 1990s was not 
adequately coupled with other strategies to consolidate the local support at the 
panchayat level that was mobilised with each Jan sunwai. The process of accountability 
that the Jan sunwais set into motion is highly contentious, and it must be viewed as a 
work in progress. As we will see in Chapter 5, under the new guise of “social audits,” 
under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (enacted in 2006), this process has 
entered a new phase as the MKSS has returned its attention to their implementation at 
the local level.  
The Jan sunwai, as we have seen, also shifted the terrain of the struggle for 
enforcement of minimum wages to right to information. In part, this shift was based on 
the recognition by MKSS activists that they would be unable to build a broader national 
campaign on the issue of minimum wages. However, the role of the local bureaucracy 
and political elites was also significant. While gram sewaks perceived the Jan sunwai as 
a threat to their authority at the panchayat level and counter-mobilised against the Jan 
sunwai, the compulsions of electoral politics compelled the BJP political leadership to 
make a public commitment to provide access to information at the panchayat level. 
Even though the two parts of the state (bureaucratic, and political) had seemingly 
contrasting responses to the Jan sunwai, they hoped to stall further Jan sunwais. Their 
reactive and conciliatory responses together shaped the demand for a legal right to 
information. 
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 As activists scaled up their struggle to higher levels of the state to demand a 
right to information enshrined in national legislation, they also shifted the location of 
their activities—that is, they moved from the panchayat to the state as well as the 
national capital. Villagers who organised and attended the initial phase of Jan sunwais 
were mobilised for state-level as well as national-level agitations to demand right to 
information laws. In the next chapter, I follow the trajectory of the right to information 
from the local to the national level as MKSS galvanised a broad-based national 
campaign to demand a national right to information law. 
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Chapter 4. Eminent Activists and the National Campaign for the People’s Right 
to Information 
 
 
“The Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners shall be persons of 
eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in law, science and technology, 
social service, management, journalism, mass media or administration and governance.”  
(Section 12 (5), RTI Act (2005)) 
 
In 1996, MKSS launched a nation-wide campaign demanding a national law on 
the right to information. This was two years after the first Jan sunwai was organised by 
MKSS in Rajasthan to expose the misuse of public funds in rural development 
programmes. The Beawar dharna (sit-in), in April 1996, saw the MKSS direct its 
demands towards the State government in Jaipur (Rajasthan), and it marked the shift 
from a local to a state-wide campaign. Just four months later, MKSS decided to form 
the National Campaign for the Peoples Right to Information (NCPRI), which resulted in 
the expansion of the right to information campaign to the national arena. In the previous 
chapter I have examined MKSS’s state-resisting strategy. The Jan sunwais were used 
by MKSS to mobilise dissent against the local panchayat staff and hold them 
accountable to villagers. The subsequent decision to form a national campaign 
highlights how activists pried open spaces to proactively engage high levels of the 
political, and administrative state with the goal of making new law to ensure a citizens’ 
right to information. 
The decision to move from Jan sunwai in rural Rajasthan to a national campaign 
partly reflected the lessons from the former; but the MKSS was also encouraged to form 
NCPRI by a network of supporters who I will call “eminent activists.” According to 
Nikhil Dey, founder member of MKSS, a number of ‘respected and senior friends of the 
MKSS’ had seen the wider implications of what had been the cause of the 40-day 
dharna in Beawar and they consequently urged the MKSS to take the step to give their 
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struggle a National face.69 These eminent activists played a significant role, first, in 
turning the MKSS struggle into a National Campaign and, then, in providing consistent 
support, ideas, and leverage to keep the campaign going and helping to spread its 
message. NCPRI was formed with the twin objectives of advocating the passage of 
national RTI legislation and supporting grassroots struggles for accessing and using 
information in different campaigns.  
 Previous research on social movement activism in India demonstrates that issue 
and interest groups often operate through national networks active in the bureaucratic or 
judicial arenas and emphasise linking localised activity with national concerns 
(Katzenstein et al, 2001:244-245). Since not all issue and interest groups in India have 
the capacity for mass mobilisation on a countrywide level, many operate through 
national networks that link concrete grassroots activities with broader political, legal, 
and bureaucratic reform campaigns (Kothari, 1984; Sheth, 1983, 2004; Katzenstein et 
al, 2001). These groups tend to have a small support base of active workers who invest 
heavily in framing processes, or collective action frames, that articulate issues and build 
support for issue adoption. Such groups, however, rely heavily on an informal support 
base of eminent people in public life to support their claims, people such as sympathetic 
civil servants, retired judges, academics, and, on occasion, even artists (writers and 
musicians). In general, scholars have paid scant attention to these actors and their role in 
social movement activism. 
Scholars who have written about RTI in India specifically (Jenkins and Goetz, 
1999a, 1999b, 2003; Singh, 2007, 2011; Mander 2003; Mishra, 2003; Kidambi, 2008; 
Sampat and Dey, 2005; Dogra and Dogra, n.d.; Mander and Joshi, n.d.; Puddephatt, 
2009; Calland, 2010) have also not examined in any detail the formation of the NCPRI 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69Nikhil Dey, MKSS activist, personal correspondence with author. 25.09.12. 
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or the forms of influence that its various actors, who have come from an array of 
institutional arenas, brought to the campaign. With the exception of Baviskar (2007) 
who identifies NCPRI’s ‘unusual’ organisational strategy through which activists 
‘cultivated links’ with state actors to form a broad-base alliance for a national RTI law. 
She does not however, examine in any detail the social background of NCPRI activists 
and theorise precisely what they brought to the campaign. 
This chapter’s focus is this missing piece of the struggle for a national right to 
information legislation. I examine the construction of NCPRI and the role of some of its 
key players, or as I call them “eminent activists.” Rather than a social movement, I 
explain that these key players that constitute NCPRI should be understood as a 
countrywide network of eminent individuals cutting across diverse institutional arenas. 
This extraordinary set of activist-minded individuals together created a persistent and 
high profile push for a national right to information legislation. Following Bourdieu 
(1986, 1991; see also Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992), I examine what eminent activists 
contributed to the campaign by exerting influence in their respective ‘fields’ and by 
harnessing their ‘symbolic capital’ to strengthen the demand for a national RTI law.  
 These ‘eminent activists’ primarily belong to the urban middle class, but most 
often have strong linkages to what in India are called “people’s movements.” These 
include the anti-dam movement, groups working on women’s rights, dalit and adivasi 
(tribal) rights advocacy organisations, urban and rural groups opposing forced evictions, 
environmental action groups, and civil liberties and human rights organisations. I will 
show how this network of transparency advocates, working in diverse issue areas and 
institutional arenas, was instrumental to the passage of the national Right to Information 
Act (2005). 
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 A second related question I examine in this chapter is why the network of RTI 
activists chose the strategy they did. Most social movements in India have used public 
interest litigation (PIL) as their primary legal strategy, but NCPRI chose to pursue the 
path of legislation. I explain the choice of the legislative over judicial route for RTI. 
Additionally, I consider two reinforcing explanations for why NCPRI chose the 
legislative route. First, in order to get rid of the Official Secrets Act (1923), a legislative 
intervention was necessary; second, public debate on accountability created an enabling 
environment to raise the demand for a national RTI law. This demand, as I will show, 
was grounded in a broad, even radical notion of transparency and accountability that 
was inextricably linked to social justice and equality; this grounding is in contrast to the 
fashionable rhetoric of ‘good governance’ (however narrowly conceived) on which 
many state and non-government actors rely. 
The enactment of a national right to information law is, in part, attributable to 
the efforts of eminent activists in NCPRI, but the response of the bureaucratic and, 
political state also strongly influenced the law’s shape. Thus, this chapter seeks to 
demonstrate how the interactions between actors inside the state and between state and 
society led to the enactment of a strong RTI law (rather than attribute credit entirely to 
societal actors). In the run up to the enactment of the national RTI law, the bureaucratic 
and political state were opposed to each other. The key deterrent for the central 
bureaucracy was not simply the potential for RTI to expose corruption—as was the case 
with the opposition to the Jan sunwai by the panchayat staff in Rajasthan—but for its 
ability to compel bureaucrats to cede some of their zealously guarded status, privilege, 
autonomy, and power. The idea of opening up government functioning to public 
scrutiny was in direct contradiction to the well-entrenched insularity of the governing 
process and the interests of those involved in it.  
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The 2004 General Elections—where the Congress Party made a public 
commitment to enact a strong right to information legislation—demonstrated the 
political state’s support at the national level for an RTI law. I examine how individuals 
developed different capacities within state and society to forge alliances, and how 
different forms of collaboration or opposition led to the enactment of the Right to 
Information Act (2005).70 For this, I focus on the creation, and role of institutional 
spaces like the National Advisory Council (NAC)—an advisory body set up to provide 
policy and legislative inputs to the Central government. Among civil society actors, two 
NCPRI activists (Aruna Roy and Jean Drèze) were invited by the President of the 
Congress Party to become members of the NAC.71 The NAC was a key institutional site 
where activists’ demand for a strong RTI law found recognition, legitimacy, and, 
importantly, the support of the Congress Party President.  
In what follows, I trace the origin of the NCPRI, the contribution of four 
categories of eminent activists, and the historical and situational context that inspired 
the choice of a legislative strategy over a judicial one. Finally, I analyse the opposing 
responses of the bureaucratic and political state in the lead up to the enactment of the 
RTI law. 
 
INTRODUCING “THE EMINENT ACTIVISTS” 
In India, ‘eminent person’ is a popular term used to refer to people in public life 
who are respected for their experience and knowledge. Eminent persons may include 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70Also see, Skocpol (1992: 1-57) and Houtzager (2005: 1-31) for a discussion of the ‘polity 
approach’ that focuses on the structure of the state and how actors (within state and society) are 
constituted and interact to produce intended change. 
71N.C. Saxena, though not a member of the NCPRI working Group, was an important ally from 
the early days when he was the Director of the National IAS academy (LBSNAA) and a 
meeting was hosted by the academy to help draft a law. He was also invited to become a NAC 
member in 2004. Thus, the NAC had at least three ardent supporters of RTI. 
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reformist bureaucrats, social and political activists, retired judges and senior lawyers, 
academics, journalists. These individuals play a vital role in building legitimacy for the 
demands of people’s movements in the mainstream public discourse.72  
For instance, a job in the government or qualifying for the IAS in India signifies 
honorific status, or what Bourdieu (1991: 170) would call symbolic capital or power—
‘a power that can be exercised only if it is recognised.’ The same is true for more 
conventional careers in law, medicine or engineering, which are highly regarded in 
Indian society as markers of stability, and which bring with them promise of material 
success. These professional fields are highly competitive. Getting into the IAS or 
establishing a successful legal practice or becoming a Judge of the High Courts or 
Supreme Court, brings with it a sense of accomplishment based on years of experience, 
which confers respect, repute, and prestige.   
However, what amplifies this respect and prestige in the case of some of these 
eminent activists is a sense of renunciation (attributable to the political culture 
commonly associated with the Gandhian political tradition or Hindu asceticism). That 
is, they reject ‘careerism’ for ‘sewa’ (service). For instance, people who give up 
prestigious careers, such as one with the IAS, attract the respect of the Indian public, 
and add a new dimension to their symbolic capital based on the perceived disinterested 
dedication to public service.73  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72See Bose (2004: 133) who writes about “popular intellectuals” (made of critics and experts) in 
the rise of the anti-dam movement or the Narmada Bachao Andolan; they belong to diverse 
backgrounds, and perform multiple roles as ‘specialists, interpreters, mediators, commentators, 
and critics’. What Bose means by “popular intellectuals” however, is not the same as what 
Gramsci calls “organic intellectuals” (who come from the working class); also see, Hung 
(2011:71-92) for a discussion of the role and contribution of the ‘local literati elite’ in 
mobilising and articulating the claims of ‘state-engaging’ protesters in eighteenth century 
China. 
73For example, Aruna Roy, founding member of the MKSS, quit the IAS, and opted for a frugal 
life full of hardships when she decided to live and work amongst the rural poor. Her decision to 
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The eminent activists in NCPRI network wear many hats. Though they are 
professionals from different fields such as the bureaucracy, academia, law, journalism 
and activism, they are all also ‘transparency advocates’ connected by the common goal 
of making the Indian state transparent and accountable to people. The eminent activists 
in NCPRI played a vital role in the success of the campaign for RTI.  
 In my analysis of a national network of right to information advocates, I classify 
the eminent activists in NCPRI into four different categories based on their professional 
backgrounds. I also mark the national struggle for the RTI as it progressed through three 
different phases, from the ‘local’ level in Rajasthan to the ‘national’ level in Delhi. This 
three-phase journey of a local struggle maturing into a national one also encapsulates 
the seminal role played by NCPRI. Three moments mark the phases of the struggle: the 
Beawar dharna in 1996; the meeting in Delhi at which NCPRI was formally 
constituted; and the period between the two national conventions for right to 
information in 2001 (Beawar) and 2004 (Delhi). The four categories of actors who 
advanced the struggle for right to information during the three phases are: the journalists 
who came to Beawar in April 1996; the retired and serving IAS officials (some of 
whom MKSS met during its struggle to enforce minimum wages)—judges, lawyers, 
and some activist academics; the final wave of activists from different people’s 
movements; and RTI Act users from different states who were sought out by NCPRI 
between the two national RTI conventions (2001-2004). I examine how each group of 
eminent activists got involved with NCPRI, and how they used their eminence or 
symbolic capital to create legitimacy and advance the demand for a national RTI law.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
quit the IAS carries immense social significance, as she is seen to have sacrificed the many 
privileges and perks that come with that government job. 
	   105	  
THE CONCEPTION AND ROLE OF THE NCPRI 
 Although some of its members are affiliated with various people’s movements, 
NCPRI does not have a mass base or following of its own. Rather, NCPRI is a national 
network that MKSS and its supporters gradually built around the idea of forging a 
national RTI campaign.  
 We can, however, begin by providing the historical context that shaped many of 
the activists who would become involved in NCPRI. Since the mid 1970s, and 
especially after the Emergency,74 there was a slow accretion of people who were fed up 
with the existing bureaucratic structure, which was opaque, secretive, and unresponsive 
to its citizens. Additionally, these people were vehemently opposed to the political 
state’s violation of civil liberties. They were therefore naturally allied to the cause of 
increasing state transparency and accountability. The debates over transparency and 
accountability were not only about improving the state’s efficiency or management of 
agencies and the delivery of public goods. Rather, the debates encompassed a range of 
interpretations, which were linked to an array of demands for social justice and equality. 
Such demands cut across various categories of class, caste, and gender. As individuals 
from various groups increasingly recognised the centrality of public access to 
government information for their respective issues, they formed a latent constituency 
for a right to information. The MKSS united such individuals under the banner of 
NCPRI.  
 In addition to MKSS activists, NCPRI initially consisted of journalists, 
bureaucrats, retired judges, a few lawyers, and environmental activists. In due course, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74A state of emergency was declared in India for a 21-month period between 26 June 1975 and 
21 March 1977 at the behest of the then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi under Article 352 of the 
Constitution of India. In what has been the only such occasion in the history of independent 
India, during emergency, democratic processes came to a screeching halt as general elections 
and civil liberties were suspended and government of the day ruled by decree. 
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the NCPRI gradually expanded its member base to include professionals of very diverse 
hues. What they had in common, however, was an element of symbolic capital typically 
not possessed by the farmers and workers who participated in the first phase of the 
struggle. By lending their symbolic capital to the struggle, these activists helped to scale 
up MKSS’s transparency activism from Jan sunwais in rural Rajasthan to a national 
legislation. Below I analyse how this occurred.  
 
Eminent Activists and Symbolic Capital 
The eminent persons, above all, contributed symbolic capital to the struggle for 
a national right to information legislation. The symbolic capital of these eminent 
activists, here, is viewed together with their social and political capital, as an 
‘instrument of power’ (Harriss, 2006: 192). By capital, I mean the resource that actors 
use within a ‘field’ or a site of struggle, which, according to Bourdieu and Wacquant 
(1992), is a ‘configuration of objective relations between positions’. That is, in each 
field, the varying volumes of individual’s capital—social, political or symbolic—
determine the position of actors in that field. For Bourdieu, there are several 
autonomous fields, each of whose logic is specific and irreducible to that field; this 
logic separates one field from another. The quantity and composition of an individual’s 
capitals in different fields shapes their habitus, or their ensemble of dispositions. One’s 
habitus includes a practical sense of a field, an investment or ‘stake’ in a field, and 
structures of perception and appreciation that recognise certain kinds of capital 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 98). Explicit forms of training that characterise a 
particular field also shape dispositions.  That is, lawyers, judges, and bureaucrats each 
need to be trained for their respective fields.  The resulting dispositions shape the 
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practices and perceptions of actors within a field (Peillon, 1998: 215; Bourdieu 1991: 
176; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).  	  
Thus, government officials acknowledge the symbolic capital of an IAS official 
through a structure of perceptions and classifications of honour, which recognise an 
official’s competence. Progressive judges, for example, recognised the symbolic capital 
of lawyers such as, K. G. Kannabiran—one of the founding members of NCPRI—for, 
in such a lawyer, they saw attributes that they associate with respect, and even 
admiration, regarding his use and interpretation of law. The respect that eminent 
activists enjoy with the institutions of government was and continues to be an important 
asset for NCPRI.  
Due to the extensive symbolic capital (as well as social capital in the form of 
connections) held by particular NCPRI members, the group was able to engage the 
state, and the state willingly engaged them. Symbolic capital in these cases finds a close 
link to social capital.  As noted earlier, the majority of these eminent activists belong to 
the middle class. The cultural capital (or education and expertise) deriving from their 
class position eases their initial entry into their respective professional fields, enabling 
them to acquire the necessary symbolic capital (Deshpande, 2003). Insofar as it conveys 
honour and respect, this symbolic capital grants access to another form of capital, that 
is, political capital.  
Political capital, according to Bourdieu (1991: 171-201) enables actors to make 
claims to representativeness. Bourdieu (1991), however, does not extend his concept of 
political capital to other arenas outside the political party or trade unions. He remains 
sceptical of the genuine responsiveness of politicians and unionists to the people they 
represent. Here, I use Bourdieu’s notion of political capital to suggest that eminent 
activists also claim to represent the socially excluded and marginalised classes. 
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However, unlike politicians and unionists, their claim to representativeness is relatively 
free from suspicion of the represented under classes, which are otherwise unable to gain 
access to the state. These people of eminence have supported social justice issues of or, 
at times, directly worked with marginalised groups. This support is also because of the 
nature of this group, and their relationship with grassroots people’s movements. 
These eminent citizens have a deep appreciation for grassroots work but are 
generally unable to do such work themselves. With an understanding of their own 
privilege, they are extremely keen to use it for the benefit of poor and marginalised 
communities. They also understand the workings of the bureaucratic and political 
establishment, and they put this knowledge to use. Finally, they could advise, suggest, 
and push a campaign like RTI into widening its sphere of action; in fact, they were 
happy to be seen as the movement’s mentors and urged groups like MKSS to form a 
national campaign.   
Apart from the honorific status and stability that their professions guarantee, for 
the eminent persons who chose to become IAS officials, judges, or lawyers, their 
professional fields revealed many constraints as well that further inclined them to 
support social justice issues. In recognition of both the constraints and possibilities of 
their professional fields, they reorient their roles. Rather than manipulating access to the 
state for personal gains, eminent people make use of their skills and position to 
highlight contradictions in state practices or interpretations of law. In certain instances, 
these have the effect of recasting the practices of the state. For instance, Shekhar Singh, 
a veteran environmental activist and academic, often found himself the lone voice of 
minorities and people’s movements fighting big dams in various government appointed 
committees. Singh was invited to participate in these committees as a representative of 
civil society and used these spaces tactically to counter the state’s logic of development.   
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These eminent persons know the language and the architecture of the state, and 
are thus able to reach deep inside it. The IAS officials or judges also have embedded in 
them an instinctive knowledge (along with mannerisms, habits, perspectives, and ways 
of negotiating or making arguments) that comes from the specific practices prevalent in 
their field. This imparts certain ease and confidence to the persons in their own field, 
further enabling them to effect change. Thus, as noted earlier, the symbolic capital of 
NCPRI activists is ‘a weapon, and a stake of struggle’, which allows them to ‘wield 
power, and influence’ in that field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 98) . However, while 
eminent persons use symbolic capital to pry open fields and provide a certain kind of 
access to positions of power, such use of such symbolic capital is restricted to a select 
few.  
Insidiously, it is precisely through wielding their symbolic capital to advance 
movement demands that eminent individuals reproduce their capital (Bourdieu 
1991:170). However, this rather abstract and unintended effect does not undermine the 
tactical importance of the eminent activists’ role in people’s movements.  Though 
furthering the aims of a campaign may aid eminent activists, it is not to their personal 
ends. In fact, what the eminent activists are able to achieve with their advantage of 
class-based connections and associated symbolic capital would be quite difficult for a 
campaign to accomplish otherwise. The tactical employment of eminent persons is, 
then, the reality of social movement activism in India: it remains one of the people’s 
movements’ main strategies. Eminent activists represent valuable allies for people’s 
movements because they help build legitimacy for movement demands.75 In this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75For instance, in a meeting organised in Jaipur in 1996, the presence of Justice Sawant, a 
retired Judge of the Supreme Court, was instrumental in countering the opposition of the state 
government, which included that of the Chief Minister of Rajasthan, to the passage of a state 
right to information law. The argument made by the Chief Minister of Rajasthan was as follows: 
If the state grants access to panchayat information, and given the geographic proximity of some 
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chapter, then, I use Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic capital to explain the significance of 
eminent activist in the RTI Campaign. First, however, I provide a brief overview of 
early debates and historical precedents that created an enabling environment for a 
demand for national right to information law.  
 
THE CONTEXT: FROM OSA (1923) TO RTI ACT (2005) 
Gould’s (2011:104-136) insightful historical account of the shifting perceptions 
of ‘everyday routine’ corruption in the late colonial and early independent eras (1930s-
1960s) in north India illustrates how anti-corruption efforts, from early on, have been 
enmeshed in bureaucratic concerns to preserve ‘integrity’. However, the intrastate anti-
corruption discourse was very different from the everyday interactions between 
government agents and citizens that shaped public views about corruption. While 
political elites thought the problem of corruption could be resolved through high-level 
committees and commissions, but as Gould (2011) notes, the disaggregated bureaucratic 
structure frustrated efforts at reform. 76 The mid-1950s debates within the Congress 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
districts of the state of Rajasthan to Pakistan, a right to information law will enable information 
falling into wrong hands. Justice Sawant dismissed such a claim and argued that the information 
being sought after (by MKSS) did not pertain to national security (for which safeguards can be 
built into the law), but rather the workers were demanding information related to expenditure of 
development funds. Citizens have a right to know, how public funds are being spent. Such 
broad extrapolations suggest that the government is reluctant to ensure transparency and 
accountability towards its citizens. Aruna Roy, MKSS and NCPRI founding member, interview 
with author. Lahore, Pakistan. 17.03.08. 
76Both the colonial state as well as the Congress Party in the post-1947 years, Gould tells us 
(2001: 172), believed that ‘the problems of everyday government and police corruption could be 
found in antiquated social customs’ such as, daalis (customary presents) and sifaarish 
(recommendations). Unlike the British, however, the Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh (the focus 
of Gould’s study) made efforts to remove these aberrations and advance the anti-corruption 
agenda: anti-corruption committees were set up, rules of bureaucratic conduct were redrawn, the 
state government also responded to the press reports exposing scandals implicating officials and 
politicians. However, the early independent anti-corruption agenda suffered on account of the 
Congress Party’s dependence on the colonial bureaucratic structure. Thus, concerns about the 
moral uplifting of bureaucrats, combined with a desire to preserve the public image of integrity, 
actually weakened high-level enactments, orders, even legislative efforts such as the Prevention 
of Corruption Act 1947. 
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Party illustrate the concerns of political elites to ensure public disclosure of income tax 
assessments and personal assets of party members (Singh, 2007:21).77 Nevertheless, a 
public discourse concerning government corruption did emerge at this time.  
After independence, discussions and debates on government transparency and 
accountability grew. Singh (2007:21) argues that the initial demands for transparency in 
Independent India were focused on ‘corruption, disasters (such as railway accidents) 
and human rights violations.’ At this time, the British-era Official Secrets Act (OSA) 
remained in effect and was blanketly used to deny requests for access to government 
information.  After the failure of the Indian armed forces in the 1962 China War, an 
‘unprecedented and strident demand for transparency’ developed (Singh, 2007: 22) and, 
with it, growing demands to repeal the OSA. India’s defenceless debacle raised several 
questions about the ill preparedness of the Indian army, and people wanted to know 
what had gone wrong and who was responsible (Singh, 2007).  
During the 1960’s the government also set up a committee to tackle corruption. 
The Santhanam Committee on the Prevention of Corruption reiterated the 1950’s 
debates on disclosure of income tax assessments and personal assets, extending it to the 
bureaucracy. The committee recommended that in matters which are ‘important to 
citizens in their day-to-day affairs’, the government ‘should make a clear distinction as 
to what information should be treated as ‘secret’ and what should be made freely 
available to citizens’ (Government of India, 1964: 48). However, it was during the 
Bihar Movement and the struggle for Total Revolution (1973-74) that the veteran 
Gandhian Socialist, Jayaprakash Narayan, gave the clarion call to the nation to ‘end 
corruption in day-to-day life and politics’ (Chandra, 2003: 2). For the first time, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77See also Deccan Chronicle (2011).  
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agenda of corruption and dysfunctional government gained national salience. Soon 
after, Indira Gandhi declared the Emergency. 
Apart from debates in the political and bureaucratic arenas, the Supreme Court, 
in the mid-1970s, interpreted the right to information as part of the right to free speech 
and expression under Article 19(1)(a). The Court, in a series of cases on the freedom of 
press, laid down the jurisprudential foundation of the right to information within the 
constitutional scheme.78 While hearing a petition challenging the election of the then 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on account of electoral malpractices, Justice K. 
K. Mathew interpreted the fundamental right to speech and expression in the following 
terms: ‘The people of this country have a right to know every public act, everything that 
is done in a public way, by their functionaries... The right to know... is derived from the 
concept of freedom of speech...’79 The Supreme Court, once again in 1982, while 
dealing with a case relating to judicial appointments observed: ‘The concept of an open 
government is the direct emanation from the right to know which seems to be implicit 
in the right to free speech and expression guaranteed under article 19(1)(a)...’80  
Following the Bhopal Gas Disaster in 1984, a growing concern over the lack of 
transparency in the regulation of risky industries led the environment movement in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78In Bennett Coleman & Co. vs. Union Of India, AIR 1972 SC 106, editors of three national 
dailies moved a petition in the Supreme Court against the government’s Newsprint Policy of 
1972-73 that restricted the acquisition, sale, and consumption of newsprint. The Court struck 
down the policy. A decade later in a similar case, Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. 
Ltd.vs Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641, when the government tried to impose taxes on sale, 
purchase of newspapers and publishing of advertisements, the Court observed, ‘The 
Government must at all material times be conscious of the fact that it is dealing with an activity 
protected by Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution which is vital to our democratic existence.’ 
79In State of UP v. Raj Narain, (1975) 4 SCC 428. A Janata Party candidate, and opponent of 
Indira Gandhi, leader of the Congress Party, alleging corruption after her 1975 election victory 
filed this case. Soon after Indira Gandhi imposed the Emergency. 
80S.P. Gupta vs. The Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149. 
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India to play a significant role in advocating for a public right to information.81 Fearing 
a similar incident in a fertilizer factory in Delhi in the aftermath of Bhopal, an 
environmental action group called Kalpavriksha moved the Supreme Court, ‘asking the 
Court to lay down the right to information as a fundamental right’ (Singh, 2007: 30).82 
Although the Court passed no specific order to this effect, it nevertheless expressed its 
unhappiness over the lack of information and appropriate avenues for understanding 
matters that require expertise at a high level of scientific and technical sophistication.83 
By the 1990’s, then, the judiciary had articulated some support for the right to 
information; but this support was not translated into directives to the executive to ensure 
transparency in everyday government functioning, and the state continued to refuse 
public access to information.  
  
The Long Shadow of the Official Secrets Act 
Thirty years after the 1962 China War, the OSA remained a significant tool in 
the hands of state functionaries at all levels to maintain secrecy.  For example, at a 
workshop organised by the government on compensation for victims of the Bhopal gas 
disaster, ‘participants who took notes at the workshop were arrested under the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81On the night of 2–3 December 1984, a leak of methyl isocyanate gas and other chemicals from 
the Union Carbide India Limited pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, resulted in the 
chemical exposure of hundreds of thousands of people. This gas leak disaster, considered as one 
of the world’s worst industrial disasters, left several thousand dead and several thousand more 
permanently disabled. 
82Also, see Singh and Singh (2006) for a discussion on the role of environmental movements, 
internationally, in advocating freedom and access to information. 
83The Court noted, ‘we had great difficulty in finding out independent experts who would be 
able to advise the court on cases … [that require] neutral scientific expertise as an essential 
input to inform judicial decision making…[W] e had to make an effort on our own to identify 
experts who would provide reliable scientific and technical input necessary for the decision of 
the case and this was obviously a difficult and by its very nature, unsatisfactory exercise…[W] e 
would urge upon the Government of India to set up an Ecological Sciences Research Group 
consisting of independent, professionally competent experts…who would act as an information 
bank for the court and the government departments and generate new information.’ M.C. Mehta 
vs. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 965. 
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provisions of the Official Secrets Act’ (Mander and Joshi, n.d.). There were also cases 
of ‘disappearances’ in insurgency-affected regions like Kashmir and North Eastern 
States. Family members of several missing persons—mostly young men—had no way 
to obtain information from the armed forces of the Indian state about the whereabouts of 
their family members. 
 The anti-dam movement working with the adivasi (tribal) communities 
similarly failed to obtain information from the government regarding the impact of dam 
projects, such as the Sardar Sarovar, on the villages in the Narmada valley. Likewise, 
workers on drought relief works were repeatedly denied access to government records. 
As we saw, the MKSS, in its struggle for minimum wages and for organising Jan 
sunwais, faced a similar denial of information. Panchayat officials, like the gram 
sewaks (panchayat secretary), and intermediate-level public officials, like the tehsildars 
and block development officers, consistently used the OSA to reject requests by MKSS 
activists and villagers for copies of official records (Roy and Dey, 2002).  
In their fight against the state, various democratic struggles quickly discovered 
that this lack of access to information created a major hurdle. The relevance of, and 
need for, government information became frustratingly apparent for the Jan sunswais 
and other rights-based campaigns and grassroots struggles. Information—whether 
pertaining to minimum wages, the whereabouts of missing persons, or the dispossession 
and displacement by big dams—appeared integral to any struggle resisting the arbitrary 
exercise of coercive state power (symbolic and physical). But as Baviskar (2007) notes, 
other movements had neither expressed an explicit demand for, nor galvanised a 
campaign around, a right to information law. Though the demand for a right to 
information law intrinsically linked the demands of all progressive campaigns for social 
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justice and equality, NCPRI finally articulated this demand and galvanised a campaign 
around it.  
 
The Rhetoric of ‘Good Governance’  
With a dramatic shift to open up the economy in 1991 came the added pressure 
for ‘good governance’ from international financial institutions (IFIs) like the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Asian Development Bank. The 
IFIs shaped the transparency agenda for many developing countries by making 
transparency and accountability mechanisms one of their loan conditions. There was 
also an evolving international trend at this time to enact Freedom of Information laws. 
In the last decade, over seventy countries have passed access to information laws; this 
trend is partly attributed to citizens’ increasing lack of trust in the state and intolerance 
towards secrecy in the functioning of both state and non-state actors (Florini, 2007; 
Banisar, 2006).  
The Government of India began to research international experiences with 
implementing access to information laws in the early 1990s.84 An inter-ministerial task 
force was set up in 1991 to examine the feasibility of enacting a Right to Information 
Act. The task force visited the UK, Canada, Sweden, and the USA to learn from their 
experiences with designing and implementing Freedom of Information laws.85 By the 
late 1990s, several state governments agreed to improve transparency in the functioning 
of government by passing right to information laws.86 By 1997, increasing pressure 
from loan agencies compelled state governments to enact right to information laws. For 
instance, according to NCPRI activists, the state of Karnataka received an unofficial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84See, Rowat (1990). 
85Government of India (2001a). 
86See, Rao (n.d.); see also Caiden and Sundaram (2004) 
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communication from the ADB endorsing the creation of an RTI law.87 The State of 
Tamil Nadu was also under pressure from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) for 
bringing in RTI law, and the ADB made the enactment of a transparency law a ‘pre-
condition of loans for sector specific spending.’ 88 
In addition to this international push for transparent regimes, “eminent and 
influential citizens” began advocating separately for the adoption of state laws. In the 
case of Tamil Nadu, S. Guhan, from the Madras Institute of Development Studies, was 
an important advisor to the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister. He invited MKSS activists to 
Chennai after the Beawar dharna (in 1996) and said, ‘he would try to ensure that a RTI 
law was passed.’89 Tamil Nadu was the first state to enact a state right to information 
law, but political opportunism resulted in a weak law. Despite efforts of concerned 
citizens such as S. Guhan, a statement made by the former State Chief Information 
Commissioner for Tamil Nadu reveals the inefficacy of the laws that were springing 
from the state’s limited transparency agenda. Referring to the Tamil Nadu RTI Law of 
the 1996, he remarked:  
 
[the Act] became a secret almost as soon as it was passed [the law was not 
adequately and/or appropriately publicised by the state government]…besides 
the concerned Secretary to government could deny any request for information, 
deemed not in public request, and sweep matters under the carpet.90 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87Shekhar Singh, former Convenor and founder member NCPRI, interview with author. New 
Delhi. 29.05.07 
88Venkatesh Nayak. Programme Coordinator, Access to Information. Commonwealth Human 
Rights Initiative, and member of NCPRI Working Committee, interview with author. New 
Delhi. 11.11.10. 
89Nikhil Dey, MKSS activist, personal correspondence with author. 25.09.12.  
90S. Ramkrishnan, State Chief Information Commissioner, Tamil Nadu State Information 
Commission (rtd.), interview with author. Chennai, Tamil Nadu. 01.12.10; MKSS activist 
Nikhil Dey also notes, ‘the state law, in the absence of a people’s movement was bound to be a 
weak law. The neoliberal agenda––however bad––would not have succeeded at that time in 
passing an RTI act. In Tamil Nadu the political leadership realised that this was an idea whose 
time had come, and it was best to pay lip service to it by passing some act, rather than seen to be 
resisting it.’ Nikhil Dey, personal correspondence, with author. 25.09.12. 
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The Central government however, in line with the “good governance” agenda, 
thought it sufficient to introduce a few insubstantial measures.  Former Cabinet 
Secretary T.S.R. Subramanian (2004: 322) recalls, ‘[I] mportant measures in 
administrative reforms taken up by me fell by the wayside…a draft legislation 
incorporating major changes in the Official Secrets Act was approved, but subsequently 
got lost somewhere in the legislative process.’ Even a request made by the 
Parliamentary Standing Committee discussing the Freedom of Information Bill in 2000 
fell on deaf ears. The Committee asked for the report of the Inter-ministerial Task Force 
Report (1991) to which the Ministry of Home Affairs responded by saying that it had 
“misplaced” Volume I of the report.91  
With the international financial institutions advocating for the RTI laws, 
“transparency” and “accountability” had become the buzzwords within corridors of the 
state.92  But the nature of transparency discourse arising from within the government 
was markedly different from the demands for accountability and transparency raised by 
the transparency struggles outside. While the state only echoed the neoliberal “good 
governance” agenda for public disclosure or ‘access’ to information, civil society 
demanded something as concrete as a legal right to information enshrined in law.  
It is thus important to recognise that there was substantial conflict between the 
ineffectual ‘good governance’ reforms pursued by the state at the advice of IFIs and the 
demands for a deeper and more social justice-oriented transparency emerging from civil 
society. NCPRI reflected the latter: it emerged to fulfil the growing public demand to 
guarantee all citizens the ability to hold public officials accountable in a meaningful 
way and on a daily basis. Thus, very different commitments grounded NCPRI’s interest 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91Government of India (2001b).  
92For instance, in the words of the Chairperson Department-related Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on Home Affairs, transparency in government ‘agitated the minds of common 
people and policy makers’. (Government of India, 2000). 
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in an RTI law. Indeed, as Baviskar (2007:20) argues, the World Bank and other IFI 
propagated “top down accountability” mechanisms did little to make the states 
accountable to its poorest citizens. The NCPRI leadership she notes (2007:20), was 
‘careful to distance itself from the neoliberal demand for transparency.’ 
This brief overview lays out the various debates occurring around transparency 
that led up to the emergence of NCPRI. Energised by MKSS struggles, in 1996, NCPRI 
became the convergence point for various actors energised by these issues. It brought 
together diverse sets of actors into a single unified campaign to advocate for a national 
right to information law. Next I discuss the Beawar dharna, organised in Rajasthan that 
provided the final impetus for the origins of this national campaign. 
 
40-DAYS IN BEAWAR 
After organising Jan sunwais between 1994 and 1995, MKSS entered the next 
phase of its struggle with a demand for a legal right to information. In April of 1996, 
MKSS organised a 40-day dharna (sit-in) in the city of Beawar, tabling the demand 
before the state government for a legal right to information. MKSS, through the dharna, 
was protesting against the Chief Minister (CM) of Rajasthan. Following the first round 
of Jan sunwais in 1995, he had made a public announcement to provide access to 
information at the panchayat level but a year later, lack of any government action 
compelled MKSS to take the struggle to higher levels of the state. Over the course of a 
year (1995-1996), as MKSS awaited further action by the state government on the CM’s 
statement, it mobilised workers from four districts of central Rajasthan to partake in 
actions that culminated in the 40-day sit-in at Beawar.93 This dharna drew the attention 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93MKSS organised workers in Pali, Rajsamand, Ajmer and Bhilwara. Those who could not 
come to Beawar contributed a share of the household grains or small donations towards the 
dharna fund. As Shusheelaji, an MKSS activist told me, ‘we collected 14 bags of wheat here (in 
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of actors outside of Rajasthan, particularly at the national level. Beawar was chosen as 
the dharna site because it is a sub-divisional head quarter.94 The day after the Beawar 
dharna began the Government of Rajasthan issued an order providing access to 
information—by paying a fee—at the panchayat level.95  
In response, MKSS along with hundreds of villagers marched to the office of the 
sub-divisional commissioner and submitted a memorandum, via the Sub-Divisional 
Magistrate, to the Chief Minister. The memorandum demanded a right to access 
panchayat level information and drew attention to the discrepancy—the introduction of 
a new clause for fee payment—between the Chief Minister’s statement in the state 
Assembly and the government order. As the activity heated up at the state and district 
levels in Rajasthan, the journalists who came to Beawar recognised the political 
relevance of the issue and pushed MKSS to take the struggle to Delhi. I now examine 
the role that each of the four types of eminent activists played in the subsequent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Jawaja block).’  Shusheela, MKSS activist, interview with author. Jawaja, Rajasthan.17.12.09; 
Shankar Singh, another MKSS activist, recalls, ‘the tea vendor at Chan Gate in Beawar, gave us 
tea at half price. He said he voted for BJP, and we were opposing his Chief Minister, but he 
agreed with us on the issue. So we could drink his tea at half price.’ Shankar Singh, MKSS 
activist, interview with author. 16.12.09; Nikhil Dey of MKSS recalls other instances of 
solidarity: ‘flower sellers gave us five rupees daily, an old man who worked for the city 
municipality as a street sweeper, came early every morning to sweep the dharna site.’ Nikhil 
Dey, interview with author, Devdungri, Rajasthan. 01.05.10; Aruna Roy recalls, the scepticism 
of lawyers from Beawar in the initial days of the dharna. They asked her, how the village 
women or, to use their words, the “skirt brigade” (ghagra paltan) that had gathered at Beawar 
could successfully advocate for a national RTI legislation. By the end of forty days however, 
over four hundred signatures had been collected and the city of Beawar extended its full support 
to the dharna. Aruna Roy, interview with author. Lahore, Pakistan. 17.03.2008. 
94That is, the administrative unit above the block or panchayat level. Beawar is also centrally 
located, and well connected by road and railways, to the state capital, Jaipur, as well as the 
national capital, Delhi, thus, making it practically and easily accessible for wider publics. Apart 
from its strategic importance, the location also had symbolic relevance. As Justice V.S. Dave of 
the Rajasthan High Court said to me, ‘the city was historically significant for the first free press 
of Rajasthan. It was also the only British India territory where rulers of the princely states of 
Rajputana had no control or power. Thus, exiled members of the Praja Mandals (People’ 
Assemblies) who revolted against princes, sought refuge in Beawar.’ Justice V. S. Dave, Judge. 
Rajasthan High Court (retired), interview with author. Jaipur. 14.12.10. 
95The Order stated that on payment of the fee (Rs. 5), information related to expenditure on 
development works undertaken in rural areas must be provided (Government of Rajasthan, 
1996). 
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campaign, starting with the reformist IAS who MKSS interacted with during the 
struggle for enforcing minimum wages, and the journalists who came to Beawar. They 
constituted important actors in the first phase of the national struggle and helped lay the 
foundations of NCPRI. 
 
THE FIRST PHASE 
The Eminent IAS 
During its struggle for minimum wages, the MKSS encountered a few 
sympathetic civil servants, in particular several IAS officials. These officials used their 
position and power to institute more transparent and accountable systems in their own 
departments and ministries. For instance, the second hunger strike in 1991 brought 
MKSS in contact with a senior IAS official, Mr. S.R. Sankaran, who at the time was a 
Secretary of the Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD). He intervened not at the 
personal request of MKSS but after reading MKSS’s letter of complaint to the MoRD. 
After carrying out his inquiry, Mr. Sankaran presented the state government of 
Rajasthan with an ultimatum: pay full minimum wages to workers of drought relief 
programmes or face withdrawal of central government funds for drought relief. The 
state government agreed to pay full wages, and MKSS ended its hunger strike.  
In his 32 years as an IAS official, Mr. Sankaran had developed a reputation for 
integrity and an unabated and open support for marginalised groups, especially Dalits. 
In his native state of Andhra Pradesh, he worked towards abolishing bonded labour by 
implementing the Abolishment of Bonded Labour Act with such activist zeal that he 
almost lost his job.96 In 1996, Mr. Sankaran became a founding member of NCPRI. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96‘I was Secretary Social Welfare and used the opportunity after the Emergency, to implement 
the bonded labour Act that had been recently enacted as part of the 20 point programme. I made 
frequent visits to villages, dealt with cases that I learnt about and released bonded labour. The 
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Along with a close friend, K.G. Kannabiran, National President of the People’s Union 
for Civil Liberties (PUCL), and Hyderabad-based journalist, Anant M. (previously a 
reporter for the Indian Express in Rajasthan), Mr. Sankaran accompanied MKSS 
activists to meetings, which he helped organise with literacy activists, journalists, 
women living in slums, intellectuals, non-governmental organisations, and civil rights 
activists.97  
IAS officials in neighbouring states like Madhya Pradesh also came into contact 
with MKSS after the Jan sunwais began in 1994. One such person was Harsh Mander, 
Divisional Commissioner of Bilaspur district in Madhya Pradesh, who became the first 
serving IAS official to join NCPRI. As Divisional Commissioner, Harsh Mander, along 
with MKSS, got a Jan sunwai organised on the PDS in Bilaspur. The record of PDS has 
been marred by extensive corruption in India. In 1995, Mander passed a series of 
government orders to ensure effective implementation of the Public Distribution System 
(PDS), a lifeline for the rural poor who depend on it for obtaining subsidised food 
grains.98  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Chief Minister, Chenna Reddy was from a feudal background. He did not like civil servants 
implementing the bonded labour Act. In a meeting he asked me, why do you go to the villages, 
why are you implementing this law? He said he was getting complaints from landlords. Why do 
you go to villages, you are a Secretary? Do other Secretaries go? Normally Secretaries don't go. 
It is the Head of Department who goes. He got angry and said, you go to villages, sit with all 
sorts of people, and take part in processions and shout slogans. I said to him, I do, except take 
part in processions, but I have given them 2 slogans- “Stop bonded labour”, “cancel loans”, 
these capture the essence of the Act, so that people may know about it. You stop this work, he 
said. I refused, and told him, he could transfer me. I don't want you in my government, he said. I 
also got a little angry, and said, I do not want to work for your government. I wrote a letter 
narrating the incident and asked for 6-month leave.’ S.R. Sankaran, Secretary of Rural 
Development, Government of India (rtd.), and Member of NCPRI, interview with author. 
Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. 20.05.10. 
97 As MKSS activist Aruna Roy told me, when someone asked us in Hyderabad where are you 
staying and we gave Mr. Sankaran’s name, that is all it took, to convince people of our integrity, 
such was his reputation. Aruna Roy, MKSS activist and founder member NCPRI, personal 
correspondence with author. 16.09.12. 
98Harsh Mander, former IAS and member of NCPRI, interview with author. New Delhi. 
16.07.09. 
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Soon thereafter, Dr. N.C. Saxena, Director of the IAS training academy, 
Mussorie, with the help of Mander (who was also a faculty member at the IAS training 
academy in Mussorie), invited MKSS activists to a meeting at the academy. Dr. N.C. 
Saxena was also a reformist IAS official. MKSS and these bureaucrats of reformist zeal 
have mutual admiration based on shared values and commitment. The two sympathetic 
officials used their symbolic capital to get something that MKSS activists could not 
have got otherwise: access to the bureaucratic field. The symbolic capital of two other 
NCPRI activists (Shekhar Singh and Aruna Roy), and their access to serving IAS 
officials in the Prime Minister’s Office, enabled NCPRI to counter bureaucratic 
opposition by officials from the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) to the 
NAC Draft of the Right to Information Bill.  
At the meeting organised in 1996 at the IAS training Academy, active civil 
servants, legal experts and activists together discussed the provisions of a new right to 
information law. This meeting produced one of the central provisions of the RTI Act 
2005—a proviso in the law that prevents civil servants from misusing the exemption 
clause to restrict access to information. Dr. Saxena, the Director of the Academy, 
conceived the idea behind the clause.99 Dr. Saxena and Aruna Roy from MKSS, later in 
2004, became members of the advisory body to the Central government, the National 
Advisory Council, which played a critical role in the enactment of the RTI Act (2005). 
In 2009, Mander joined them as a member of the NAC, which, in its second term, took 
up the formulation of another important piece of legislation, the National Food Security 
Bill. These reformist bureaucrats thus played key roles in the formulation of, and early 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act states, “Provided that information which cannot be denied to the 
Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any person”. This proviso accompanies 
the other provisions laid out in the RTI Act (2005) that specifically deals with exemption of 
certain categories of information. According to Aruna Roy, In order to avoid wanton denial of 
information by public functionaries, Dr. Saxena suggested the inclusion of this provision. 
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mobilisation around, the right to information. Other eminent activists from the 
journalistic field joined them in 1996. 
 
 Eminent Journalists 
As Sheth (1983: 4) notes, grassroots initiatives in India extensively use the 
‘Fourth estate’, or media, to ‘protect the rights’ of the poor. In India, as elsewhere, 
journalists’ concern with the freedom of press often makes them strong supporters for 
freedom of information. 100 However, the journalists who had gathered at the Beawar 
dharna played a somewhat different role. They were not the key actors demanding the 
right to information, but, instead, were instrumental in popularising a distinct 
conception of the right to information in India—expressed as “the right to know, the 
right to live” that emerged from the struggles by peasants and workers over the 
enforcement of minimum wages. The visit of several journalists to Beawar played an 
important role in the founding of a national RTI campaign. 
Journalist and political analyst Nikhil Chakravarty, founder of a left-wing 
journal called Mainstream; Kuldip Nayyar, another journalist and former High 
Commissioner to the UK and a Member of Parliament; and Prabhash Joshi, senior 
journalist from Jansatta (a leading Hindi National daily), were among the initial few 
who came to the Beawar dharna in 1996. These journalists helped propel RTI into the 
national public domain. Some of these journalists came to Beawar simply out of 
curiosity.101 For Chakravarty, the struggle of peasants and workers in Rajasthan was 
‘one of the most important struggles of independent India’, and he compared it to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100For example in Malaysia, the Centre for Independent Journalism was one of the key 
organisations leading the campaign for the enactment of the freedom of information bill as they 
envisioned it as a natural corollary to the freedom of press. ‘Lobbying with Local Government’. 
Workshop organised by Pusat Komas. Malaysia 29-30 March 2010. 
101Quoted in, Dey and Roy (2009). 
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many struggles led by Gandhi that he had participated in.102 At the Beawar dharna, he 
said, ‘it was in small meetings such as this one, attended by a few hundred ordinary 
people, that India’s freedom movement took shape...This was a right that should have 
come with independence. It is not going to be easy to win this entitlement, but you must 
not give up. This is like a second battle for independence.’103 Kuldip Nayyar, who 
accompanied Chakravarty, said later that year at a meeting organised by the Press Club 
in Jaipur, ‘we came because we saw a spark in the movement at Beawar.’104  
 Another journalist, Prabhash Joshi, who happened to be passing through Beawar 
was sought out or “way-laid” by MKSS.105 In 1996, Joshi spent twenty-four hours at the 
Beawar dharna, and said ‘I want to acknowledge and pay my respects to the ordinary 
men and women who are the real sovereigns of this country and who, through this 
dharna and struggle, are asserting their sovereign rights in a democracy.’106 He returned 
to Delhi to write a powerful editorial titled ‘The Right to Know, the Right to Live.’107 In 
the article he argued that the right to live and the freedom of expression were integral to 
one another. He wrote, ‘in a democracy with high levels of poverty, the right to 
information cannot be limited to freedom of expression, but is without doubt about the 
right to life’ (Joshi, 1996). The article captured the essence of the local struggle by the 
workers and peasants in Rajasthan, and its title became the campaign’s most popular 
slogan.  
 Soon after, Prabhash Joshi together with Ajit Bhattacharjea, the Director of Press 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102Ibid 
103Ibid 
104The Hindu (1996) 
105According to MKSS activist Nikhil Dey, who went to invite Prabhash Joshi to the Beawar 
dharna, Dey recalls, I talked for nearly an hour, as he [Joshi] ate his dinner, in the end, he 
[Joshi] simply said “I will come”. Nikhil Dey, MKSS activist, interview with author. 
Devdungri, Rajasthan. 01.05.10. 
106Roy, Dey and Singh (2010) 
107Author translation from the original title in Hindi, see Joshi (1996).  
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Council of India (PCI), played an important role in gathering some of the prominent 
people that would constitute NCPRI. It was Joshi also who suggested the campaign be 
called the ‘National Campaign for People’s Right to Information.’108 Both Joshi and 
Bhattacharjea became founding members of the NCPRI, and continued to write 
extensively on the RTI. In order to spread the word about the campaign in Rajasthan 
and its gradual expansion to other parts of the country, Bhattacharjea founded 
‘Transparency: Bulletin of the Right to Information Movement.’ Joshi became a 
confidante and mentor of MKSS activists Aruna Roy and Nikhil Dey, who, along with 
other people’s movements like the Anti-Dam Movement, or NBA, relied upon Joshi for 
his astute understanding of politics while lobbying political parties, and especially in 
moments of crisis.  
  Although the issue of right to information had been a substantial concern for the 
press (largely the print media), no member of the press—apart from the 1970’s public 
interest litigations to protect free press—had pursued the RTI as a legal entitlement. 
Intellectuals in seminars, policy makers in government, and even courts of law had 
actively discussed the right to information. Thus, when these journalists visited Beawar 
in 1996, they encountered a familiar demand, but, this time, it was being made by a 
rather unexpected part of the citizenry: rural workers and peasants. The journalists 
realised that the framing of the demand for a right to information also went beyond its 
more common liberal conceptualisation. That is, ordinary workers and peasants had 
successfully linked the right to information to their struggle for enforcement of 
minimum wages, but also to a more substantial and ideal form of democracy, far from 
the lived experiences of poorer citizens.  
 The MKSS now had access to two different fields: the media and the bureaucratic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Aruna Roy, founding member NCPRI and MKSS activist, interview with author. Lahore, 
Pakistan. 17.03.2008. 
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state. It also had the support of prominent individuals who had the relevant capital to 
exert influence in their specific fields. With the support from IAS officials and 
journalists, the MKSS expanded its activity and sought out other actors at the national 
level. New actors known to the journalists and IAS officials were brought together 
under the banner of NCPRI. Prabhash Joshi and Ajit Bhattacharjea, together with Nikhil 
Chakravarty and Kuldip Nayyar, got Justice Sawant involved in drafting the law as 
Chair of the Press Council of India. The NCPRI was constituted in 1996, in Delhi, with 
the specific purpose of engaging the political state—politicians/parliamentarians—at the 
national level. I now focus on the creation of NCPRI that followed the Beawar dharna, 
which brought together lawyers, judges, and activist academics. Each used their specific 
capital in the bureaucratic and political spheres to advance the demand for national RTI 
legislation. 
 
THE SECOND PHASE 
The Meeting in Delhi 
The major objective of NCPRI in 1996 was to lobby for a national right to 
information act. The opposition by the gram sewaks and tehsildars (block level 
officials) and other district level officials, as well as the foot-dragging by the BJP 
government in Rajasthan influenced NCPRI’s decision to target the Indian Parliament, 
and demand a national RTI law. This would also mark the first time the demand for 
institutionalising the right to information was expressed publicly. According to Shekhar 
Singh, former Convenor and founding member of NCPRI, ‘in 1996 Aruna and Nikhil 
emerged from Rajasthan, and talked about wanting to institutionalise RTI, because they 
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had seen its impact [based on Jan sunwais] at the local [panchayat] level.’109 According 
to Singh, who taught at the Indian Institute of Public Administration (IIPA) for twenty-
four years, ‘we thought it [a national legislation] would be easier than state acts, 
primarily influenced by the fact that in Rajasthan it would be an uphill task.’110  
The NCPRI was formally constituted when a meeting jointly organised by the 
IIPA and the Press Council of India, under the chairmanship of a retired Supreme Court 
judge, Justice P. B. Sawant, who, along with Nikhil Chakravarty, Prabhash Joshi and 
Ajit Bhattacharjea, brought together an array of supporters. Along with the Attorney 
General of India, they brought retired Judges from the Higher Judiciary, such as Justice 
V. M. Tarkunde (retired judge of the Bombay High Court), a Public Interest Litigation 
lawyer in the Supreme Court, Prashant Bhushan, an ardent advocate of judicial 
accountability, Subhash C. Kahsyap, a constitutional expert. Additionally, journalists, 
academics, and social and political activists attended the meeting. Also present at the 
Delhi meeting was former Prime Minister V. P. Singh, who quit the Congress Party in 
1989 as it was battling corruption charges over a defence deal (also known as the Bofors 
case). Singh would become a strong supporter of the national right to information 
legislation, and in 2005-06 he helped mediate between NCPRI activists and the Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh on behalf of RTI and the right to work campaigns.  
IAS officials from the IIPA were also invited and the entire group debated the 
issue of transparency and accountability for a day and half. Shekhar Singh, who knew 
Harsh Mander, explained, ‘I knew Aruna, not personally, but from when she worked 
with my father, [who was a civil servant]. In 1996, Harsh [Mander] introduced me to 
them [Aruna and Nikhil]. I was teaching at the IIPA and had some funds available to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109Shekhar Singh, former Convenor and founder member NCPRI, interview with author. New 
Delhi. 29.05.07. 
110 Ibid 
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me, with which we organised the first NCPRI meeting in Delhi.’111 The meeting led to 
the creation of a Working Group of ten founding members as the main decision making 
body of the NCPRI. 112 This is what the network looked like in 1996. 
After the meeting in Delhi, participants were also given various responsibilities. 
Singh was given the responsibility of taking the message of RTI to civil servants. As he 
told me, ‘we infiltrated RTI into every course [at the IIPA].’113 A core group was also 
formed to draft a bill on the right to information. Under the chairmanship of Justice 
Sawant, the Press Council of India drafted a model bill on the right to information (also 
known as the PCI Draft Bill), and submitted it to the Prime Minister of the United Front 
Government. NCPRI activists thus pushed the draft Bill in the political sphere.  
In the 1996 general elections, none of three major political parties (Congress, the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), or the Left Front) were able to secure the requisite number 
of seats in Parliament to form a government. The United Front coalition government 
came to power for a year and was headed by two Prime Ministers—I.K. Gujaral and 
H.D. Deve Gowda. The Congress Party supported this coalition government of thirteen 
disparate political parties from the outside (Kaviraj, 1997; Pai, 1996). The United Front 
coalition government had also placed the issue of transparency and the right to 
information in its Common Minimum Programme. It is interesting to note that the first 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111Ibid 
112The founding members of NCPRI who met in Delhi in 1996 were -Ajit Bhattacharjea, Aruna 
Roy, Bharat Dogra, K.G. Kannabiran, M.P. Parmeshwaram, Prabhash Joshi, Prashant Bhushan, 
Renuka Mishra, S.R. Sankaran, and Shekhar Singh. The NCPRI is still active today with a 
Working Group of thirty-two members. An honorary Convenor and a full-time General 
Secretary are the official points of contact for the NCPRI. 
113Ibid; RTI was incorporated into the advanced professional programme for civil servants at 
IIPA. MKSS activists were invited as resource persons to facilitate discussions on right to 
information for IAS officers under training at the IIPA (see, Government of India, 1997b; 
Government of India, 1997c). The new Director of the IAS Academy in Missouri, B.S. Baswan 
also wrote to the Additional Secretary Administrative Reforms and Training in the Department 
of Personnel and Training, Government of India, endorsing Shekhar Singh’s suggestion made 
on behalf of NCPRI’s: to incorporate penal provisions and disclosure of file notings in the draft 
Press Council of India draft right to information Bill (Government of India, 1997a). 
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Prime Minister of the United Front government, I.K. Gujaral was a former journalist. 
As Justice Sawant said, ‘we sent the draft Bill to all Members of Parliament, Members 
of State Legislative Assemblies, and Chief Ministers of states.’ 114 The Prime Minister 
at the time gave a ‘positive response to the PCI Draft Bill.’115 In 1997, the United Front 
coalition government constituted a working group headed by a consumer rights 
advocate H.D. Shourie. The Working Group on RTI and Promotion of Open and 
Transparent Government invited Justice Sawant to its meetings to discuss the contents 
of the Freedom of Information bill.116 
The conservative Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), however, replaced the United 
Front Government in 1998. The political environment under the new BJP government 
was not conducive to getting the legislation passed.117 An illustration will help to 
convey the stance of the BJP government. Acting independently, the Urban 
Development Minister (who was also advised by NCPRI member and Supreme Court 
lawyer Prashant Bhushan) in 1999 attempted to enforce transparency in the Urban 
Development Ministry and issued an order giving access to official records and 
documents of the Ministry.118 The Cabinet Secretary, on the instructions of the Prime 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114Justice P.B. Sawant, former Judge of the Supreme Court and Chairperson of Press Council of 
India, interview with author. Pune, Maharashtra. 26.09.10. 
115 Ibid 
116Minutes of meeting of the Shourie Working Group give details of the comments made by 
Justice Sawant on two provisions of the proposed Freedom of Information Bill - the definition 
of public authority and the discussion of the inclusion and wording of non-obstante clause or 
overriding effect of RTI on other legislations (Government of India, 1997d). 
117Justice P.B. Sawant, former Judge of the Supreme Court and Chairperson of Press Council of 
India, interview with author. Pune, Maharashtra. 26.09.10. 
118Urban Development Minister Ram Jethmalani issued the order using the Supreme Court 
Constitution bench decisions, mentioned earlier that held that the citizens have the right to get 
information about all aspects of government functioning. He had also insisted that anything 
available to Members of Parliament must be available to citizens. The same clause that N.C. 
Saxena an IAS official had suggested in 1995 at the meeting at the IAS academy in Mussorie. 
Venkatesh Nayak. Programme Coordinator, Access to Information. Commonwealth Human 
Rights Initiative, and member of NCPRI Working Committee, interview with author. New 
Delhi. 11.11.10. 
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Minister, revoked the Minister’s order.119 For NCPRI, the next few years would be 
about building a support base for the right to information outside. 
While the central government remained unresponsive to proposals for right to 
information legislation, MKSS travelled to other states in India with the PCI Draft Bill, 
and, in 2001, NCPRI organised its first national convention in Beawar to commemorate 
the five-year anniversary of the dharna and submission of the Press Council of India 
(PCI) draft RTI Bill. Next, I examine what the network looked like five years after it 
was first constituted. NCPRI expanded between 2001 and 2004 by including new actors 
(activists and activist academics) and building inter-organisational linkages with 
different issue groups and grassroots campaigns. 
 
THE THIRD PHASE 
My fourth category of eminent activists that were invited into NCPRI after 2001 
share the same symbolic capital—respect, prestige and honorific status—with the initial 
wave of journalists, IAS officials, judges and lawyers, and academics that led to the 
creation of NCPRI in 1996. However, what is markedly different about this second 
wave of eminent activists is their claim to representativeness. This fourth category 
includes activists, lawyers, artists, leftist intellectuals or academic activists who are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Additionally, according to Shekhar Singh, founder member of NCPRI, the actions of the BJP 
government lead the Centre for Public Interest Litigation and Common Cause, two non-
government organisations, to file a public interest litigation in the Supreme Court asking the 
court declare unconstitutional the actions of the Cabinet secretary as well as Section 5 of the 
OSA that prevents public officials from disclosing official information. It further asked the 
court to direct the government to issue administrative directives based o the Press Council of 
India draft RTI Bill. Shekhar Singh, former Convenor and founder member NCPRI, interview 
with author. New Delhi. 29.05.07. 
According to Nikhil Dey, MKSS activist, MKSS was party to this Supreme Court case where 
Jethmalani’s orders were being used in Court to ask the government what it was doing about the 
RTI law. However, as Dey said to me, ‘our focus was never such cases, but the legislation.’ 
Nikhil Dey, MKSS activist, personal correspondence with author, 25.09.12.  
	   131	  
representatives of people’s movements from the ‘non-party’ political domain (Kothari, 
1984; Sheth, 1983).120  
These groups are at the margins of the mainstream political field. These left 
progressive movements are typically non-violent in nature and advance the interests of 
marginalised and excluded citizenry from outside the sphere of electoral politics. They 
represent an alternative political force—“people’s politics”—that seeks to change state 
practices and policies from the outside. This third type of eminent activists, some of 
whom sacrificed traditional careers for full-time activism, are not interested in capturing 
state power, and thus their claim to represent the poor and excluded is often seen as 
more respectable and prestigious than politicians. This makes it difficult for the state to 
dismiss and/or co-opt them. Moreover, because they are non-violent, it is somewhat 
more difficult to repress them than the violent left. These movement leaders began to 
play a major role with the Beawar convention in 2001.  
 
The National Convention in Beawar (2001) 
Medha Patkar, the leader of the anti-dam Narmada Bachao Andolan (the NBA), 
and Arundhati Roy, writer and public intellectual, were amongst the eminent activists 
from across the country that gathered in Beawar in 2001. The question that the 
participants centrally grappled with at Beawar was how to strategise new ways—aside 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 The term “non-party political formation” was first used by Rajni Kothari (1984) to talk about 
public interest groups working outside the electoral domain, mainly in villages with the poorest 
of poor, bargaining for policy changes. Sheth (1983) also talks about the “Grassroots 
Initiatives” that are similar to Kothari’s “non-party political formations”: they do not intend to 
capture political power, and work at the village level to create an alternative model of 
development. Morris-Jones (1963:140) also categorises such groups in what he calls the third 
idiom of politics in India: “saintly politics”. These groups, as we also know, work through 
national networks active in the bureaucratic and judicial arenas (Katzenstein et al, 2001). Such 
groups are different from New Farmers Movement in India, who are also non-political in form, 
but have entered into informal alliances with political parties, and use different tactics to put 
pressure on the state: ‘blocking food transport systems, denying officials access into their 
villages, refusing to pay outstanding bills’ (tax arrears, electricity bills etc.) (Brass, 1995: 3-4). 
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from the once-in-five year vote—to hold the Indian state accountable. Since a lot of 
different issue groups or campaigns worked at the local level, the relevance of devising 
new practices of accountability from the district level down to the panchayat was a 
common concern. Therefore, at the first national convention in Beawar, in 2001, the 
NCPRI adopted a resolution articulating a vision of the ‘People’s Right to Information’, 
with reference to various policy areas vital to the people—health, food security, human 
rights, gender, education, environment, and national security. Additionally, in an effort 
to support grassroots struggles for the RTI, NCPRI made official its objective to include 
people’s movements in the campaign.121  
Eventually, discussions and forums brought more and more social movements 
into the fold. One of the ways in which NCPRI reached out to other people’s 
movements to build inter-organisational ties was through its own founding members, 
who were also affiliated with other networks, such as the Peoples’ Union for Civil 
Liberties (PUCL), Citizens for Democracy, and Jan Vikas Andolan (Centre for 
Education and Documentation).  
 
The Campaign at Work 
Whereas the struggle for the right to information law took root in Rajasthan and 
Delhi, it began to spread to other states. Activists from MKSS and NCPRI were seeking 
out other activists from across the country that would understand the relevance and need 
for official information to be accessible to broader publics. The draft Press Council of 
India or PCI Bill was discussed in detail in meetings organised by the MKSS and the 
NCPRI. Based on these discussions, the draft underwent further revisions. As Mr. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (2001) 
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Sankaran explained, ‘The right [RTI] emerged from a field experience in Rajasthan, but 
it got canvassed in different forums [across the country].’ 122 
MKSS and NCPRI activists collaborated with local activists in south and east of 
the country to popularise the right to information. From October 1996, NCPRI 
organised meetings in Orissa (October 15), Tamil Nadu (October 29), Karnataka 
(November 4), and Andhra Pradesh (November 6-7). In Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh), 
meetings were organised by NCPRI through founding members such S. R. Sankaran 
and K.G. Kannabiran. M.P. Parmeshwaram, a nuclear scientist who quit his job to join 
the Kerala People’s Science Movement (KSSP), was also a founding member of the 
NCPRI. In 1996, KSSP members visited Rajasthan to observe and learn from the 
MKSS on how to organise Jan sunwais.123  In Orissa, Agragamee, an organisation 
working in tribal districts of Orissa took the initiative to organise meetings. In Chennai 
(Tamil Nadu), the Madras Institute of Development Studies gathered academics, policy 
makers, human rights activists, and members of citizens’ fora.  In Bangalore 
(Karnataka), the Jan Vikas Andolan (Centre for Education and Documentation) 
organised a daylong workshop for Southern states on RTI.124 A year later, NCPRI also 
organised a public hearing with the NBA in Madhya Pradesh on the Maheshwar dam 
project.  
In Rajasthan, apart from MKSS, NCPRI linked up with single issue-based 
networks, such as the right to food. Issue groups like the right to food would become 
important national campaigns in their own right, such as the Right to Food Campaign, 
and the People’s Action for Employment Guarantee (PAEG), and had overlapping 
memberships between NCPRI. The Right to Food Campaign, for example, followed the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122S.R. Sankaran, Secretary of Rural Development, Government of India (rtd), and Member of 
NCPRI, interview with author. Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. 20.05.10. 
123 T. Gangadharan, KSSP activist, interview with author. Trichur, Kerala. 12.05.10. 
124 Srivastava. (n.d.); see also Jan Vikas Andolan (1996). 
	   134	  
conventional social movement strategy outlined above and filed a public interest 
litigation to enforce a legal right to food. The PAEG, on the other hand, with its 
overlapping membership of activists like Aruna Roy and activist academic Jean 
Drèze—both members of the NAC—used the legislative route to enact a legal right to 
work. 
By the time of the first national convention, at least five state governments had 
enacted state RTI laws. As we learnt earlier, some of these state laws were partially 
influenced by the then-fashionable “good governance” agenda, which had been 
internalised by the existing bureaucratic structure. It is not surprising that these state 
laws, by and large, provided only limited access to information and were difficult to be 
put into use for ordinary citizens. Nevertheless, they filled citizens using these laws 
with an unfamiliar poise and sense of equality in their dealings with IAS and other 
public officials (gram sewaks, tehsildars). Between 2001 and 2004, the repeated use of 
various state RTI laws led to a burgeoning group of RTI users and activists across India.  
 
The Second National Convention on RTI 2004 
By the year 2004, experiences derived from different states’ RTI campaigns 
made the right to information a politically effective demand. NCPRI became the vehicle 
for realising this demand. As noted earlier, between 2001 and 2004 NCPRI began to 
expand its member base. It identified and actively sought out new RTI advocates from 
different states as well as actors representing diverse issues such as the right to food, 
work, environment, electoral reforms, and others. Some new entrants were also personal 
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friends of NCPRI activists.125 The new actors were invited to join the NCPRI campaign 
committee.  
For instance, Frederick Noronah, an eminent journalist from Goa, became a 
close ally of NCPRI and a prominent advocate for RTI in the state of Goa.126 An Indian 
Revenue Services (IRS) official, Arvind Kejriwal, became a strong RTI advocate in 
Delhi. Kejriwal and other activists of Parivartan used the Delhi RTI Act (2001) and 
pioneered urban Jan sunwais in a working class neighbourhood of east Delhi.127 These 
Jan sunwais were primarily inspired by and closely modelled on the MKSS experience. 
Well-known journalist Prakash Kardaley from Pune, and regional editor of the national 
newspaper Indian Express, also joined the NCPRI. Kardaley also founded the first 
online discussion group on RTI called Hum Janenge, or “We will know.” Other new 
allies included Maja Daruwala and Venkatesh Nayak of the Commonwealth Human 
Rights Initiative (CHRI), which is a non-partisan transnational non-governmental 
organisation working on the practical realisation of human rights. The CHRI brought 
the international experiences of freedom of information laws to the NCPRI. Later we 
will learn about the role of CHRI members in revising the draft Bill for the NAC in 
2004. 
NCPRI also sought out ordinary people who were actively using state right to 
information laws. One such person was Shailesh Gandhi, a businessman from Mumbai 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125Suman Sahai (a friend of Shekhar Singh) from the Gene Campaign, working on famer’s 
rights in particular genetic resources and trade, and Dunu Roy (a close friend of Aruna Roy) 
from Hazard Centre a Delhi-based research group that works on urban planning were on the 
NCPRI Campaign Committee. 
126Noronah (n.d.). 
127Kejriwal took a leave of absence and set up an organisation called Sampoorn Parivartan to 
check corruption in delivery of public services. In 2000 Kejriwal broke off from Sampoorn 
Parivartan, to start a new organisation called Parivartan and began work in a working class 
neighbourhood of Delhi, Sundernagri. He eventually resigned from the IRS in 2006. In 2001 
Kejriwal also spent time in Rajasthan with the MKSS and later organised the first urban Jan 
sunwai on development works in the city. Parivartan activists incorporated several aspects of 
the MKSS repertoire, including the use of music, street theatre, and open public hearings. 
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who sold his business and devoted his time to filing right to information applications. 
On average, Gandhi filed one right to information request per day and unearthed a 
number of scams involving transfer appointments of the Mumbai police and sales of 
public land. Gandhi joined NCPRI in 2004 and later went on to become its Convenor in 
2007. The following year, he was appointed Information Commissioner in the Central 
Information Commission, the independent appellate body under the RTI Act. Anjali 
Bharadwaj, who previously worked with Kejriwal and Shekhar Singh and later started 
her own organisation, Satark Nagrik Sangathan (SNS), which works in slum areas of 
south Delhi, also became a NCPRI member. SNS, like Parivartan, was active in 
organising Jan sunwais on the implementation of the Public Distribution System 
(PDS).128   
NCPRI also established links with people who were using cultural media, like 
folk music, to draw people’s attention to various forms of state repression. Vinay 
Mahajan, an agricultural engineer, and Charul Bharwada, an architect, formed Loknaad 
or People’s Voice to increase social awareness through singing; they soon joined hands 
with NCPRI after meeting MKSS activists Aruna Roy and Nikhil Dey in the aftermath 
of the 2002 communal riots in Gujarat.129 Several of the new members who joined 
NCPRI were invited not only to display organisational strength, but also to proactively 
share in the commitment to ‘support a participatory, just, informed, secular and humane 
democracy.’130 Thus, from a small group of ten members—largely journalists, a retired 
judge, lawyers, and civil servants—NCPRI expanded to include ordinary citizens, other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128For a detailed discussion of the SNS’s anti-corruption activism and its use of right to 
information for PDS and other urban services for slum dwellers see, Webb (2011); for a 
discussion of the use of right to information and Jan sunwais on implementation of PDS in 
working class neighbourhoods in east Delhi see Pande (2008). 
129Vinay Mahajan, founding member Loknaad, and member of NCPRI Working Committee, 
interview with author. Ahmedabad, Gujarat. 7.12.09. 
130National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (2004a). 
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activists and activist academics representing diverse issue groups. Many of the people I 
mentioned above were invited by Shekhar Singh, Aruna Roy and other founding 
members of NCPRI to join the Working Committee of NCPRI after the second National 
Convention on the RTI organised in Delhi in October 2004.131 
The NCPRI network—which by now encompassed legal experts, social 
activists, civil servants, journalists, and ordinary citizens—proved significant to the 
creation of the national RTI law. In creating this network, NCPRI brought together 
technical skills in law-making, insights into government functioning, and of course the 
symbolic capital that would ultimately help them gain access to government officials 
and lawmakers. By 2004, with an expanded member base and the momentum generated 
by the dynamic use of various state RTI laws, eminent activists in NCPRI made the 
demand for a national right to information legislation politically relevant. NCPRI had 
been waiting for a moment that would enable it to translate a politically effective 
demand into a universal right. That moment arrived with the 2004 general elections and 
the change in the central government. 
 
A POLITICAL OPENING 
In the 2004 general elections, the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
was unexpectedly defeated by a new Congress-led coalition.132 The Congress Party had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131Like the constitution of the first NCPRI working committee in 1996, the second working 
committee was elected at the Delhi convention, and later expanded to include new members by 
circulating names to the campaign committee (as per the NCPRI constitution). Since 2005 
NCPRI also developed an informal support base of members who make nominal monetary 
contributions to become members (on an annual basis or paid a lump sum amount to become 
members for life). These are ‘passive’ members, that is, they pledged support for the cause, 
actively use right to information, but did not actively engage in the actual drafting of the law or 
in the running of NCPRI. 
132The Congress Party had successfully managed to gather enough seats (40 percent) in the Lok 
Sabha (People’s Assembly), clinching the required majority with the left parties supporting the 
government from ‘outside’ (Wilkinson, 2005); also see, McGuire (2009). 
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focused on forging strong alliances with regional parties, including the left parties. In 
order to woo the rural, middle, and low-income voters, it also expressed a commitment 
to the aam admi (common man) through electoral promises, including pledges to a 
transparent and accountable government and to the creation of jobs.133 After the general 
elections, the Congress Party coalition (supported from the outside by left parties) 
formed the United Progressive Alliances (UPA) government. The Common Minimum 
Programme or CMP produced by the UPA coalition government contained the vision of 
the aam aadmi’s sarkar (government of the common man), and was the result of an 
agreement between coalition partners to ensure the Congress Party would deliver on its 
election promises (Baviskar, 2007).  The CMP specifically stated, ‘The Right to 
Information Act will be made more progressive, participatory and meaningful’ 
(Government of India, 2004b: 16). 
As Shekhar Singh recalls in early 2004, ‘Nikhil, Jean, and I were meeting, when 
somebody from the Congress Party called to ask for two paragraphs, one on right to 
information and another on the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), 
for their party manifesto.’134 Two paragraphs were drafted, but even as the activists took 
up the opportunity to push forward their demands, they did not pin any hopes on the 
phone call. A few months later, the Congress Party had won the election, and laid out 
the “main priorities” of the Congress led coalition government in the CMP. A strong 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133For instance, in a discussion with some women in a working class colony in east Delhi, I 
recall their enthusiasm for the Congress Party. One of the ladies I spoke to said, “Indira ne 
basaya, Sonia kaam dilayegi” (Indira settled us, Sonia will find us jobs). I was speaking to 
some women in New Seemapuri, a working class residential area in east Delhi, as part of my 
research entitled ‘Ensuring public accountability through community action’, conducted for the 
Institute of Social Studies Trust (ISST), supported by the International Development Research 
Centre (IDRC), Canada. 
134Shekhar Singh, former Convenor and founder member NCPRI, interview with author. New 
Delhi. 29.05.07. 
	   139	  
right to information law was one of the ruling coalition’s priorities. Reading the CMP, 
the NCPRI activists became hopeful.  
However, activists did not rule out a strong bureaucratic opposition to their 
model law—with its guarantee of universal access, strong penal provisions, and an 
independent appeal mechanism. As I will discuss, in response to NCPRI’s RTI draft 
bill, the bureaucratic state attempted to push for a weaker Freedom of Information Bill, 
already passed by Parliament in 2002 (which was not yet notified by the central 
government). But the Congress Party committed to passing a stronger RTI law. This 
commitment, apart from coinciding with civil society’s demands, also had the 
unequivocal support of the party leadership.  
A combination of factors contributing to NCPRI’s importance greatly affected 
its ability to achieve its objective. The work of NCPRI’s eminent activists led to the 
creation of a political space at the national level. At this stage, key activists in the 
network, such as Aruna Roy, Jean Drèze, and N C. Saxena, were invited to occupy 
positions in the National Advisory Council (NAC), an apex public policy advisory body 
that included Sonia Gandhi, the Congress Party President. The NAC was set up to 
provide policy and legislative inputs to the government with the mandate to implement 
the CMP. Thus, activists gained direct access to the highest levels of the state, access 
that they previously lacked. Thereby, the NAC became a key site to offset the counter-
mobilisation of IAS officials, especially those in the Department of Personnel and 
Training (DoPT).  
As I will illustrate below, in the lead up to the enactment of the RTI law in 2005, 
the oppositional responses of the central bureaucracy—namely, by the Department of 
Personnel and Training, which is in charge of recruitment, training, career development 
and staff welfare—and of the political state, pushed activists to simultaneously resist 
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and engage the different arms of the state. NCPRI activists’ relationships to certain state 
actors enabled it to leverage its access to the top political leadership, via the NAC, and, 
hence, to offset the opposition from the central bureaucracy. While activists had an 
unusual amount of access to the political state, they also engaged the top levels of the 
bureaucratic state by vetting sympathetic bureaucrats. Throughout the pre-legislative 
process, these bureaucrats served as key informants for activists, and allowed NCPRI to 
successfully counter the opposition from the DoPT bureaucracy.  
 
INFILTRATING THE POLITICAL STATE 
 In June 2004, the Congress Party President, Sonia Gandhi, set up an apex policy 
advisory body—the National Advisory Council (NAC)—with prominent members of 
NCPRI as its members. The NAC became a political space for societal actors working 
with the poor, marginalised and excluded groups to negotiate significant rights-based 
policies, such as the Right to Information, the Right to Work (NREGA), and the Forest 
Rights Act (FRA). With the support of Mrs. Gandhi, key NCPRI activists that had 
direct access to her enabled the national right to information legislation to make its way 
to the top of the NAC agenda. However, the discussion in the political field, largely due 
to the support from Mrs. Gandhi, was different from the discussion in the bureaucratic 
field, which channelled its opposition via the Prime Minister. 
 First, let us consider the support that the NCPRI activists had in the political field 
and from Mrs. Gandhi. As Convenor of the NCPRI at the time, Shekhar Singh was 
given the task of operationalising the group’s demands and advocacy strategies. ‘We 
developed a whole series of amendments to the Government’s Freedom of Information 
Bill 2002. Arvind (Kejriwal) did some initial work and then Prashant (Bhushan). 
Finally, Nikhil (Dey), Arvind, Prashant, Charmine [Rodrigues, from CHRI] and I sat up 
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till 3 am, and clause-by-clause revised the Government’s Freedom of Information Bill. 
We all had different perspectives: Nikhil (also a law graduate) brought the grassroots 
experience, Prashant was the legal eye, and Charmine was well versed with laws across 
the world.’135 Shekhar Singh also activated his international network of transparency 
advocates on the International Transparency Task Force for feedback.136 
 In August 2004, Aruna Roy, as a central node of the RTI network, and member of 
the NAC, sent the NCPRI draft to the NAC for discussion. With no fixed agenda, the 
strong network presence in the NAC made it possible for NCPRI’s model RTI Bill to 
become the first item discussed by the NAC. Rather than consult the ministry of law 
and the concerned Department of Personnel and Training, and rather than constituting a 
committee—as was done in the case of the Forest Rights Act—NCPRI drafted a 
national right to information law along with the political state while largely avoiding the 
bureaucratic state. The NCPRI’s model RTI bill, with some changes,137 was sent, with a 
signed letter from Sonia Gandhi, to the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) for discussion in 
Parliament.138 At this stage the right to information legislation left the political field, 
momentarily, and entered the bureaucratic field.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135Shekhar Singh, former Convenor and founder member NCPRI, interview with author. New 
Delhi. 29.05.07. 
136The task force was initiated by Joseph Stiglitz as a part of the International Policy Dialogue, 
and produced a series of country and area specific papers see, Florini, A. (2007); Some 
members of this task force also attended the Jan sunwai organised by MKSS and NCPRI in 
Kumbalgarh, Rajasthan (1999).  
137For instance, the NAC changed the recommendation on appointment of Information 
Commissioners. NCPRI had recommended a committee that has a Chief Justice must do the 
appointments. The bureaucrats in the NAC did not want to involve the judges in the 
appointments process. As per the law, the Committee for the appointment of Information 
Commissioners at the Central level includes the Prime Minister, Leader of Opposition and a 
Union Cabinet Minister to be nominated by the Prime Minister. At the State level the 
Information Commissioner is appointed by a Committee, which includes the Chief Minister, 
Leader of Opposition and a Cabinet Minister to be nominated by the Chief Minister. As a result, 
despite the provision for journalists, academics, lawyers to be appointed Information 
Commissioners, with a few exceptions, the post of the Information Commissioner has been 
handed out to retiring bureaucrats. 
138 In her letter Mrs. Gandhi reiterated the promise of the UPA to pass a strong, participatory 
and meaningful RTI Act (Gandhi, 2004). 
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BUREAUCRATIC BLOCKAGE 
 The process of enactment entered its most critical moment upon entering the PMO 
in August 2004. The political parties and politicians felt less threatened by the RTI than 
the bureaucracy, who would be directly impacted by it and ‘burdened’ with its 
implementation. Implementing the RTI law would require a change in mindset, and a 
radical overhaul of the bureaucratic apparatus’s day-to-day functioning. For this, neither 
the top level IAS officials nor the lower level sarkari karamcharis were prepared. As a 
result, while en route from the NAC to Parliament, the RTI law received its staunchest 
opposition, particularly from the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT), the 
nodal department in charge of reviewing the NAC draft.  
 Both the scope and breadth of public access to government information and the 
penal provisions in the RTI bill were some of the strongest provisions internationally 
and, therefore, also the most worrisome for the bureaucrats. The penal provisions in the 
NAC draft were particularly worrisome as they applied to erring officials, thus fixing 
the failure to provide information personally on officials rather than collectively on 
departments or ministries. According to Singh, who taught IAS officials for over two 
decades, the ‘NAC draft created panic amongst sections of civil servants.’ My teaching 
at the IIPA allows me to get informal information from former trainees, and Aruna's 
own networks allowed us to know blow by blow what was happening and how the 
bureaucracy was burying the recommendations of the NAC.’139  
 The bureaucracy adopted a two-fold counter strategy: it proposed to resurrect the 
weaker Freedom of Information Bill (2002) and to create additional legal hurdles. A 
series of late night discussions took place, and bureaucrats, particularly in the DoPT, 
arrived at the decision to activate the Freedom of Information Bill (2002). They [DoPT 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139Shekhar Singh, former Convenor and founder member NCPRI, interview with author. New 
Delhi. 29.05.07. 
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officials] told the Prime Minister’s office that similar recommendation as those made by 
the NAC in 2005 had earlier been considered and rejected by government when passing 
the Freedom of Information (FOI) Bill (in 2002). Thus, there was no need to consider 
them again.140 The DoPT officially took the view that since the Freedom of Information 
Bill (2002) had already been passed by Parliament and received Presidential assent, the 
government should notify the FOI Act, and implement it for a few years; then further 
amendments to improve the FOI Act could be considered. A draft note prepared by the 
DoPT for a cabinet meeting stated, ‘…Certain provisions suggested by the Council 
[NAC] have been modified keeping in view the legislative, constitutional, and 
administrative requirements.’141 As Shekhar Singh told me, ‘in a meeting with Sonia 
Gandhi in which I was present a senior civil servant [IAS official] confirmed the actions 
of DoPT officials.’142 In December 2004 a significantly watered down version of the 
RTI Bill was sent to the Parliament for discussion.  
 The NCPRI countered the opposition by the bureaucracy by seeking out different 
people to petition different political parties. Notably, NCPRI activists lobbied leaders of 
the Communist Party of India, a key partner in the UPA coalition government. It also 
sought the legal opinion of former law Minister Shanti Bhushan—also the father of an 
NCPRI member, lawyer Prashant Bhushan—to counter the opposition from the DoPT 
and the Ministry of law. The issue at stake was whether in a federal system, the central 
(national) government could make a law when its enactment is a state subject. The 
NCPRI argued that transparency, or right to information, was not mentioned in any of 
the three separate lists (state, central or concurrent) that provide legislative powers, and 
the central government could therefore pass a national law. In a letter to the NAC 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140Ibid. 
141 Government of India (2004a). 
142Shekhar Singh, former Convenor and founder member NCPRI, interview with author. New 
Delhi. 29.05.07. 
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Chairperson, NCPRI activists wrote, 
 
Whereas the Freedom of Information Act 2002, for all its faults, was applicable 
to the States, Union Territories and the Central Government, this new RTI Bill 
[which the DoPT sought to get passed in Parliament] appears to be intended to 
be restricted to only the Central Government and the Union Territories. It has 
thereby, in one stroke, taken away the access given by the earlier Act to 
information with state governments, district authorities and local bodies. This 
denies the very information that people actually need to hold public authorities 
accountable…The new Bill formulated has also changed the NAC 
recommendations regarding penalties, rendering them ineffective. The penalty 
clause is perhaps one of the most critical provisions for implementation of the 
RTI law.143  
 
NCPRI activists also made an additional move. They used their symbolic capital 
and reached out to the former Prime Minister V.P. Singh in order to gain access to 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who seemed to be taking a more conservative stance 
than the political leadership of his party.144 The Prime Minister’s stance was only 
natural, since he was not a politician but a former bureaucrat. At the meeting, NCPRI 
activists Shekhar Singh, Aruna Roy, and Jean Drèze learnt that the PM was in 
agreement with the basic principles of transparency and expressed his support for an 
open, accountable government. Nevertheless, he was hesitant to implement a law with a 
strong penalty clause, which he considered an impediment to bureaucratic 
independence. The PM, however, also told the activists that he was under great pressure 
from the party president, Sonia Gandhi.145 The difference between the PM and Mrs. 
Gandhi on the scope of the RTI law is public knowledge (and is presently reflected in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (2004b) 
144V.P. Singh while he was Prime Minister in 1989 had also proposed to enact a right to 
information (and a right to work) legislation, but the government lost power. In 2005, he was 
also instrumental in influencing the Communist Party of India Marxist (CPI (M)) to revise its 
position on the waiver on minimum wages that it had agreed on for passing the national right to 
work law. 
145 After the meeting summarising the stance of Prime Minister (PM) Manmohan Singh, the 
V.P. Singh remarked that the PM lacked the “mann” (will) for right to information and the 
“money” for right to work or NREGA.  
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ongoing debates on amendments to the right to information Act that the government 
periodically seeks to pass).146  
The more conservative stance of the PM, especially on the penal provisions, was 
thus not a surprise. However, it was Mrs. Gandhi’s unflinching support for a strong RTI 
law that helped overcome the bureaucratic resistance that was being channelled via the 
PMO. Several NCPRI members, as well as the former Chief Information Commissioner 
of India, Wajahat Habibullah, confirmed Mrs. Gandhi’s unwavering support for a strong 
RTI Bill. As to why the RTI was so readily accepted, he explained to me, ‘[apart from 
the efforts of MKSS and NCPRI], it [the RTI Act] was Sonia Gandhi’s contribution. 
The [Congress] Party had come back unexpectedly [to power], and one of the key issues 
she pushed for was RTI.’147 According to Shekhar Singh, who at the time was the 
NCPRI Convener, ‘in our first meeting with her, she told us I am 100 percent with 
you.’148  
The draft RTI Bill was soon referred to a Parliamentary Standing Committee, 
which contained several Sonia Gandhi loyalists, including its chairperson, E.M.S. 
Nachiappan. Although it is standard practice for all legislation to be referred to such 
standing committees, the referral to a standing committee provided NCPRI with the 
opportunity to use the legislature against the executive and to counter the attempts by 
the bureaucracy to push through a weak RTI law. NCPRI members activated their 
personal networks and mobilised individuals, groups, and advocates of RTI to depose 
before the Parliamentary Standing Committee, which introduced over 150 amendments 
to the draft Bill to restore it to the original NAC draft. On May 5, 2005, even as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146See, Times of India (2010b). 
147Wajahat Habibullah, former Chief Information Commissioner, interview with author. New 
Delhi. 05.01.2011 
148Shekhar Singh, former Convenor and founder member NCPRI, interview with author. New 
Delhi. 29.05.07. 
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opposition was boycotting Parliament, the Right to Information Bill was passed. The 
Bill was notified on June 15, and came into effect on October 13, 2005 after receiving 
Presidential assent. 
  
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
This chapter tells us how a network of individuals from various institutional 
arenas used their symbolic capital to pass a national RTI legislation. In the preceding 
pages we have seen how four types of NCPRI activists used their relevant capitals in 
various fields—bureaucratic, political, and media—to exercise influence and advance 
the demand for national RTI legislation. The chapter seeks to build our understanding 
about one of the more commonly observed, but rarely examined, tactics of social 
movement activism in India: the use of eminent middle class persons in creating 
legitimacy inside the state and in society for social justice struggles. By examining the 
formation of NCPRI, and the role of its eminent activists, this chapter tells us exactly 
how and through whom social movements engage the state.  While most people’s 
movements and other modes of protest rely on eminent activists to make their demands 
relevant, NCPRI was different in that the intelligentsia ‘constituted’ the campaign 
(Baviskar, 2007). I have shown in this chapter how NCPRI knitted together these 
activists from diverse professional fields, and successfully harnessed their symbolic 
capital into a very effective coalition to pass a national right to information. 
The different responses of the bureaucratic and political arms of the state to the 
national RTI law highlight the relevance of MKSS’s strategy to simultaneous resist and 
engage the state. In Chapter 3 we saw how MKSS used the Jan sunwai as a resistance 
strategy to create a new practice of accountability at the panchayat level that refused to 
part with information. The local struggle in Rajasthan however, was an early indication 
of the difficulty in pressurising state governments to enact RTI laws. Thus, MKSS 
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scaled up its struggle to the national level and proactively engaged the state, where as 
Baviskar rightly notes (2007: 20), the right to information was perceived as a 
‘universally desirable right.’ Thus the political state as well as some supportive 
bureaucrats at the national level willingly engaged activists and supported the enactment 
of a national law. However, while right to information as an idea might have been 
universally desirable, the legal mechanism to enforce the right, as we saw in this 
chapter, was strongly opposed by the central bureaucracy.  
Within the political state, the support for RTI was synonymous with allegiance 
to the party high command. Even though the threat from RTI appeared imminent, 
politicians were ambivalent toward the law. After all, day-to-day functioning was the 
domain of bureaucrats, the penal provision applied to erring public officials who were 
obligated by the new law to provide information, and not to elected politicians whose 
fate was secure for the next five-years. Therefore, the newly elected Congress Party 
decided to enact the RTI Act, which was one of its major election promises.  
However, for NCPRI and MKSS activists, the enactment of the national RTI law 
was only a first necessary step in the long struggle to transform the everyday practices 
of state agencies. With the law passed, NCPRI has joined forces with other campaigns 
to battle against regressive amendments and interpretations to the law, which would 
undermine the guarantees that the Right to Information Act 2005 grants. Thus, NCPRI 
focused on publicising the new law, organising trainings, and advising other campaigns 
and NGOs on the use of RTI. MKSS, however, once gain shifted the terrain of its 
struggle. Along with NCPRI, and other activists in the Right to Food and Right to Work 
Campaigns, MKSS activists lobbied for a national law guaranteeing the right to work 
for rural citizens. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) was 
enacted six months after the RTI Act. Activists managed to institutionalise the Jan 
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sunwai, reconceived as social audits, into the new right to work. In the next chapter, I 
shift attention from the national-level and go back to rural Rajasthan, and trace MKSS’s 
efforts to embed its legislative victory into the everyday practices of local panchayats. 
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Chapter 5. Linking the Rights to Information and Work 
 
In this chapter, I follow the trajectory of the right to information and work back 
to the local state, under changed circumstances—namely, after the enactment of the 
right to information law and the institutionalisation of the Jan sunwai (public hearings), 
reconceived as social audits under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act (or NREGA). While a national right to information law became a 
powerful tool to alter citizen-state interactions, the law in itself was clearly insufficient 
to achieve the kind of change in citizen-state relations envisaged by MKSS. While 
activists involved in the RTI campaign were able to get the Jan sunwai institutionalised 
as a social audit in the new right to work legislation, passed in 2005, 149 much work had 
to be done to ensure its adequate implementation. The RTI struggle thus returned full 
circle to enforcing the right to work in rural Rajasthan. After beginning its activism with 
resistance to the local state over non-payment of wages, then moving towards an 
engagement with the national state to pass a right to information legislation, in the last 
several years MKSS turned its attention to social audits in an, as yet, indeterminate 
phase of the struggle characterised by both resistance and engagement directed 
primarily at the local and state levels. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149NREGA is unique in the existing gamut of welfare, employment relief, and poverty 
alleviation programmes introduced by the government of India since the 1970s. In contrast to 
more popular conditional cash transfer schemes, the new Indian law guarantees a legal right to 
work. It is premised on the principle of demand-based, labour intensive wage employment or a 
legal guarantee of 100 days of manual work per year to adult members of rural households 
within five kilometres of their house. State governments are mandated to provide work within 
15 days of receiving an application. If it fails to do so, the state government ‘has to’ pay an 
unemployment allowance, thus creating an incentive for state governments to provide 
employment on demand. Its strong transparency and accountability provisions—manifest 
through social audits—also make NREGA different from its related predecessors such as 
Drought Relief, Jawahar Rozgar Yojana, National Rural Employment Programme, and Food for 
Work.  
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Social audits are commonly understood as an oversight mechanism to tackle 
corruption in NREGA. For MKSS, social audits are not primarily conceived as a 
method of tackling corruption. Rather, MKSS conceives social audits as a necessary 
legal mechanism that creates possibilities for transforming the existing practices of the 
state bureaucracies charged with administering welfare programmes such as, NREGA. 
The audit guarantees a process of accessing information related to all public works, 
physically verifying these works, and publicly sharing or presenting the information on 
their implementation. 
This chapter contributes new knowledge of India’s right to information by 
examining a crucial and previously untold part of the RTI story—that is, the post-
legislative struggles fought to make the social audit provision of NREGA work. This 
phase of the struggle has not been documented by existing studies on the right to 
information in India (Jenkins and Goetz, 1999a, 1999b, 2003; Baviskar, 2007; Singh, 
2007, 2011; Mander, 2003; Mander and Joshi, n.d.; Mishra, 2003; Puddephatt, 2009; 
Calland, 2010; Webb, 2011).  
The post-legislative campaign I will primarily discuss took place in Rajasthan 
and has had two distinct phases. In the first phase, from 2006-2008, the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP)-led state government failed to organise the legally mandated social 
audits. The BJP political elites made themselves inaccessible to the civil society groups 
attempting to hold the state government accountable. MKSS and other societal actors 
under the banner of Suchna Evum Rozgar Adhikar Abhiyan, or SR Abhiyan (The Right 
to Information and Work Campaign), responded to the state’s inaction by organising 
campaigns to create acceptance and recognition for social audits; and critically, they 
also persuaded the state government under a subsequent administration to enact the 
social audits.  
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The second phase of the campaign began in 2009 after the state assembly 
elections, which also hoisted the Congress Party to rule. Under the new administration, 
the state government made a public commitment to organise the first state-supported 
social audit. In late 2009 however, following substantial protests, counter-campaign by 
the local state, and, in particular, by the gram sewaks and sarpanches, to prevent 
outsiders from participating in social audits, the state declared an indefinite stoppage to 
the social audits. With the social audits stalled indefinitely, civil society actors launched 
a new campaign for an inclusive social audit process. Civil society actors demanded that 
social audits should be open to all citizens, and persons other than the village 
sarpanches should chair or preside over social audit proceedings. 
This chapter’s examination of the ongoing efforts of MKSS and SR Abhiyan to 
ensure implementation of social audits in Rajasthan views law not as a narrow set of 
rules or norms that govern social behaviour but, rather, as an arena of struggle/conflict 
(Thompson, 1975; Hunt, 1993) in which different groups engage in conflict over the 
construction and use of law (Houtzager, 2001). The struggle over the execution and 
implementation of social audits in Rajasthan illustrates that the interaction between 
social movements and legal reform is not unidirectional (Coglianese, 2001). As we will 
see, for both—state and society—legally mandated social audits create possibilities as 
well as barriers, and therefore, actors in the state and society interpret legal mechanisms 
such as social audits differently. For gram sewaks and sarpanches, social audits signify 
loss of social and political power, which they articulated as a loss of sovereignty of 
panchayats. In contrast, for civil society, social audits are necessary legal mechanisms 
to alter the existing practices of local social and political elites that subvert the state’s 
welfare functions and accountability to the poor. The struggle over organising social 
audits in Rajasthan also reveals the contentious interactions between levels of the state 
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itself. While social audits received significant support from higher levels of the 
bureaucratic and political state, this created substantial friction with lower-level 
government functionaries, namely the grams sewaks and sarpanches, who strongly 
oppose social audits. Showing how social movement activists strategically navigate 
these divisions within the state, this chapter also reveals the multi-scaled activist 
pressure necessary to consolidate legislative gains at the local level.  
 
Institutionalising the Jan Sunwai 
MKSS and its network of eminent activists and people’s movements were 
successful in pushing for the institutionalisation of social audits—modelled on the Jan 
sunwai—into the landmark NREGA.  The new right to work law would be the largest 
public works project in the world, guaranteeing every rural family 100 days of work at 
minimum wages. While negotiating with UPA over the passage of NREGA, MKSS and 
other activists proposed the Jan sunwai as the solution to government concerns that 
such a large welfare program implemented by local governments would breed 
corruption. One of the arguments put forward by MKSS and its allies150 was the 
potential of Jan sunwais to reform the local panchayats and make them more responsive 
to the poor. In a meeting with the Prime Minister in 2005, activists pointed to the 
success of the Jan sunwais to assuage the fears of the government regarding 
‘unscrupulous politicians who could use NREGA to support their private armies and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150Several rights-based advocacy organisations connected to issue campaigns: for the right to 
information, food and work, as well as people’s movements, agriculture workers’ unions, 
academics, writers, and leaders of the Left political parties (in particular the Communist Party 
of India or CPI) came together under the banner of People’s Action for Employment Guarantee 
(PAEG) in 2004, to campaign for a national right to work legislation. For a discussion of the 
role of the PAEG in the enactment of NREGA, see, Chopra, D. (2010, 2011; see also Vivek, 
2010). 
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that NREGA would be a source of huge corruption.’151 They were, consequently, 
successful in embedding social audits into the final draft of the NREGA. 
Under sections 17 and 19 of NREGA, state governments that receive NREGA 
funds from the Central government are obligated to conduct social audits. Panchayats 
are responsible for organising social audits every six months (section 17 (2)), and state 
governments are responsible for facilitating them (section 18). The social audit clause in 
NREGA therefore links the right to information and the right to work statutorily 
through the institutionalisation of the Jan sunwai. The audit guarantees access to 
information and public vigilance in implementation of the largest public works program 
in the world. 
In Chapter 3, I have argued that the Jan sunwai operated as an alternative public 
sphere. A social audit is somewhat different: while the Jan sunwai was organised by 
civil society as an alternative to the official institutions, social audits would now have 
an institutionalised role in government functioning sanctioned by law.  While the law 
sets out that social audits are the principal monitoring mechanism for NREGA, state 
governments have discretion over formulating rules for their implementation.152  Right 
to Work activists, in 2006, co-wrote the NREGA operational guidelines with officials of 
the central government in the hope that state governments would use them to draft their 
own state rules. These guidelines, however, were not part of the law. Although they 
contain a detailed charter specifying the roles and responsibility of each of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Shekhar Singh, Convenor, NCPRI, who was present at the meeting, summed up the 
apprehensions of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in these words. He also told me, ‘The 
National Janata government (1989–91) under VP Singh had also formulated a detailed plan for 
a universal employment guarantee scheme at the time. However, the idea of ‘social audit’ was 
not heard of and the government lost power (because of the Mandal Commission report) before 
it had the opportunity to implement its plan.’ Shekhar Singh, former Convenor NCPRI, 
interview with author. New Delhi. 18.06.10. 
152In India’s federal system, employment falls in the domain of both state and national 
governments. Therefore, while NREGA is a national legislation, its implementation is the 
responsibility of state governments. 
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“stakeholders” for conducting social audits, most state governments paid little attention 
to them.153 
State governments receiving NREGA funds (with the notable exception of 
Andhra Pradesh) have not formulated social audit rules. Nor have they, as yet, instituted 
different ways to ensure transparency that would render social audits unnecessary. For 
instance, the state-led model of social audit in Andhra Pradesh is widely believed in 
India to be a ‘successful case of institutionalised accountability’ (Aiyar et al, 2011; 
Singh, 2010; Afridi, 2008; Aakella and Kidambi, 2007a, 2007b; Shah and Ambasta, 
2007). This model bypasses panchayats and is top-down: an independent agency under 
the aegis of the state department of rural development conducts the social audit. It 
enjoys political commitment from top levels of state political leadership. In other states 
such as Tamil Nadu, political commitment at higher levels of the state has led to an 
executive decision to exclude works that are material-intensive in an effort to maximise 
transparency in NREGA. For example, labour intensive earth works are prioritised over 
material based works in order to prevent the entry of contractors as well as to minimise 
the possibilities of corruption.  
The process in Rajasthan has been different. Activists have interpreted social 
audits as a necessary legal mechanism to entrench a hard won right to ensure a new 
practice of accountability at the local level. Their campaign to conduct social audits 
intensified tensions between different levels of the state responsible for NREGA. Each 
of the differently affected actors, as I will show, brings multiple contending meanings to 
the terrain of struggle over NREGA social audits. The state government’s approach to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153Stakeholders include: wage seekers, gram sabha, panchayat representatives, block, district, 
state and central-level public officials charged with implementing NREGA, see Operational 
Guideline no. 2-2.5 (Government of India, 2008: 6-10). 
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resolving the tensions between its own people and civil society groups has fluctuated 
between ambivalence and conciliation depending on regional party politics.  
The political state at the local level or sarpanches interpreted the social audit as 
an infringement of their powers as elected representatives. Together, the political, and 
bureaucratic parts of the local state see social audits as an attempt by higher levels of 
the state, as well as by activists, to “weaken” panchayati raj (local self-government). 
The lower bureaucracy, or gram sewaks (panchayat secretaries), interpreted the social 
audit as “anti-panchayats.” In order to contain social audits and limit the participation of 
‘outsiders’ (or civil society), the gram sewak association in Rajasthan discovered a 
loophole in the law (NREGA): the (controversial) clause 13 (b). The association used 
this clause, which limits the role of outside individuals in social audit proceedings, to 
challenge in the Rajasthan High Court the state government (in collaboration with 
MKSS) social audits.154 Below I provide an account of this struggle over social audits in 
Rajasthan based on interviews and my own fieldwork between sarpanches and gram 
sewaks, SR Abhiyan and MKSS activists, politicians and government officials at the 
district and state-levels in Rajasthan as well at the national level. 
 
FIRST PHASE: THE POST-LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLE (2006-2008) 
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which was in power in Rajasthan when 
NREGA was enacted in 2005, was (at best) ambivalent towards organising social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154According to clause 13 (b) a social audit organised by the gram sabha is “open to public 
participation”, but outside individuals can “attend” a social audit as “observers” and are not 
allowed to intervene in the proceedings. The Central Employment Guarantee Council (a 
national advisory body housed in the central Ministry of Rural Development) amended the 
clause (via a government notification) in a meeting chaired by the Minister of Rural 
Development, which was not attended by several key non-state representatives of CEGC, such 
as NREGA activists, Aruna Roy and, Jean Drèze. Thus, until the gram sewaks used clause 13(b) 
in Court to challenge social audits in Rajasthan, activists were unaware of this amendment that 
had been approved by the central government in December 2008. 
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audits. Although Rajasthan was one of the largest recipients of NREGA funds during its 
term (2003-2008), the BJP state government did not formulate the required 
administrative rules to govern social audits. Although the state government was 
dependent on central government funds and legally obligated to administer the right to 
work, it also had discretion over formulating rules. However, past experience—that is, 
MKSS’s use of Jan sunwais in the 1990s—had also made clear to the BJP government 
that it was politically damaging to deny people wages under public work programmes, 
and made social audits politically so consequential. Thus, while it verbally expressed an 
agreement with the legal mandate for social audits, the BJP government did not take any 
concrete steps toward institutionalising them. 
Interviews with leading activists and public officials reveal that MKSS and its 
allies in the SR Abhiyan had little or no access to the top levels of the political state 
while the BJP was in power. Instead, MKSS sought out district collectors who 
expressed an interest in making NREGA and social audits work. In one of the most 
prominent instances, soon after the law came into effect in April 2006, MKSS 
collaborated with the district Collector of Dungarpur district, an Indian Administrative 
Service (IAS) official (later in 2009, she would serve as district Collector of Bhilwara). 
Together with the support of the district administration, MKSS organised a mass-public 
awareness campaign: the Dungarpur NREGA padyatra (foot march), which covered the 
entire district (all 237 panchayats, approximately 800 villages). 155 Over a thousand 
participants from across the country, including activists from various issue campaigns, 
non-government organisations, academics, student volunteers, and state government 
representatives joined the Dungarpur padyatra. The state-wide campaign for the rights 
to information and work, or SR Abhiyan, was formally constituted after the padyatra by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155See, Sivakumar (2006) 
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a network of non-government organisations (including MKSS). Since 2006 this network 
of activists and non-government organisation has been engaged in a protracted struggle 
to ensure effective implementation of NREGA in Rajasthan. In sum, while it was 
blocked from any productive engagement with the state government, the MKSS reached 
out to sympathetic bureaucrats at the district level, and began to create awareness about 
NREGA among villagers and other civil society groups. They additionally sought to 
encourage the acceptance and recognition for social audits amongst the district, block 
and local-level state officials. 
In response to the BJP state government’s inaction, MKSS and SR Abhiyan also 
organised ‘popular’ or public audits of NREGA works. The methodology of these 
public audits was similar to that of Jan sunwais (Chapter 3), with one exception. With 
the enactment of the Right to information Act and NREGA, the district administration 
was now obligated to supply information requested under either of the two laws. In 
order to organise public audits, activists used the RTI Act and the provisions of 
NREGA, together with its operational guidelines, to obtain official records related to 
works carried out under NREGA. These were Jan sunwais under the altered conditions 
provided by legislative success—but, as we will see, also in the face of local 
government intransigence. 
The SR Abhiyan invited the state government, particularly the bureaucrats 
charged with overseeing NREGA at the district level and in the state capital, to attend 
the public audits. MKSS activists also reached out to representatives in the Ministry of 
Rural Development, the Government of India and, to the members of the national 
advisory council for NREGA—the Central Employment Guarantee Council or CEGC 
(of which some MKSS, NCPRI and PAEG activists are also members)—to participate 
as independent observers. However, the political state, and specifically the state chief 
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minister and the minister for rural development, remained inaccessible and largely 
absent. 
In what follows, I draw on participant observation of three public audits 
organised in Udaipur, Banswara, and Jhalawar districts in Rajasthan (2007 to 2008). I 
selected these three districts (figure 5.1) because they illustrate the ongoing contention 
between state and society actors over the NREGA social audits. The Udaipur public 
audit revealed state scepticism about the specific methodology of these audits used by 
MKSS and SR Abhiyan. The public audits in Banswara and Jhalawar districts provided 
different instances of how the legal mandate of NREGA social audit was re-interpreted 
and resisted by panchayat functionaries.  
 
Public Audits 
The Udaipur public audit organised in early 2007 provided MKSS with a unique 
opportunity to spread the experience and expertise of organising Jan sunwai to different 
parts of Rajasthan. MKSS, along with other organisations in the SR Abhiyan such as 
Udaipur based non-government organisation Astha Sansthan, organised a training camp 
for participants from other non-government organisations. Along with training 
participants on how to conduct a social audit, they also worked with SR Abhiyan 
activists to devise other ways to ensure transparency on the worksite.  
The Jan sunwais had illustrated to MKSS activists how difficult it was for 
ordinary villages to understand official records. In order to simplify public records and 
make them accessible to villagers, MKSS activists prepared new formats for recording 
information related to NREGA—the process of “conversion” we discussed in Chapter 
3. For example, activists prepared forms for each worksite supervisor to record the 
amount of daily work done per worker. If adopted, this practice of record maintenance  
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Figure 5.1. District map of Rajasthan. 
 
could enable workers to calculate their total wages and, hopefully, deter sarpanches 
from underpaying them.  Activists also drafted model social audit rules that laid down 
the procedure for constituting a social audit forum, publicising names of its members 
and, preparing official records necessary to conduct a social audit.  
While the BJP state government was not keen to enact social audit rules, it 
agreed to host a national workshop on how to organise social audits as part of its 
obligations for administering the employment guarantee scheme. The new forms and 
model rules prepared by activists were discussed at this national workshop that was co-
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organised with the Ministry of Rural Development.156 For the panchayat and, 
particularly, for block level officials, the political and economic implications of 
organising social audits were not known. However, the state government remained 
sceptical and even unwilling to have groups like MKSS define its approach to NREGA 
social audits. The state and district level bureaucrats were in favour of an approach 
strictly attuned to the law, with little room for improvisation on the ground.  
The state officials and elites did not immediately perceive the Udaipur public 
audit as a threat. In contrast, the Banswara and Jhalawar public audits resurrected a 
latent but entrenched opposition to the practice of public auditing. Two public audits 
were organised in Banswara (district) in early 2007. During the first round of public 
audits, MKSS and SR Abhiyan, alongside local villagers, unearthed substantial 
irregularities concerning material procurement. Material used for NREGA works was 
procured through unregistered or fake firms owned by relatives of a village sarpanch.157  
It was clear that NREGA funds earmarked for ordinary workers were being misused for 
private gains. These irregularities from Banswara echoed findings in the 1994 Jan 
sunwai of Bhim block (Rajsamand district), where materials were also procured through 
unregistered firms.158 
Later that same year (2007), an official ‘mass’ NREGA social audit was planned 
in Banswara district with the collaboration of the district administration and the state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156Aruna Roy and Nikhil Dey (MKSS activists) are also members of the steering committee of 
the independent social audit agency in Andhra Pradesh. These model rules presented at the 
Udaipur workshop were shared with the officials from state government of Andhra Pradesh who 
attended the workshop. Later that year, the state government modified the rules and, in 2007, 
became the first state to enact social audit rules. 
157MKSS briefing note for Journalists 06 September 2010. 
158In the case of Bhaironath and Sons in 1994 for example, block level officials siphoned off 
central government funds for employment relief through fake firms registered in the names of 
their wives. Nikhil Dey, MKSS activist, interview with author. Jaipur, Rajasthan. 15.12.2010. 
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department for rural development.159 As MKSS and SR Abhiyan stepped up their 
campaign on social audits, the opposition to the social audit process by gram sewaks 
and sarpanches grew from all political parties, including the BJP, Congress, and Janata 
Dal United (active in the tribal district of Banswara).160 This was the first instance of 
social audit being re-interpreted as “anti-panchayats.” The gram sewaks from Banswara 
(district) questioned the role of “outsiders” (in particular, MKSS) and their right to 
organise and participate in a social audit gram sabha, which they argued was the 
responsibility of a sarpanch. Following protests by the gram sewak, the district 
collector of Banswara, who had earlier agreed to collaborate on the social audit, rejected 
the request for information or official records related to NREGA works. Members of the 
State Legislative Assembly (MLAs) also extended support to the gram sewaks and 
sarpanches. The state minister for Panchayati Raj, ‘blamed activists for trying to malign 
panchayati raj bodies.’161 This powerful axis of panchayat staff and state legislators 
jointly organised dharnas (sit-ins) and rallies, eventually filing a writ petition in the 
Rajasthan High Court to prevent the social audit from taking place. 162   
Lacking concrete evidence of wrongdoing to challenge MKSS activists on any 
credible grounds, the petition took issue with the lyrics of an MKSS song (written a 
decade back, during the first phase of the Jan sunwais in 1994-1995).163 Targeting its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159Due to the irregularities in NREGA expenditure brought out by the first public audit, the 
government of Rajasthan selected Banswara to develop a model social audit district. The state 
government received financial assistance of over Rs. 20 lakhs (US$ 2 million) from the central 
government to carry out model social audits. 
160See also Sebastian (2007a) 
161Sivakumar (2008) 
162The Hindu (2007a).  
163Similarly in 1998 at the height of the struggle for right to information in Rajasthan, the BJP 
government, unable to find concrete evidence against MKSS activist Aruna Roy, targeted her 
husband. Bunker Roy, Director of Social Work Research Centre in Tilonia, was issued a notice 
by the income tax department to review his bank accounts. In response, within a week of 
receiving the notice the SWRC organised a Jan sunwai and opened up all its accounts, including 
the personal accounts of the Director for public scrutiny. No irregularities were found (see also, 
Towards Transparency. Directed by Apurva Yagnik (n.d.)). 
	   162	  
long-term opponent, the gram sewaks alleged that MKSS was “anti-panchayat” and 
disrespectful towards panchayat functionaries. Quoting the lyrics, “BDO rupiah khagyo, 
Secretary rupiah khagyo… Chori Vado Ghano Hogyo, Koyi to Mundo Kholo… (BDO 
ate our money, the Secretary ate our money…Corruption is rampant, will someone 
speak out…)”, 164 gram sewaks alleged that MKSS activists painted panchayat 
functionaries and block level state officials as venal and corrupt (these allegations 
would be repeated two years later in Bhilwara, in 2009). The petition specifically asked 
the court to prevent “outsiders” from organising social audits. 
The protest by gram sewaks in Banswara was unlike previous protests against 
Jan sunwais in its vehemence and success in shaping the future terrain of struggle over 
NREGA social audits in the state. Previously gram sewaks had mobilised to prevent 
MKSS from organising Jan sunwais. For instance, in 1994 in Jawaja block (Ajmer 
district) gram sewaks mobilised across the state against Jan sunwais, and filed a petition 
in the High Court (Chapter 3). Again in 2001, in another panchayat, Janawad, the gram 
sewak prevented access to information and ran away with all official records related to 
rural development that were necessary to organise the Jan sunwai.165 The opposition to 
the Banswara public audit in 2007 was different; it was the first time MKSS activists 
were prevented from carrying out a public audit and expressed complete state 
intransigence at all levels. To quote an MKSS activist summarising the implications of 
the boycott by gram sewaks in Banswara: 
 
If Dungarpur in 2006 represented a step forward in the right direction and 
exemplified what cooperation among the people, civil society and government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164The song satirises the role of panchayat staff, and block level officials in perpetuating 
corruption in drought relief programmes. MKSS People’s Songs: 18. 
165Lachu ba, resident Janawad, interview with author. Janawad, Rajasthan. 27.07.10.  
However, by then the Rajasthan state RTI law had been passed, and the information had to be 
made available, and the Jan sunwai was organised.  
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could do, Banswara 2007 erased all that, taking the Rajasthan Government’s 
position back to a time when neither right to information nor social audits 
existed.166 
 
MKSS and SR Abhiyan activists were not hopeful of an audience in the BJP 
Chief Minister. Thus, activists were forced to maintain their presence in Banswara and 
agitate outside the District Collector’s office; at the same time, however, they scaled up 
their advocacy efforts. Activists began to lobby politicians and bureaucrats at the 
national level, where they thought they had better chance of leveraging the issue.167 Ten 
days after the Banswara social audit was scheduled to begin, only partial information 
pertaining to 6 out of the 8 administrative blocks of the district were made available. 
Unable to organise a full-fledged social audit, activists and local residents took out a 
samvaad yatra (dialogue march) that covered 45 villages in eight blocks of Banswara 
district. Over 60 public meetings were organised in which information on RTI and 
NREGA was disseminated through activists explaining the social audit process. 
Villagers were invited to attend a Jan samvaad (public dialogue) at the district 
headquarters. 
 This Jan samvaad (public dialogue) that marked an end to the dharna (sit-in) at 
the district headquarters in Banswara was organised as another “strategic move” to 
circumvent the gram sewak’s boycott of the social audit.168 An IAS official from the 
apex audit agency—the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General—in Delhi (also 
an MKSS ally and familiar with the Jan sunwai) chaired the Jan samvaad, and 
creatively converted it into a Jan sunwai. The Banswara Jan samvaad was similar to the 
Jan sunwai in Jawaja (1994), where, without access to official information and on the 
basis of public testimonies, officials were compelled to take note of grievances and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166Nikhil Dey, MKSS activist, quoted in The Hindu (2007c). 
167Sebastian (2007a, 2007b; see also Indian Express, 2007). 
168Sivakumar (2008); The Hindu (2007b). 
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complaints. Thus, the Jan samvaad at Banswara provided a platform for workers (many 
of them dalits and adivasi (tribal) who were willing to publicly state their grievances on 
NREGA.  
Elected representatives, such as zilla pramukhs (district councillors) from other 
political parties (Congress Party and Janata Dal United) also used the Jan samvaad to 
highlight the BJP government’s shortcomings. The gram sewaks were invited to 
participate in the Jan samvaad; they did attend, but only as observers. They stood at the 
far end of the tent occasionally interrupting proceedings by shouting down speakers and 
accusing them of using the samvaad to further their rajnitik (political) interests. MKSS, 
however, had managed to partially salvage the Banswara debacle. However, after the 
Banswara debacle, the local state successfully counter-mobilised to prevent further 
social audits. The opposition in Banswara was only the beginning of a concerted effort 
to organise panchayat staff in other regions of Rajasthan against social audits.  This 
would next come to a head in Jhalawar district. 
In early 2008, a grassroots organisation of farmers and labourers called Hum 
Kisan (We Farmers) from Manohar Thana block (Jhalawar district) told SR Abhiyan 
activists that workers in their block had not been paid minimum wages under NREGA. 
The Abhiyan announced its next public audit in Jhalawar district, which was also the 
Lok Sabha (parliamentary) constituency of the BJP chief minister. In a public statement, 
the Abhiyan resolved to push for “an inclusive social audit process” and proceeded to 
organise the Jhalawar public audit as a Jan sunwai (without any involvement from the 
state government).169  
Right-wing Hindu fundamentalist organisations, such as the Sangh Parivar, the 
Vishva Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council) and, the Bajrang Dal, who have close 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169SR Abhiyan (2008)  
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links to the BJP, have a strong presence in Jhalawar.170 The relationship between MKSS 
and the conservative Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in Rajasthan has been mostly non-
collaborative and at times confrontational.171 Opposition and violence against activists 
marked the first day of the Jhalawar public audit. Activists were beaten up and 
terrorised as they were surveying the neighbouring villages were the social audits were 
scheduled to take place. The presence of a television media crew captured the violence 
at one of the sites and telecast it live (with several repeats throughout the day). Without 
access to political elites in government, the campaign continued to maintain pressure on 
the state government through the media and the CEGC at the national level.  
Jhalawar could have been a second failed attempt, but the press coverage had a 
major impact on the future of the Jhalawar public audit. The media attention created 
public pressure and raised doubts about the BJP government’s commitment to fighting 
corruption in NREGA. The Jhalawar public audit was thus ultimately executed as 
planned. It covered five panchayats in Manohar Thana block, and unearthed that the 
panchayat staff had siphoned off over US $14 million of central government funds for 
NREGA. Like the Udaipur social audit in 2007, the Abhiyan invited members of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170On my way to Jhalawar I read a sign marking the start of the district boundary, it read, “VHP 
welcomes you to the Hindu Nations, Hindu State.” 
171Apart from the BJP government’s conservative and deeply myopic understanding of the 
demands for transparency and state accountability, MKSS’s strong resistance to and open 
condemnation of communalism also clashes with the BJP ideology of Hindu Nationalism. The 
BJP in the last decade has come to epitomise communalism and is associated with right wing 
fundamentalism and extreme targeting of religious minorities, particularly Muslims and 
Christians. The most shocking evidence of this was the communal pogrom targeting Muslims, 
in Gujarat in 2002. After Gujarat, Praveen Togadia of the Vishva Hindu Parishad (World Hindu 
Council), distributed trishuls (a three spear, popularly associated with Hindu fundamentalist) in 
Ajmer, a Muslim dominated district in Rajasthan. Togadia was arrested after the leader of the 
opposition (Congress Party), Ashok Gehlot, intervened. The next day BJP/RSS called for a 
bandh (shut down) in the Jawaja block (Ajmer district). MKSS runs two fair price shop in 
Jawaja market, and refused to adhere to the BJP/RSS call for a bandh. In response, the RSS 
activists shouted insults “you are all sons of Muslims” (tum saab sangathan wale (MKSS 
activists) musulman ki auulad ho), and tried to forcibly remove activists from in front of the 
shops, where they were blocking the entrance. The police eventually intervened, but only after 
Aruna Roy, MKSS activists, spoke to the Police Commissioner. Shusheelaji, MKSS activists, 
interview with author. Jawaja, Rajasthan. 17.12.09; see also Srivastava (2003). 
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Central Employment Guarantee Council (CEGC) and other IAS officials from the 
Central Vigilance Commission to participate as independent observers.172 While the 
state government did not participate in the public hearings, as a result of the media 
publicity it assured action on the findings of the social audit submitted by SR Abhiyan. 
This assurance, however, did not translate into action. While the Abhiyan was able to 
conduct the public audits in the five panchayats as planned, the Jhalawar public audit 
further entrenched the opposition to the social audit process at the local level. The gram 
sewaks and sarpanches felt that detailed public scrutiny of NREGA works, if followed 
by quick and decisive action by the state government, would undermine their power. 
Thus, they viewed the audits as a direct threat to their authority at the panchayat level. 
Soon after the Jhalawar public audit, the second phase of NREGA went into 
effect, extending it to all 604 districts across India. Many of the districts where the 
Abhiyan worked came under the purview of this second phase of NREGA, thus 
expanding its prospects for organising social audits on its home turf. The following year 
(2009) the Congress Party replaced the BJP as the state government of Rajasthan, and 
announced the first state-supported social audit to be organised in Bhilwara (district).  
The struggle to implement legally mandated social audits between 2006-2008 
illustrates varying responses from the higher and the lower levels of the bureaucratic, 
and political state. While the political elites in the BJP government initially expressed 
ambivalence, the panchayat staff, supported by local politicians, staunchly opposed 
public audits that were organised by SR Abhiyan. This brought the BJP into full support 
of the local government functionaries, and against the social audits. What this shows is 
that in addition to a relatively strong grassroots campaign for social audits, political 
commitment at the top level is imperative to ensure implementation of legally mandated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172The Hindu (2008). 
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social audits. As we will see next, in 2009, under a new political party, civil society 
actors managed to achieve the necessary political commitment to make social audits 
work. 
 
THE SECOND PHASE: STATE-SUPPORTED SOCIAL AUDITS  
The Bhilwara social audit was the first social audit in Rajasthan that was 
conducted under the aegis of the state government. The new Congress Party state 
government in 2009 reiterated its election motto from 1998: “zero tolerance to 
corruption.” In a public display of its commitment to transparency and accountability, 
the state government announced the first state supported social audit in Rajasthan. It 
was a heavily publicised affair.  
Unlike the BJP, the Congress state government intended to institutionalise social 
audits in the state. For inspiration, it looked to its counterpart in the southern state of 
Andhra Pradesh (AP). Drawing on the AP experience the Rajasthan government’s 
model for institutionalising social audits was focused on creating a base of trained 
social auditors at the block and district levels that would facilitate social audits on a 
regular basis. According to the former NREGA Commissioner, at Bhilwara ‘[our] larger 
purpose was to impart training.’ 173 
 Unlike AP, Rajasthan also had civil society actors that had laid the foundation 
for social audits with the Jan sunwai. The Congress state government, therefore, invited 
MKSS and SR Abhiyan to train officials and to help conduct the Bhilwara district-wide 
social audit. Thus, almost twenty years after it first developed and used the Jan sunwai 
at the panchayat level in Rajasthan, MKSS was about to embark on the first state 
supported social audit. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Former Commissioner, NREGA, Government of Rajasthan, interview with author. Jaipur, 
Rajasthan. 17.09.10. 
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While the congress government expressed political support for instituting social 
audits, the Chief Minister did not have sufficient political capital to follow through on 
his decision. The selection of Bhilwara as the site for the first state social audit reflected 
the intersection of party and caste politics. In early 2009, the President of the Congress 
Party, Sonia Gandhi, visited Nagore (district) in northeast Rajasthan to celebrate the 50th 
anniversary of Panchayati Raj (local self-governance); it was here that the first 
panchayat was formed. However, the Congress feared that conducting social audits in a 
Jat dominated belt would alienate one of its major bases of support in the state that are 
very well organised, and sometimes contentious. As I was told by former NREGA 
Commissioner, ‘the state government of Rajasthan initially planned to use the 50th 
Anniversary platform in Nagore to publicly commit to social audit;’ however, ‘being a 
Jat belt, we did not want to face huge opposition right at the beginning.’ 174 Alwar, 
another Jat-dominated district, was ruled out for the same reason.  
The Congress party structure in Rajasthan is over-represented by Jats. From 
1952 to 2003 the upper castes and Jats have dominated the Congress Party, and jointly 
constituted 58 % of Congress MLA’s (Jaffrelot and Robin, 2009; see also Sisson, 1966: 
610). Among these, the Jats represented the single largest group (20.2 %) of Congress 
MLA’s; the Brahmins formed 14.9% and the Rajputs 11.6% of the Congress MLA’s 
(Ibid).175 According to former NREGA Commissioner, fears of opposition from Jat 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Ibid. 
175State politics in Rajasthan, in contrast to the rest of the Hindi belt–Bihar, U.P. and Madhya 
Pradesh–has been elite-based, dominated by the upper castes, Brahmins, and Rajputs, and the 
intermediate caste, Jats (Harriss, 1999; Jaffrelot, 2009). In the mid 1990s with the BJP’s rise to 
political prominence, the party in Rajasthan used upper caste Rajputs to extend the dominance 
of upper castes in the state (Jenkins, 1998). After 2003 the BJP has also managed to win over 
some traditional Congress supporters such as Jats, Dalits and Muslims (Lodha, 2004). 
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panchayat functionaries or ‘roadblocks at the very beginning’ that could lead to a 
‘premature death of social audits’ in the state forced the government to re-consider.176  
Jodhpur (district), the Lok Sabha constituency of Congress Chief Minister, and, 
Bhilwara (district), the Lok Sabha constituency of the Union Minister for Rural 
Development, were eventually shortlisted as potential (safe) districts for the government 
to launch the state-supported social audits. 177 Bhilwara was ultimately chosen, as it was 
the highest spending district under NREGA for 2008-2009. Furthermore, the IAS 
official in charge of Bhilwara district had previously collaborated with MKSS in 2006 
to organise the Dungarpur social audit padyatra (foot march).178 This is how one 
newspaper summed up the political commitment for the social audit:  
 
[In fact] the stock-taking found Rajasthan and Bhilwara lucky, as the Gehlot 
[Congress] government [of Rajasthan] put a committed team in place. The 
Commissioner of NREGS in the State is a senior IAS officer known for his 
commitment to the social sector, and the Bhilwara Collector has proven 
credentials in the implementation of the programme.179  
 
For a first state-supported social audit that covered an entire district, the 
Bhilwara social audit was politically, as well as practically, an ambitious undertaking. 
Over a thousand people from sixteen different states in India participated in a social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176Former Commissioner, NREGA, Government of Rajasthan, interview with author. Jaipur, 
Rajasthan. 17.09.10.  
After Bhilwara as the state government made a public announcement to hold the next social 
audit in Alwar a Jat belt, MLAs along with grams sewaks and sarpanches blocked the roads 
leading to the panchayat in order to prevent the social audit. 
177Over the years in Bhilwara (district), caste dynamics have also undergone change. The 
intermediate castes like Jat and Gujjars (peasants, and herder castes) have become more 
dominant than the traditional Brahmin, Rajput, and Baniya (merchant caste). Jats and dalits in 
rural parts of the district (Bhilwara) have been Congress supporters while Brahmins and Rajputs 
in the villages, and Baniyas in the city in Bhilwara district have allied with the BJP. Bhanwar 
Meghwanshi, local Dalit leader and MKSS activist, interview with author. Bhilwara, Rajasthan. 
18.12.10. 
178The IAS officer came to be associated with social audits. As a Congress Party leader said at a 
public meeting in Bhilwara, ‘wherever she goes, she will organise social audit. Manju Rajpal 
means social audits.’ Author field notes, Bhilwara, Rajasthan. 12.10.09. 
179The Hindu (2009). 
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audit training conducted by MKSS and SR Abhiyan activists. Many of the participants 
were also state and district resource persons from Rajasthan. After the Bhilwara social 
audit they would facilitate social audits in their respective districts, as the state 
government gradually expanded its social audit plan.  
Although the Bhilwara social audit was not organised as a Jan sunwai, the 
training for the social audit closely followed the same methodology (Chapter 3). 
Awareness padyatras (foot marches) were planned in all 381 panchayats (1600 villages) 
of the district covering 900 NREGA worksites. Of these, 11 panchayat samitis (or 
blocks) were selected for a full-scale social audit.180 In the 11 panchayats selected for 
full-scale social audits, teams of 10-12 people spent over a week living in the 
panchayats. The social auditors were provided complete records of NREGA works in 
advance. Over 10 days, SR Abhiyan activists, volunteers, and official block, and 
district-level trainees sought out local villagers to collectively accomplish the following: 
assess the quality of NREGA works, authenticate the works, verify the expenditure 
incurred in the works, and spread awareness about the ten entitlements under 
NREGA.181  
At the end of the verification activities, a social audit gram sabha was convened 
as mandated by law (NREGA section 17). In Chapter 1 we got a glimpse of this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180As the former NREGA Commissioner told me, ‘everyone wanted to do social audits but not 
in their districts. Whichever district we (the state government) selected, we would have to 
explain the choice of district.’ Therefore, the 11 panchayats were selected by a lottery system, 
drawn in the presence of the Union Minister for Rural Development and Panchayati Raj. 
Former Commissioner, NREGA, Government of Rajasthan, interview with author. Jaipur, 
Rajasthan. 17.09.10. 
181A social audit supplements the annual financial audit undertaken by the government, with a 
review of the ten entitlements under NREGA. These are the right to 100 days employment per 
year for every rural family; the right to a job card; the right to demand work and get it within 
fifteen days—or else receive unemployment allowance if work is not provided in time; the right 
to get work within a five-kilometre radius from their home; the right to select the work in the 
gram sabha; the right to minimum wages; the right to payment within fifteen days—or else 
receive compensation; the right to worksite facilities—water, shade, medical kits, and crèches; 
the right to transparency and proactive disclosure of all records; and the right to audit works and 
expenditure in social audits. 
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process, where the findings of the social audits were shared with the villagers at the 
social audit gram sabha, which was attended by senior officials from the district and 
state capital. The District Collector also instructed the gram sewak, NREGA support 
staff (including worksite supervisors, technical assistants, and junior engineers), and the 
sarpanch to be present at the social audit proceedings. Similar to the previous public 
audits (in Banswara 2007, and Jhalawar 2008), the social audit in Bhilwara unearthed 
significant financial irregularities in material expenditure on NREGA, in all 11 blocks. 
In contrast to the earlier audits where the MKSS had to pressure the government 
into taking action, this was a state-supported social audit and the government promised 
prompt action. In one block alone (Suvana) pending wages payments amounting over 
eight hundred thousand Indian rupees were paid immediately after the social audit was 
organised. Further, 16 first information reports or FIRs were filed, majority of which 
were against panchayat staff for financial irregularities in material expenditure, and for 
authorising use of machinery on NREGA worksites.182 
The state government set up a social audit Directorate183 and appointed a 
reformist civil servant from the Audits and Finance Department to be director.184 The 
government also instituted a new system of payments for materials at the block level in 
response to the gross irregularities in purchase of materials revealed by the Bhilwara 
audit. Previously, the power to purchase material and make payments was vested with 
the sarpanch. Through an executive order, this was replaced by a new system of 
inviting tenders at the block level. Under this new system, sarpanches had to place their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182Author field notes. Bhilwara, Rajasthan. October 2009. 
183The Andhra Pradesh government set up the first social audit directorate in the country, which 
is an autonomous registered society whereas; the one in Rajasthan is part of the state rural 
development department. 
184Back in 2001 this official headed a government-appointed Committee to verify the findings 
of a Jan sunwai organised by MKSS in Janawad panchayat. The Committee confirmed the 
findings of the Jan sunwai but also brought out additional anomalies. Since 2001 this state civil 
servant has been one of the few reformist civil servants that MKSS regularly consults. 
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orders for materials at the block level, where all purchases would be made; however, 
this process was subject to scrutiny by a block level committee that included the 
sarpanch, a junior engineer and a ward member. 	  
While the state government was instituting these changes, opposition to the 
social audit at the panchayat level was simmering. As the former Commissioner of 
NREGA said to me soon after the Bhilwara social audit, ‘I received calls [from a 
Congress Party MLA, a Jat], he said, ‘[We] will lose [the next] elections; [you] have 
dug Congress’s grave [with the Bhilwara social audit].’185 Senior bureaucrats and 
politicians continued to express concern over the looming threat from the 
aforementioned Jat-dominated districts. It appeared that, at the state level, the political 
commitment for social audits had not been consensually arrived at. The decision was 
made by the Congress party leadership with the support of the higher levels of the 
bureaucratic state, with little regard for the lower levels of administration. Therefore, 
when the Congress Party Member of Parliament (MP) from Alwar, a Jat-dominated 
district, announced the next social audit (after Bhilwara) would be carried out in his 
district, the gram sewaks and sarpanches from the district took a delegation to the Chief 
Minister in protest.  
For his part, the CM assured activists about his commitment for prompt action. 
At a meeting attended by the author, he stated, ‘I agree with the ground 
reality...corruption must not get ingrained…otherwise NREGA will become 
redundant.’186 While he assured activists that issues that have arisen from the Bhilwara 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185Former Commissioner, NREGA, Government of Rajasthan, interview with author. Jaipur, 
Rajasthan. 17.09.10. 
186The CM went on to assure activists of the willingness of his government to act on complaints 
from Bhilwara. He said to activists, ‘the people in the government are of your choice’ [referring 
to the Bhilwara district Collector who had earlier collaborated with MKSS in Dungarpur as well 
as the new Director of Social Audit who was known to MKSS activists]. SR Abhiyan activists 
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social audit would get addressed, the CM also told them that gram sewaks from Alwar 
(district) had expressed fear that, after Bhilwara, they would be the next “targets.” In 
response, the CM said to the Abhiyan activists: 	  
Even when we do good work, vested interests will collaborate to defeat our 
objectives. [However,] keep an open mind in improving the system. I have 
reassured the delegates from Alwar district that no innocent sarpanch would be 
affected. If elected representatives are ashamed, it is not in public interest. 
Imagine its impact on democracy and the democratic processes.187  
 
On the one hand his government had made a public commitment to ensure transparency 
in government functioning and combat corruption, on the other hand the CM wanted to 
avoid another electoral defeat. 188 Thus, the CM started to express caution. Apart from 
the CM, the state Minister for Rural Development and Panchayati Raj also enjoyed the 
confidence of activists and of the bureaucrats charged with implementing NREGA. In 
the lead up to the Bhilwara social audit, the Minister had initiated a monthly dialogue, 
or samvaad, on NREGA, which was held at the Panchayati Raj training institute in the 
state capital. While receptive towards activists’ demands for an inclusive social audit 
process, the State Minister—a former sarpanch himself—also expressed sympathy for 
the concerns of panchayat functionaries. While the government assured prompt action 
on the findings from the Bhilwara social audit, the state minister also cautioned against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
meeting with Ashok Gehlot, Chief Minister of Rajasthan, author filed notes. Jaipur, Rajasthan. 
29.10.09. 
187Ibid. 
188In his first term in 1998 as Congress party chief minister, Ashok Gehlot had reduced the 
retirement age of government employees from sixty to fifty-eight years. He followed this 
decision by refusing to increase the dearness allowance (percentage of the basic salary, added to 
an individual’s salary along with other benefits, such as rent allowance to make up his/her total 
salary) for government employees. Gram sewaks, among several other middle to lower level 
public officials, counter mobilised, and went on strike, which lasted thirty days. With no signs 
of an end to the strike, the CM was faced with the possibility of the central government (which 
at the time was a BJP-led coalition) imposing President’s rule. The strike ended, but it came at a 
heavy price for the Congress Party. It lost the next state assembly elections in December 2003, 
and returned the BJP to power in Rajasthan. See also Sethi (2012); Khera (2006); De (2003). 
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selective targeting of panchayat staff. According to one newspaper, the State Minister 
for Rural Development and Panchayati Raj stated: 
 
I accept that there is corruption in panchayati raj. I participated in the social 
audit in one panchayat, and could not miss the apprehensions of the 
functionaries. I myself had been a sarpanch for long. Perhaps instead of blaming 
those at the lower levels we should first make the persons at the top 
answerable.189  
 
In an unusual manoeuvre then, the state Minister together with the NREGA 
Commissioner—a state civil service official who was promoted to the IAS—actively 
pursued cases of corruption that implicated three other IAS officials (District 
Collectors).190 Usually, only lower level officials are pursued.  
What is apparent from these quotes is that the state political leadership was 
beginning to feel the pressure from the sarpanch and gram sewak backlash against 
social audits. As the state government investigated alleged corruption by IAS officials 
and attempted to implement NREGA at the panchayat level by reconfiguring its 
institutional design, the panchayat staff asserted its autonomy using the rhetoric of local 
self-governance. The gram sewaks perceived the new system as a direct threat to the 
possibilities of additional remuneration through implementing NREGA. And counter 
mobilised against the order. In response, the state government, in its efforts to contain 
the opposition by gram sewaks, announced the constitution of a committee of all 
“stakeholders” to discuss the new tender system. On the committee was a newly elected 
dalit sarpanch from Rooppura panchayat, Bhilwara (district), who supported the new 
system. In an interview before he went to the first committee meeting he told me: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189Quoted in The Hindu (2009). Following the statement, as noted before, IAS officials in 
charge of NREGA who proceeded with corruption inquiries against other IAS officials faced 
harassment and were also transferred to other departments. 
190DNA (2010a). 
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The new [materials] procurement system is very useful for a dalit sarpanch, like 
me. I used to wonder how I would manage in the earlier system, where I would 
have had to run around [from block to district level] to get funds released to 
purchase materials. Under this new system I simply need to place my request, 
and the block level officials manage the purchase. For the rich, this may not be a 
‘good’ system but for sarpanches like me this system works well.191 
 
For many other sarpanches the new government order was interpreted as a lack 
of trust in the sarpanches. It was considered a ‘violation of the rights of the panchayat’ 
under NREGA and an ‘attempt to weaken the strongest element of panchayats’, that is, 
the sarpanches.192 They interpreted the changes as an attempt to distribute opportunities 
for graft upwards. According to the President of the Rajasthan Sarpanches Association, 
‘this rule [for purchase of materials] has been introduced by bureaucrats so that 
government officials can get commission from the big contractors.’193  
However, the state government’s response to the emerging opposition to the new 
tender system indicated how entrenched the gram sewaks and sarpanches were within 
the established system of managing and delivering welfare programmes. First, the state 
government was forced to relent and approve all pending material payments that it had 
withheld after the Bhilwara social audit. These payments were withheld pending further 
inquiry because the firms that were to receive these payments were unregistered and 
some were suspected (or found to be) owned or managed by panchayat functionaries or 
their relatives. As pressure mounted from the panchayat functionaries and local MLAs, 
the state government gave in and provided a “one-time” approval on pending payments, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191Suresh Chandra Meghwal, Sarpanch Rooppura Panchayat, interview with author. Tilonia, 
Rajasthan. 07.09.10. 
192See, Dainik Navjyoti (2010a) for the reactions of sarpanches from Bikaner district. In 2010, 
the majority of newly elected sarpanches belonged to the general or other backward caste or 
intermediate caste categories. 
193De (2010). 
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which it justifies as a pragmatic response.194 In an interview, the state Minister for Rural 
Development and Panchayati Raj told me: 
 
We did not buckle under pressure; we acted with the best intentions. Why must 
we always be suspicious of sarpanches? You take a step back when the situation 
requires. Bhilwara did manage to instil fear. We sent a message across the state, 
a big step forward to make a point regarding accountability.195  
 
The state government hoped that authorising the disbursal of pending payments 
would pacify the protesting panchayat staff. It therefore decided to organise more social 
audits. A fresh round of social audits was announced in the panchayats with the highest 
material expenditure on NREGA. MKSS and SR Abhiyan were once again invited to 
facilitate the new round of social audits. Two members from the Abhiyan were attached 
to a team of social audit facilitators, who were trained at Bhilwara. These teams were 
responsible for organising trainings at the block level for the village social audit 
committee that would carry out the social audit. However, fresh from the victory over 
recalling changes to the material purchase system, opposition to the newly announced 
social audits began with renewed rigour.	  
The new round of social audits scheduled for the highest spending panchayats 
across the state was met with widespread opposition by gram sewaks and sarpanches. 
Social audits were re-interpreted as selective targeting of democratically elected (and 
helpless) sarpanches. Even those sarpanches, who had not experienced a single social 
audit, in order to prevent their panchayats and themselves from being audited, joined the 
gram sewaks in protest across the state.  
The term social audit became synonymous with MKSS, which was seen as its 
main advocate. MKSS was thus cast as a key opponent of panchayat staff and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194Subhramaniam (2009). 
195Bharat Singh, Minister for Rural Development and Panchayti Raj, Government of Rajasthan, 
interview with author. Jaipur, Rajasthan. 20.12.10. 
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legislators. A Member of Parliament from Dausa district told the press, ‘we will not let 
Aruna Roy [MKSS activist] and her team enter Alwar [district].’196 A few days later, in 
Madhogarh panchayat, Alwar (district), the opposition party BJP led protesting 
sarpanches, gram sewaks, and MLAs in blocking the national highway (between 
Rajasthan and Delhi). They refused to get up until the district administration assured 
them that no civil society representatives would be involved in the social audit.197 In the 
same panchayat, the gram sewak ran away with all NREGA records making it clear that 
social audits would not take place in Alwar district, despite the public commitment 
made by the Congress Party MP from Alwar; this again highlighted the tensions 
between local and state levels of governance. 
In another village, Sameliya (in MKSS’s home district Rajsamand), the social 
audit team members were physically beaten and threatened at gunpoint by supporters of 
the sarpanch in order to prevent them from participating in the social audit. Similar 
cases of disruption, harassment, and threats of physical violence were reported from 
other districts where SR Abhiyan members are based, such as Sikar, Udaipur, Baran, 
Bikaner, and Mount Abu.198 Similar to the Banswara public audit in 2007, the Bhilwara 
social audit in 2009 saw the gram sewaks re-signify social audits as “anti-panchayat”. 
As a member of the Bhilwara gram sewak association complained to me: 
 
Social audit [done] by social workers is disrespectful to the sarpanch…they 
search for opposition in the village, and guide them…they [MKSS] are anti-
panchayats, their intent is to capture NREGA [that is, both the funds and power 
that comes along with it].”199  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196Subhramaniam (2009) 
197DNA (2009)  
198 NREGA Samvaad, author field notes. Jaipur, Rajasthan. 09.12.09. 
199Spokesperson Bhilwara gram sewak association, interview with author. Bhilwara, Rajasthan. 
23.08.10. 
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The opposition, though largely directed at activists, extended to higher levels of the 
state as well: 
 
The Collector listens to them [MKSS] and promptly issues suspension orders 
against us. [In order] to hide corruption at higher levels, social audit has been 
imposed on panchayats.200 
 
Despite the claims of the panchayat functionaries, MKSS and the Abhiyan 
activists argued that the implementing and auditing agencies should be separated—that 
is, the sarpanches and gram sewaks who implement NREGA should not also preside 
over social audits that review the same works. This was the same struggle to transform 
the patterns of power and inequality in local governance that MKSS had initiated with 
the Jan sunwai in 1994. The struggle over the NREGA social audits was fundamentally 
a struggle over the structure of local governance. 
Nevertheless, the backlash to the Bhilwara social audit by panchayat 
functionaries had caught both the state government and the Abhiyan off guard. The state 
government went into a fire-fighting mode, simultaneously dealing with conflagrations 
in the lower bureaucracy and in the IAS lobby, which was trying to circumvent the 
departmental probe on the alleged misconduct of its District Collectors. As it juggled 
opposition from within, the state government also tried to appease those societal actors 
that it had invited to help institutionalise social audits. Having retracted on the material 
payments issue, the Congress government decided to buy itself some time. The 
upcoming panchayat elections presented it with an opportune moment to do just that: it 
postponed all social audits until after the elections. In the meantime, the gram sewaks 
went to court. 
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A little over a month after the Bhilwara social audit, the High Court of 
Rajasthan intervened; the gram sewaks’ associations had successfully obtained a stay 
order on further social audits. The court held that the state government had not given 
sufficient prior notice for the second round of social audits, and quoted clause 13 (b) 
from the law to emphasise the role of gram sabhas in organising social audits.201 In late 
2009, the gram sewaks were successful in preventing “outsiders” from participating, 
facilitating, and assisting in the social audit process. In effect, civil society would be 
shut out of the social audit process. 
The state government used the court order as a justification to suspend all social 
audits. The second round of social audits planned by the government of Rajasthan in the 
31 panchayats with highest material expenditure were now indefinitely on hold. In a 
letter, the state government of Rajasthan clarified its position to the Government of 
India: ‘Clause 13(b) of the schedule-I [of NREGA] prevents active participation, 
facilitation or assistance of any outsider in the Gram Sabha, including civil society 
organisations or Government agencies.’ 202 Thus, the Rajasthan social audit process 
came to an abrupt halt, just two months after the first state-supported social audit.  
While the gram sewaks shifted the struggle to the judicial arena, the higher 
bureaucracy in the state capital created its own hurdles such as transferring sympathetic 
higher officials in charge of implementing NREGA. Due to his active involvement in 
the departmental inquiry to investigate the alleged divergence of NREGA funds by 
three IAS District Collectors, the presiding NREGA Commissioner was strongly 
rebuked by other senior IAS officials. He was also accused of being too supportive of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201The High Court order held that ‘... it will be open for the gram sabha to conduct social audit 
of all the projects under the Scheme taken up within the Gram Panchayat, strictly adhering to 
the norms laid down under Clause 13(b) of Schedule- I attached to the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act, 2005’ (Writ Petition No SPCWPs No. 11075/2009 and 
10916/2006). 
202Government of Rajasthan (2010a).  
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MKSS. 203 Ultimately, following a heated argument with a senior IAS official (in the 
presence of the Chief Minister), the Commissioner was forced to transfer to another 
department.204 In a domino affect, the newly appointed Director of the new Social Audit 
Directorate resigned shortly thereafter, citing unaccounted for delays in providing him 
an office and a support staff. Within two months following the first state-supported 
social audit, the state government had given in to the demands of the panchayat 
functionaries on the purchase of materials and the IAS lobby was successful in breaking 
up the core team of state officials committed to NREGA. MKSS had lost two of its 
closest allies, and the social audit process was under duress. As a result of the 
multivalent opposition to social audits from high and low levels of the state, activists 
were pulled in different directions. Consequently, they searched for other avenues and 
devised different strategies to keep the struggle alive. 
 
MAPPING THE TERRAIN OF THE STRUGGLE OVER SOCIAL AUDITS 
The constant movement of activists from one level of the state to another —local 
panchayats, the state capital, to the national capital—helps convey the shifting terrains 
of the struggle over NREGA social audits. The interactions between MKSS and the 
different levels of the state were configured differently. While the success of the gram 
sewaks in obtaining a stay order pushed the struggle into the judicial arena, the MKSS 
chose not to enter that arena but to remain in the bureaucratic and political fields. 205 
They simultaneously maintained a presence at all levels of the state, devising strategies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203As I recall the analogy used was “sitting in the laps of MKSS activists”. Author field notes, 
November 2009. 
204The argument escalated as a result of the senior IAS official using abusive language to refer 
to MKSS activists, and the enthusiasm displayed by the Commissioner for social audits. Such 
disagreements are common, and usually end in transfers. See, chapter 5 for a similar instance 
involving another IAS official, also a founder member of the NCPRI. 
205Sebastian (2009; see also Sethi, 2010). 
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to resist and engage wherever they got blocked. There are two reasons why MKSS 
activists chose to engage in a prolonged bureaucratic and political struggle rather than a 
legal one. First, though a judicial interpretation could conceivably expand the 
interpretation of the right to conduct a social audit, it could also further limit its scope 
and use; the activists wanted to avoid the latter possibility at all costs. Second, until the 
court stay on social audits was lifted, activists felt they had to resist the local state that 
continued to pocket NREGA funds meant for ordinary workers. Thus, activists had to 
formulate alternative strategies for ensuring transparency and accountability (instead of 
expending energy in the courts). 
Therefore, faced with the ban on social audits, MKSS devised a strategy to 
circumvent it by urging the state government to organise “special audits.” This was 
strategically negotiated at the monthly NREGA samvaad, or dialogue platform. The 
gram sewak opposition to the social audit had paralysed the state government, but it had 
also reinforced its fears about the prospects for rampant corruption. For its part, the state 
government was not generally opposed to the social audits as much as it was hesitant to 
confront the panchayat staff. Thus, with two public officials at the state capital (joint 
director of the social audit Directorate and NREGA Director) willing to conduct the 
special audits, MKSS activists were able to persuade the state government to undertake 
the special audits.  
All of the highest spending panchayats—one in each of the 31 state districts 
(except Bhilwara)—were identified for these special audits. As expected, the audits 
unearthed several cases of corruption in NREGA at the panchayat level. Of the 31 
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Figure 5.2. An example of JIS: Expenditure details for NREGA works painted on the wall 
of a primary school in Badkochda panchayat in Jawaja block, Ajmer district, Rajasthan. 
Photo by author (2010). 
 
special audits undertaken, the most notorious were the findings from Malaton ki Wer 
panchayat (Ajmer district) where auditors unearthed some 1.3 billion rupees worth of 
corrupt funds related to NREGA works.206 Thus, activists were able to influence higher 
levels of the state government via the monthly samvaad to some effect. They leveraged 
openings at the higher bureaucratic level to exert pressure on lower levels of 
government. 
Another strategy devised to circumvent the ban on social audit was the Janata 
Information System (JIS). Through a JIS, all information related to NREGA was to be 
publicly displayed by painting it on the walls of panchayat offices and in the villages 
where NREGA works were undertaken (figures 5.2 and 5.3). At the urging of MKSS, 
the Rajasthan government agreed to implement these JIS—bright yellow boards to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206Shrinivasan (2010); see also, Dainik Bhaskar (2010a, 2010b); DNA (2010b). 
	   183	  
  
Figure 5.3. Another example of JIS: In Heera Ki Bassi village, Vijaypura panchayat, Devgarh 
block, Rajsamand district, Rajasthan. Painted on the wall of a house is a list of job cardholders 
along with the total number of workdays and wages received. Photo by author (2010). 
 
painted on the side of government buildings—in every panchayat in Rajasthan. This 
temporary replacement for social audits was designed to ensure the flow of NREGA 
expenditure information to the public.207 In 2001, this type of public disclosure act had 
led the villagers in Janawad panchayat to seek information on the development works 
carried out in their panchayat, motivating them to organise a Jan sunwai. 	  
Faced with an antagonistic local state, MKSS also decided to move more 
forcefully into resistance mode by forming NREGA workers’ unions at the panchayat 
level. A two-week long padyatra (foot march) was organised in April 2010 across 
Rajsamand (district) in an effort to mobilise workers to join NREGA workers’ unions. 
On 1 May, over 200 unions from central Rajasthan marched from their villages to attend 
MKSS’s annual May mela (May Day fair) in Bhim (Rajsamand district). These were 
not officially registered unions, but informal groups of 10-15 NREGA workers. At the  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 See also Mohan (2009) 
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mela, MKSS took the responsibility of getting the unions registered at the state 
capital.208 
The state government, however, refused to register the NREGA workers’ 
unions, stating that NREGA workers did not qualify as employees as per the definition 
under the Trade Union Act.209 MKSS continued to organise informal unions at the 
village level while also devising ways to register them at the state level. In late 2010, 
after a 43-day dharna (sit-in) in the state capital (demanding a minimum wage increase 
under NREGA), MKSS was able to negotiate the formation of NREGA workers unions 
with the Congress state government.210 
Finally, in order to circumvent the court order banning “outsiders” from 
participating in social audits, the MKSS and the Abhiyan activists decided to support 
some of their own members to contest the local panchayat elections in early 2010. In 
their election manifesto, the new aspirants promised, if elected, to institute an inclusive 
social audit process. Once again SR Abhiyan activists used the NREGA samvaad to 
prevent newly elected sarpanches from being manipulated by social and political elites 
in the village. As part of its Panchayti Raj Sashaktikaran Abhiyan (campaign to 
strengthen panchayats), activists demanded that the Social Audit Directorate duly audit 
all accounts of the previous sarpanches before they handed over charge to the newly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208In 2008 MKSS initiated the process of forming NREGA workers unions in Rajasthan; also 
see Sebastian (2008). 
209For instance, using existing case law this is how Additional Labour Commissioner in his 
order explained his decision: ‘the term trade union defined under the Trade Union Act 1976 
contemplates the existence of employer and employee engaging in the conduct of trade or 
business (meaning a commercial undertaking).’ By such a interpretation the official concluded, 
‘the applicant union does not fulfil the necessary requirement for the purpose of registration 
under the Trade Union Act 1976 as they [Rajasthan Rojgar Guarantee Mazdoor Union or 
NREGA Workers’ Union] are not employer or employee engaged in trade or industry.’ 
(Government of Rajasthan, 2010b).  
210At the end of the Mazdoor Haq Satyagraha dharna or Civil Disobedience for Worker’s 
Rights, the state government and SR Abhiyan reached an agreement on four demands one of 
which was “to register NREGA Worker’s Union on appeal against the refusal order.”  
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elected sarpanches.211 Here MKSS’s access to senior politicians at the state level, and in 
particular to the Minister for Rural Development—who was particularly inclined to 
strengthen local self-government—was crucial for obtaining the executive order to 
ensure the audit of all previous NREGA records of outgoing sarpanches. This mandate 
would force incumbent sarpanches to open up their records to the scrutiny of senior 
officials and, in particular, to the government auditors. 
As these various strategies were being negotiated, in May 2010, almost eight 
months after the Bhilwara social audit, the Rajasthan High Court lifted its stay order on 
social audits. The Court stated that organising social audits as per the law (section 17(2) 
of NREGA) were the responsibility of the gram sabha, and reminded the state 
government of its failure to give the necessary prior notice (14-days in advance) for 
scheduling the social audits. The state government, however, still upheld the 
controversial clause 13(b) of NREGA that limited the role of outsiders in social audit 
proceedings. This clause, the state government argued, had to be amended at the 
national level in order to enable the participation of others outside the village gram 
sabhas. Predictably, MKSS, NCPRI and PAEG activists had already begun to engage 
politicians and bureaucrats at the national level on the controversial clause 13(b). 
 Following the High Court decision, the Rajasthan state government announced 
a fresh round of social audits in July 2010. This time, however, the audits were done 
without the involvement of any societal actors or groups like MKSS. With strict 
adherence to legislative provisions, the state government announced a new social audit 
schedule along with the procedure for selecting the village social audit committees, who 
would be responsible for conducting the audits. In this new round of state-led social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211Dainik Bhaskar (2010c). 
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audits, the village social audit committees, the panchayat functionaries, and the block 
staff all aided the panchayats in organising the social audits. 
In late August 2010, a month before the social audits were scheduled to begin, 
the gram sewaks throughout the state of Rajasthan threatened to go on strike, stating a 
lack of staff and financial support for implementing NREGA. Again the gram sewak 
association in Bhilwara led the protest with a NREGA mukti padyatra (“liberation from 
NREGA protest march”). Their slogan “deliver us from NREGA” drew attention to the 
lack of adequate staff and financial resources with which panchayat staff were expected 
to implement NREGA. Rather than negotiate with the state government to redress their 
grievances, the gram sewaks criticised and protested the Congress state government’s 
“obsession” with social audits. 
Three days after speaking to protesting gram sewaks in Bhilwara, I attended a 
‘state-led’ social audit in Tilonia village (Ajmer district). It was presided over by the 
sarpanch who had authorised the works that were being audited. The social audit, 
however, could not go ahead as the gram sabha did not have the necessary quorum 
(1/3rd resident members from the village). As I watched the social audit proceedings, 
the son of the sarpanch along with a few other villagers started to pull people into the 
meeting from the side of the road, making them sign the attendance register. The 
majority of these people did not stay for the meeting. Attempts to achieve an artificial 
quorum, and objections by some residents (also members from the Social Work 
Research Centre, a non-government organisation based in Tilonia) led to confusion and 
chaos, and the social audit was terminated midway.212 
Within a week of this new round of social audits, sarpanches had joined the 
gram sewaks in a symbolic show of strength and agreed to go on strike in solidarity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212Author field notes. Tilonia, Rajasthan. 26.08.10. 
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with them. Approximately five thousand panchayat functionaries had been mobilised 
over nine months (November 2009-August 2010). On 2 September 2010, these gram 
sewaks and sarpanches boycotted the social audits and marched to Jaipur to surround 
the state assembly in protest.213 Sarpanches also clashed with the police, while trying to 
gain entry into the state assembly.214 In Bhilwara (district), where the opposition had 
originated, the sarpanches collected a thousand rupees from each sarpanch to form an 
association. Those who refused to pay or join the protest in Jaipur were ordered not to 
hold the scheduled social audit. Even though sarpanches publicly touted loss of 
sovereignty of panchayats as their reason for protesting social audits, their primary 
reason to oppose the social audit was the fear of being exposed as corrupt.  As the dalit 
sarpanch from Rooppura panchayat told me:  
 
When I refused to become a member [of the association in Bhilwara] and said I 
will organise the social audit on 2 September they put a lot of pressure on me. I 
received phone calls from a MLA who tried to convince me to go to Jaipur and 
join the protest rather than organise the social audit…I stayed and organised the 
social audit [anyway].215 
 
As these protests were underway in Rajasthan, MKSS, NCPRI and PAEG 
activists had also become active at the national level: they had become members and 
chairs of three of six central government “working groups” on NREGA. The apex 
national advisory body on NREGA, the Central Employment Guarantee Council 
(CEGC) constituted these six working groups to improve NREGA implementation.216 
One CEGC working group was set up to advise the central government on transparency 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213Hindustan Times (2010).  
214Dainik Navjyoti (2010b, 2010c; see also Yadav, 2010).  
215Suresh Chandra Meghwal, Sarpanch Rooppura Panchayat. Tilonia, Rajasthan, inter view with 
author. 07.09.10. 
216CEGC is a national level advisory council headed by the Minister for Rural Development. Its 
members include members of Parliament, representatives of state governments, and 
representatives of grassroots groups associated with the right to work. 
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and accountability in NREGA and was headed by MKSS activist Aruna Roy. These 
working groups were not a response to the protests against social audits in Rajasthan 
per se; rather they were a kind of political opening (however limited) that MKSS used 
to scale up its advocacy for social audits at the national level.  
The working group included some old friends of MKSS and fellow eminent 
activists such as Shekhar Singh of NCPRI and Sowmya Kidambi (a former MKSS 
activist) the Director of the social audit agency of Andhra Pradesh. The working group 
also included other civil society groups, think tanks as well as representatives of the 
Central Vigilance Commission, and of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG). 
However, the appointment of these representatives was left to the heads of departments. 
The chairperson and MKSS activist Aruna Roy reached out to Central Vigilance 
Commissioner and to the CAG; she was successful in incorporating a set of progressive 
civil servants from these departments who supported social audit. She also sought out 
senior civil servants from the Departments of Panchayati Raj and Rural Development in 
Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, and Bihar. The working group also consulted eminent 
judges and lawyers who were not official members of the working group but whose 
legal opinion was incorporated into the group’s final report to the government. 
The ban on social audits in Rajasthan compelled the working group to submit its 
first set of immediate recommendations to the Government of India: an amendment to 
the controversial NREGA clause 13 (b) that altered the clause by making the social 
audit proceedings open to all.217 As part of its recommendations to the central 
government, the group also framed the Transparency and Accountability rules for social 
audits, which were to be notified by the ministry of rural development.218 These rules 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 Interim recommendation on Clause 13(b) of Schedule-I of NREGA (Government of India, 
2010). 
218 Government of India (2010). 
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elaborated the legal mandate for social audits by laying down the procedure for 
organising biannual social audits, as well as constituting an independent social audit 
agency in each state to ensure social audits were duly conducted.  As I noted earlier, 
prior to this, no social audit rules had been framed apart from those drafted by activists 
in Udaipur (2007), which were then revised and adopted by the Andhra Pradesh 
government.  
Also at the national level, the MKSS and SR Abhiyan lobbied the leaders of the 
Congress Party and, through one of its core activists (Aruna Roy), also lobbied the 
National Advisory Council (NAC), of which she was also a member. The NAC was 
reconstituted in June 2010, and, soon after, it set up a sub-group to advise the 
government on improving transparency and accountability in the delivery of various 
welfare programmes. In the Transparency and Accountability sub-group meetings, 
NREGA corruption and the disruption of the social audits due to clause 13(b) were 
debated in detail.219 Through the NAC, MKSS activists and officials in the AP social 
audit directorate attempted to bring pressure on the Ministry of Rural Development that 
had earlier (in December 2008) amended the controversial clause 13(b) to limit the role 
of outsiders in social audit proceedings. It took another nine months, and, after 
consulting the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Ministry of Law, the Ministry 
of Rural Development amended the controversial clause 13 (b), making social audits 
more inclusive. The Ministry additionally ordered the formation of independent social 
audit directorates at the state level to conduct social audits. The government of India, 
based on the recommendations of the CEGC working group, also enacted the social 
audit rules.220 This was a significant success and arose from the tireless movement 
between levels of the state by MKSS activists and their allies at the state and national 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 I participated in two meetings, organised in August and October of 2010. 
220 Government of India (2011). 
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levels. Trying to implement national legislation locally, it found itself blocked by local 
government functionaries, then the judiciary, and then by a half-willing and half-timid 
state government. Going above their heads to the national government, activists were 
successful in at least removing the legal obstacle to social audits under NREGA. This 
was largely the state of affairs when I finished my fieldwork in 2010. The battle 
continues. 
 
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
This chapter tells a previously untold story about India’s right to information 
struggle: the post-legislative struggle to realise the original goals of the RTI by 
institutionalising social audits under NREGA. It was an effort by MKSS and its allies in 
the SR Abhiyan to make legislative victories translate into an actual transformation in 
the everyday practices of state agencies on the ground. As we have seen, the 
implementation of social audits has been deeply contentious, illustrating the stakes 
involved. The opposition to social audits is deeply entrenched in the local state, and the 
struggle for it is indeterminate and on-going. In Rajasthan, the presence of strong civil 
society actors pushing for social audits has intensified the tensions between different 
levels of the state charged with monitoring NREGA and implementing social audits. 
The above narrative demonstrates that as the struggle was pushed out of villages and 
into the state capital, different levels of the state alternately blocked and supported 
social audits in different phases in accordance with shifts in the political balance of 
forces on the ground. 
For gram sewaks and sarpanches, organising social audits meant a reduction of 
power, influence and monetary gains at the village level. More specifically, they 
believed they were being ‘targeted,’ whereas other (line) departments, such as irrigation 
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and public works, were exempted from the social audit process. They conceived the 
social audit as bureaucratic high-handedness and believed they were being singled out. 
The state government was paralysed and seemed hesitant to take any action against the 
protesting gram sewaks. Explanations for the state government’s response include in-
fighting within the state government and the compulsions of electoral politics. Having 
lost the previous elections by confronting the lower bureaucracy over a different issue, 
the Congress state government did not want to risk another electoral defeat. It seemed 
like an opportune moment for the BJP (as the party in opposition) to politicise the issue. 
Despite their best efforts, however, the BJP was unable to manipulate the protests.221 
The inability of either political party to contain or appropriate the protest is illustrative 
of the complex nature of relations between the different levels and parts of the state in 
Rajasthan. In particular, it highlights the friction between the local state and higher 
levels of the bureaucracy. Additionally, it demonstrates the dependency of the political 
state on the panchayat staff. 
The opposition to the NREGA social audits in Rajasthan also saw the 
coalescence of what we might call a sarpanch class identity, expressed in the term 
“sarpanch jati.” For instance, the President of the Rajasthan Sarpanch Association told 
the media, ‘we came here [to Jaipur] as a single force, irrespective of our political 
inclinations, in the larger interest of rural development.’222 A startling example of the 
alliance building between sarpanches that cut across castes was the participation of a 
former MKSS activist and, dalit sarpanch from Tilonia village (Ajmer district), Naurti 
bai. I have discussed Naurti bai’s pioneering role in the struggle for enforcement of 
minimum wages in Harmada village in 1981 (Chapter 3). In September 2010, however, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221Times of India (2010a) 
222 Ibid. 
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as thousands of sarpanches marched to the state capital, Jaipur, Naurti bai shocked the 
MKSS in joining the march to express solidarity with the thousands of protesting 
sarpanches against the NREGA social audit. This alliance demonstrated the 
significance of the re-interpretation of social audits and its potential to galvanise support 
on the pretext of loss of sovereignty of panchayats. A few months later, Naurti bai told 
MKSS activists that she had been persuaded to join the protest primarily because she 
was told that as an elected representative, the social audits would also target her. 
How do we make sense of this resistance by the local state that managed to 
indefinitely stall social audits in Rajasthan? As an explanation, I want to look back on 
the iterative trajectory of the rights to information and work. We recall that in 1991 
MKSS’s struggle for the enforcement of minimum wages started locally, at the 
panchayat level. However, MKSS was forced to scale its activities up to higher levels of 
the state in order to make its demands actionable. While scaling up was necessary to 
secure a national RTI law, shifting scales also made the MKSS less visible at the village 
level. As its activists gained prominence and access to higher levels of the bureaucratic 
and political state, increasing MKSS’s ability to push for legislative gains, the group 
simultaneously compromised its mobilising capacity at the panchayat level. This left it 
vulnerable to the gram sewak and sarpanch counter-attack. 
 Twenty years later, it was the gram sewaks who took the struggle from the 
village/panchayat level to the judicial arena and higher levels of the state.  Fearing an 
adverse judicial decision, MKSS chose not to enter the judicial arena; instead, it 
responded by keeping the struggle alive in the state capital and at the national level. As 
MKSS engaged the state and central governments, activists simultaneously resisted the 
local state. MKSS, through its strategies of multi-scalar engagement and resistance, 
tried to take the struggle back to the village level with the objective of reinvigorating the 
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effort to transform the everyday practices of the local state (that, as we saw in Chapter 
3, MKSS had begun with the Jan sunwai).  
This account of the struggle over social audits in Rajasthan has, I believe, 
provided insight into the iterative nature of state-society interaction at multiple levels. It 
shows how a fragmented Indian state forces activists who aim to transform it to 
constantly shift scales and alternate between strategies of engagement and resistance. 
Following victory at the national level, MKSS returned to where it began: organising 
for transparency in the local implementation of right to work programs, this time with 
the initial backing of the state government. However, this effort elicited an intense 
counter-mobilisation by local state functionaries, who were themselves successful in 
scaling up the struggle and blocking these efforts with the help of the judiciary and a 
cowered state government. Faced with recalcitrance at local government and hesitation 
at state government, the MKSS went back to the national level to help change the rules 
governing social audits at the national level. Having exploited a sympathetic opening at 
the national level, they at least removed any legal blockage to the organisation of 
participatory social audits in Rajasthan. A modest victory after relentless campaigning 
at all levels. We are, nevertheless, still far from seeing a thorough institutionalisation of 
social audits across Rajasthan. That struggle continues. This chapter has, however, 
provided an understanding of the form that struggle for transparency and accountability 
will continue to take: a relentless shifting across scales and oscillation between 
engagement and resistance in the effort to leverage different parts of the state against 
one another and thereby gradually push them all in a more democratic and social 
accountable direction.  
Having followed the full trajectory of the intertwined struggles for rights to 
information and work, in the concluding chapter I reflect on what this trajectory reveals 
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about the nature of the Indian state, the vision of transparency and accountability 
underpinning this multi-scaled activism and its broader implications for our 
understanding of social movement activism in general.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion: Pragmatic Activism and the Rights to Information and 
Work  
 
This dissertation has traced the trajectory of the inter-linked struggles for right to 
information and work in India. It has examined multi-scaled activism that began with 
the Jan sunwai in the villages of Rajasthan; progressed towards an ultimately successful 
campaign for a national right to information legislation; and returned to rural Rajasthan 
in an (ongoing) effort to institute social audits in the implementation of the newly won 
right to work. I have shown how this ‘long arc’ of activism has been shaped by the 
sustained efforts of MKSS/NCPRI activists to creatively and pragmatically look for 
openings and find leverage in different parts of the Indian state. Where activists found 
openings, they engaged; where they were blocked, they mobilised to force an opening 
or found new levers of engagement in different parts of the state. This account makes an 
original contribution to the existing literature on the right to information in India by 
showing how each stage of the campaign, until now studied separately, fits into a single 
larger trajectory of activism. Focusing on the larger trajectory reveals how the campaign 
for the rights to information and work moved continuously between scales and 
oscillated between engagement and resistance. It also highlights that this ongoing 
campaign has been driven by a larger objective than the struggle against corruption—it 
has been driven and framed as a struggle to transform the Indian state, to make it more 
democratic, responsive and accessible to the poor. 
The study began with an historical account and theorisation of the role of Jan 
sunwais in this larger trajectory. Chapter 3 showed how the right to information 
emerged from the struggle over wages in public works projects in rural Rajasthan. 
When MKSS’s efforts to ensure transparency in the local implementation of drought 
relief programs in Rajasthan encountered a hostile local state, they resisted and created 
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alternative public spheres (the Jan sunwais) to expose the misuse of public funds. In 
effect, the Jan sunwai attempted to turn the table by allowing ordinary citizens to 
interrogate the state and its officials. Of course, while challenging local power 
inequalities, the Jan sunwais did not eliminate them at the village-level. And they ran 
into significant resistance by the vested interests they challenged. 
When officials of the local state proved hostile to the Jan sunwai, recognising 
the limits of this localised resistance, MKSS activists shifted scales, and created a 
national network of ‘eminent activists’ to advocate for an RTI Act at the central level, 
utilising the symbolic capital of these privileged activists to engage different segments 
of the national government. Chapter 4 showed how this network of eminent activists 
significantly advanced the struggle for the right to information at the national level: it 
persuaded government officials and infiltrated the state apparatus through the IAS 
training institutes; writing about it in national news papers; building alliances with other 
people’s movements and issue campaigns; and by drafting a national right to 
information law. Thus, this study illuminates an often mentioned but under-theorised 
aspect of many social movements in India: the role of elite supporters in helping to 
institutionalise changes originating from more subaltern struggles. This is well-
established in the social movement literature and studies of activism in other national 
contexts that note state-engaging protests benefit when they enlist supportive fractions 
of the educated classes to gain public and government support (McAdam, 1999; 
Tarrow, 1994; Houtzager, 2000; Hung, 2011).  
With the enactment of a national right to information and its incorporation into 
the newly won right to work, MKSS activists turned their attention to the 
implementation of the right to work at the local level. MKSS’s effort to institutionalise 
social audits in the implementation of NREGA reflects its long-term and unfinished 
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objective of democratising the state and, in particular, making it more accountable to 
poorer citizens. With the leverage provided by national legislation, the MKSS returned 
to rural Rajasthan to try to enforce its writ. In the face of fierce resistance by 
increasingly organised local government functionaries to social audits, the MKSS had to 
again switch scales and strategies, trying to gain support from state and then central 
government. During this phase, we saw a more constant and rapid shifting between 
resistance and engagement as avenues for engagement at the state-level dried up in the 
face of an effectively mobilised opposition. This oscillation continues today with the 
outcome yet to be determined.  
It is this back and forth across multiple scales and strategies over time that 
defines the pragmatic, long-term efforts of MKSS and NCPRI to transform the Indian 
state. It is a long, slow and excruciatingly difficult process, but these efforts have 
generated some significant (perhaps even uncommon) achievements: the model of 
collective, open public hearings represented by the Jan sunwai; the path breaking RTI 
legislation; and, however partial and imperfect so far, social audits institutionalised into 
NREGA.  
This conclusion seeks to develop some of the implications of the kind of 
activism explored in this study by addressing three further questions: 1) what does the 
long trajectory of activism tell us about the nature of the Indian state and the conditions 
or possibility for its democratisation and responsiveness to the poor?; 2) is the type of 
civil society activism embodied by MKSS necessary for the achievement of 
transparency and accountability in government programs like NREGA, or are there 
alternative paths? and 3) what lessons, if any, does this kind of activism have for other 
rights-based campaigns in India, and what does this study illuminate about social 
movement activism more generally?  
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A Fragmented and Differentially Embedded State 
The trajectory of the rights to information and work over the course of two 
decades provides some important insights into the nature of the Indian state.  While 
Marxists and Weberians alike have tended to see the state as a monolithic entity, 
debating whether “it” is more, less, or “relatively” autonomous (Kohli, 1987, 1990a, 
1990b; Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987, Vanaik, 1990, Kaviraj, 1991, Chatterjee, 1998, 
Bardhan, 1984, 1989), several decades of interaction between the MKSS and different 
parts of the Indian state points to a different reality. In a similar vein as the ‘everyday 
state’ literature in India that points to the disjuncture between the national and the local 
or ‘everyday state’ (Fuller and Harriss, 2000; Wade, 1982; Gupta, 1995; Jeffrey, 2000; 
Robbins, 2000; Parry, 2000; Oldenburg, 2006), what the campaigns have come up 
against is not “the state,” but rather a sprawling and fragmented body composed of 
different parts that appear to be more or less “autonomous” and more or less 
“embedded” with different social groups at different points in time.  
What do we learn about the literature on the Indian state that has focused on 
either the very top or bottom levels of the state? And how do we think about/frame the 
struggles that seek an enduring transformation of the state’s different levels? There is a 
significant degree of incoherence to the state; and this incoherence can and has 
provided space and leverage for movements seeking its transformation. This is not to 
join the group of scholars who argue that the state is a mere “effect” than a substantive 
entity (Mitchell 1999); it is rather to argue that the state is a complex of offices, officers, 
and activities that lacks a singular will, and that this messy complex provides the 
opportunity for social movements to leverage and arbitrage parts of the state against 
each other. We therefore need to move beyond the “cohesive state” portrait found in 
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many studies of the Indian state and of right-based campaigns, and address this 
complexity head on. 
 This dissertation has provided many instances of activists being blocked at one 
level of government, yet finding sympathetic officials in different parts of the state that 
have helped overcome such blockages. While the dissertation has provided more 
instances of higher level government officials helping to overcome blockages at the 
local level, the point here is not simply that the central government or elite IAS officials 
are more willing to support progressive state reforms than members of the local state. 
While in broad strokes there is some validity to this claim, the point is rather that 
openings for social movements do not statically adhere at any particular level of 
government, but dynamically change over time. Numerous factors, including the 
balance of political forces and vicissitudes in electoral politics produces such opening at 
different points in time. The central government, for example, only provided an opening 
after the Congress Party came to power on a platform that included the rights to 
information and work. The state government in Rajasthan provided no opportunity for 
engagement under the BJP, forcing the movement to remain in resistance mode. While 
the Congress government that subsequently came into power in Rajasthan provided 
important support at times, this also changed as the reaction of the local sarpanches and 
gram sewaks, who grew in strength over time and began to outflank MKSS on the 
ground in Rajasthan. The art of rights-based campaign strategy, the case of the rights to 
information and work suggests, resides in constantly reading these changes, adapting to 
modifications in what the social movement literature calls the ‘political opportunity 
structure,’ (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996), alternating between engagement and 
resistance as expediency demands.  
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Civil Society-led versus State-led Transparency: Rajasthan and Andhra 
Pradesh Compared 
 
 The next question I want to turn to is whether this civil society activism is the 
best or only way to “open up” the state, or whether the state is capable of opening itself 
up to broad public scrutiny? I address this question by briefly contrasting the role of 
MKSS in the role out of social audits in Rajasthan, and the more autonomous state-led 
effort to institute social audits in Andhra Pradesh (AP). 
The social audits on NREGA were introduced in markedly different ways across 
India. In Rajasthan, the case explored in detail in this dissertation, civil society played 
the lead role in trying to implement social audits. In contrast, in Andhra Pradesh the 
state government has instituted social audits on its own initiative (albeit inspired by the 
MKSS model). This raises the question: is the kind of activism practiced by MKSS the 
best or only way to go about making the Indian state more transparent and accountable 
in its functioning? 
In 2004, Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy (YSR), from the Congress party was elected 
Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh. He came to power on a platform that included the 
implementation of welfare programmes, such as the Food for Works and NREGA. At 
the same time, the Congress Party was also hoisted to power at the Centre or national-
level on a platform that included the right to work. Once in power, YSR was confronted 
with the well-known problem of corruption in the implementation of social welfare 
programmes, and fulfilling his party’s electoral promise: to tackle an agrarian crisis in 
the state by improving the implementation of social welfare programmes (Aiyar et al, 
2011). He decided to implement NREGA social audits, which were first piloted to 
assess the implementation of Food for Works programmes.223 A year later, the Andhra 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223Sowmya Kidambi, Director SSAAT, Government of Andhra Pradesh and former MKSS 
activist, interview with author. Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. 22.05.10. 
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Pradesh government invited MKSS to provide consultation on how to set up social 
audits, and a former MKSS activist was invited to join the Strategy and Performance 
Innovation Unit (SPIU), located within the Department of Rural Development and 
responsible for the training and oversight of the cadre of officials who conduct social 
audits across the state. While inspired by MKSS, the Andhra Pradesh social audit 
initiative would be state-led and followed a different strategy from the civil society one 
in Rajasthan. First, and counter to the national legislation the AP government decided to 
keep NREGA implementation in the hands of the state bureaucracy rather than the 
panchayats. Second, it would be the state government itself that would undertake the 
audits through a parastatal agency created specifically for the purpose: Society for 
Social Audit Accountability and Transparency (SSAAT, which was earlier the SPIU). 
Third, the state government would train ordinary people, in particular youth from dalit 
households, from different parts of the state, to conduct the audits in different 
constituencies. Finally, a separate vigilance agency would follow up on the social audit 
reports submitted by the parastatal audit agency. 
The decision to centralise NREGA implementation in a government agency, and 
organise social audits through that agency was meant to keep NREGA free of 
corruption, and avoid the fate of other government social welfare schemes. However, 
putting such a system into place required a significant effort to build support and 
legitimacy inside the government itself.  
Two factors facilitated the Andhra Pradesh government’s social audit initiative. 
First, the Chief Minister enjoyed strong political capital within his party and emerged as 
its undisputed leader in the 2004 state elections. He appointed pro-poor, reformist civil 
servants to senior positions in the state Department of Rural Development in charge of 
implementing the employment guarantee scheme. These high-level bureaucrats were 
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given a “free hand” in implementing NREGA.224 And they actively mobilised political 
support for their efforts both inside the state and in society, and used the media to 
capitalise on every press conference and public appearance of the Chief Minister to 
shape public (political) opinion in favour of social audits.  Through the press 
conferences, it was made clear, support for social audits meant support for the Chief 
Minister. Meanwhile, the underlying message the Chief Minister communicated to his 
party members was: keep your hands off NREGA. A politically powerful CM had thus 
declared the program politically out of bounds for profiteers within his own party.225 
Second, the Andhra experience suggests a unique history of concerted efforts to 
disempower panchayats, and this disempowerment of local government provided the 
political conditions for a centralised social audit initiative—a condition that is not 
shared in Rajasthan or some of the other states in India.226 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224Former Principal Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh, interview with author. 
Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. 20.05.10. 
225YSR, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh was considered to be one of the most corrupt 
Chief Ministers, as I was told repeatedly while in Andhra, by several independent researchers, 
retired civil servants. Implementing NREGA won him titles like “people’s messiah”, but he 
made all his money elsewhere (infrastructure contracts). This is how one independent researcher 
described the former Chief Minister: ‘YSR believed everyone had a price, you might refuse a 
few thousand rupees, but half a million rupees will make you reconsider…and then he gave you 
five billion, and you didn’t know what hit you!’ Anant M., independent researcher, interview 
with author. Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. 24.11.2010. 
226For example, as I was told by an independent researched based in Hyderabad, in the early 
1980’s N.T. Rama Rao, Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh from the Telegu Desam Party (TDP) 
came to power on a platform to ‘rid Andhra Pradesh from a corrupt Congress Party.’ After 
coming to power he created mandals or administrative blocks to limit the influence of 
panchayats that he considered were Congress party strongholds. Later, Chandrababu Naidu, also 
from the TDP, was Chief Minister of the state in the 1990’s. His  ‘competitive neoliberal 
populism’ further destroyed the powers of the sarpanches, and ‘turned everyone into a small 
time contractor’ by creating middle level institutions like self help groups, water user 
associations, and joint forest committees. These institutions were created to address the ‘needs’ 
of different ‘stakeholders’, replacing the discourse of ‘rights and entitlements.’ These middle 
level stakeholder institutions received money from the state government to implement (World 
Bank funded) government projects and reduced the financial and decision making power of the 
sarpanches at the village level. Anant M., interview with author. Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. 
24.11.2010. 
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 The Andhra Pradesh model has achieved notable results. It is the only state that 
has organised regular, bi-annual social audits since 2007, a feat not matched even by 
Rajasthan, where social audits originated. In the five years since social audits began, the 
AP government has recovered over $20 million in embezzled NREGA funds, and over 
4,500 public officials have faced administrative and criminal charges.227  
In contrast to Rajasthan then, in AP we have a responsive state with high state 
capacity, minimal civil society involvement and good results. 228 So, what does this 
experience suggest about the role of civil society in generating transparency and 
accountability? The AP example illustrates that, when a Chief Minister enjoys high 
levels of political capital it is possible to transform parts of the Indian state (or at least 
part of its functioning) from above. In contrast, in Rajasthan infighting within the 
Congress Party and dispute over the party leadership failed to produce the necessary 
political support for the government’s social audit initiative. Furthermore, the panchayat 
system in Rajasthan is relatively well entrenched and was able to mobilise against social 
audits.  
Among the questions this comparison raises, without civil society pressure, how 
did the Andhra Pradesh government win its battles with other levels of the political and 
administrative state? Answering this question is beyond the scope of this dissertation 
and requires further research.  
There are three reasons, however, that suggest that the relative success of the AP 
experience should not lead us to conclude that civil society activism will be superfluous 
to achieving transparency and accountability anytime soon.  First, the AP experience 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227Sowmya Kidambi, Director SSAAT, Government of Andhra Pradesh and former MKSS 
activist, interview with author. Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. 22.05.10. 
228Here by the state government’s responsiveness we might mean, both taking a lead to 
implement social audits, rather than being responsive to a campaign or ‘the poor’ as well as 
responding to its electoral mandate. 
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suggests that the ability of the state to reform itself depends on political support, which 
does not exist everywhere and clearly changes over time. What happens after the 
supportive ruling party leaves power, and the opposition has no interests in upholding 
the efforts of its predecessors?  Further, the role of civil society in the implementation 
on NREGA in each state will also shape the path each state will take. For example, in 
Andhra a senior official in the rural development department told me, ‘lack of civil 
society actors [also] made social audits appear an independent process under the aegis 
of the government.’229 Given the history of political protest in Andhra Pradesh: dalit 
assertion as well as the Naxal movement (Maoist insurgency) that were anti-state, 
rights-based campaigns, dalit organisations and progressive left groups are suspicious of 
the state; they do not ‘critically engage the state’ as the MKSS has done in Rajasthan.230  
There are, of course, tradeoffs for civil society when they enter policy arenas. 
Grassroots groups can not be present at all levels at all times, and engaging 
different/higher levels of the state may make them less visible at other/local levels. As 
we saw in Chapter 5, civil society actors in Rajasthan were outflanked by reactive 
sarpanches at the local level. But in the absence of strong civil society pressure, there is 
nothing to prevent the state from back-tracking on its commitments. Does the absence 
of civil society actors in state-supported social audits, then, make them politically more 
vulnerable or sustainable, irrespective of the political party in power? In Andhra 
Pradesh, it remains to be seen.  
Second, while there are surely gains, there may also be something lost in the 
qualitative nature of social audits when governments rather than civil society activists 
and villagers run them. For some civil society actors in Andhra Pradesh the problems 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229Former Principal Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh, interview with author. 
Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. 20.05.10. 
230P.S. Ajay, member Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Workers Union (APVVU), interview with 
author. Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. 27.11.10. 
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with the state-led process are its focus on financial aspects of NREGA rather than the 
overall implementation of the right to work, and the questionable commitment of 
village social auditors who may be more interested in government promotion than the 
long-term support of the communities they are auditing.231 Further, many of the critics 
view the state-led process as highly centralised, insulated, and designed to ‘exclude 
panchayats.’232  Whatever we make of these criticisms, it may be the case that state-led 
audits do produce a different kind of accountability than what many social movements 
would like to see. State-led social audits may be very effective at curbing corruption and 
making social programs more effective; they will likely not be vehicles for long-term 
organising for social change that has driven MKSS in Rajasthan over the past two 
decades. 
Third, it should be kept in mind that the AP model was directly inspired by 
MKSS’s efforts in Rajasthan. It represents, in essence, a scaling up of MKSS’s 
experiments with Jan sunwais and then social audits. State-led processes of reform, we 
might conclude, often take their models from civil society, and do not necessarily mean 
no role for civil society. The creative experiments of civil society activists are likely to 
remain significant even for state-led efforts at increasing transparency and 
accountability for the foreseeable future. Indeed, civil society actors behind the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231P.S. Ajay, Member Andhra Pradesh Agriculture Worker’s Union (APVVU), interview with 
author. Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. 27.11.10; Ravikumar, WASSAN, interview with author. 
Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. 29.11.10.  
232K.S. Gopal, Centre for Environment Concerns, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. 24.11.10; also 
see, Gopal (2009); Some studies also point to problems of ‘co-option’ of village-level social 
auditors and district level resource persons, and suggest that signs of ‘routinisation’ (Aiyar et al, 
2011) are emerging—that is, like Rajasthan, people whose interests are most challenged are 
learning how to beat the system. 
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Rajasthan social audit experience were invited onto the team of the AP unit overseeing 
its state led initiative.233 
How might such forms of civil society or state-led processes for 
institutionalising accountability play out in different national contexts? Or in other 
states in India that do not have the Andhra Pradesh capacity, which way are they going 
to go, and can we expect to see a greater role for civil society? These questions need to 
be explored in further research, but what we can conclude for now is that state-
initiatives to scale up the efforts of civil society can have different strengths and 
weakness.  Studying the various permutations of each type of initiative and the 
conditions under which they emerge, and for their success, will require detailed 
comparative research across Indian states. 
 
Defensive and Offensive Engagement: Two Forms of Social Movement 
Activism 
 
 Is the type of social movement activism analysed in this dissertation relevant for 
other kinds of rights-based struggles in India? Is the inter-linked struggle for the rights 
to work and information unique in some ways, or does it share characteristics with other 
movements like the campaign for the Forest Rights Act?  What lessons may the long 
trajectory of the right to information and the right to work have for the literature on 
social movements and social movement activism in India that has been largely framed 
in terms of defensive/conflict struggles—protests against the denial of existing rights by 
the state (Kumar and Kerr, 2012; Sundar, 2001, 2011; Menon and Nigam, 2007; 
Dwivedi, 2006; Ray and Katzenstein, 2005; Sheth, 2004; Brass, 1995; Omvedt, 1993)? 
What the case of the long trajectory of the rights to information and work shows is that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233The Director of the parastatal agency in charge of social audits in Andhra is a former MKSS 
activist. And two other MKSS activists (Aruna Roy and Nikhil Dey) are also members of the 
steering committee that advises the Andhra audit agency. 
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rights-based campaigns and contemporary social movements in India are arrayed 
against different arms of the state. We therefore need to move towards thinking about 
how to frame such struggles that do not fit neatly into the defensive framing.  
 In Chapters 1 and 2, I introduced a distinction between state-engaging and state-
resisting movements. This distinction draws on the work of Ho-fung Hung (2011), who 
proposes it as an alternative to Tilly’s (1978) “reactive” and “proactive” movements. I 
have shown, however, that the movement for the rights to information and work has 
been characterised by a continuous oscillation between state-engagement and state-
resistance. It pragmatically resists where it is blocked, engages where it has an opening. 
This oscillation, I argue, is not unique to MKSS but is also deployed by other 
movements who confront the Indian state on a range of issues. This general feature of 
movement struggles supports my argument about the nature of the Indian state—a 
stratified and multi-layered India state necessitates movements to resist and engage its 
different parts at different phases of their struggle—that they are all arrayed against. 
But, there is, I would argue, an important distinction between the MKSS, whose 
ultimate mission is to transform the Indian state and achieve new rights, and those 
movements whose purpose is essentially to prevent the Indian state from encroaching 
on existing (de jure or de facto) rights and entitlements.  
In other words, we must re-introduce Tilly’s distinction between pro-active and 
re-active movements. The first are engaged in an ongoing effort to transform the Indian 
state and broaden its capacities to serve the poor and support other resistance struggles; 
the second engage the state out of defensive necessity to prevent their dispossession or 
encroachments on existing entitlements. While each might oscillate between 
engagement and resistance, what they are seeking to achieve is quite different. This 
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distinction becomes clear by comparing the Right to Information and Work campaign 
with the campaign for the Forest Rights Act.  
In 2003, activists from the Front for Tribal Self Rule met in Delhi to build a 
national network—the Campaign for Survival and Dignity (CSD)—to protest against 
the eviction orders issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF). This 
network of tribal and forest dwellers’ organisations had already been campaigning for 
the effective implementation of another legislation: Panchayat (Extension to Schedules 
Areas) Act or PESA.234 At the meeting in Delhi, in 2003, the CSD drew up a plan for 
coordinated protests at the state and district-levels as well as to seek out Members of 
Parliaments in the national capital. A national public hearing followed state-level 
agitations against the MoEF eviction orders, where thousands of tribals testified against 
evictions and human rights violations (Kumar and Kerr, 2012; Asher and Agarwal, 
2007). Additionally, some members of the Campaign for Survival and Dignity in states 
such as, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan, also filed writ 
petitions in high courts to stop evictions; with the exception of Andhra Pradesh, no 
other state was able to obtain a stay order on the evictions (Asher and Agarwal, 
2007).235  
FRA’s starting point is defensive. It seeks to protect vulnerable populations from 
the coercive (dispossessing) arm of the state. It arises, as Kumar and Kerr (2012) note, 
from a long history of attempts by tribal and other traditional forest dwellers to fight 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234A former Commissioner of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Commission, B.D. 
Sharma, played a pivotal role in drafting PESA, a law passed in 1996 that, gives tribal 
communities substantive powers with regard to natural resource management and self-
governance (Sundar, 2001). 
235In India, the experience of using Courts to gain social economic rights has produced uneven 
results. For instance, in the case of forest rights, Upadhyay (2001) notes that state forest policies 
(however prohibitive) provided tribal rights activists with existing ‘legal spaces’ to uphold 
constitutional guarantees for tribal communities. On the other hand Menon (2007) argues while 
courts have upheld ‘adivasi’ rights in the abstract, they have been less willing to recognise their 
specific rights to land, forest rights, or more broadly, even livelihood. 
	   209	  
evictions and infringements on traditional use rights by the colonial and post-colonial 
state.236 The practices of the forest bureaucracy, which Sundar notes (2001: 2018), are 
designed to ‘serve the interest of revenue and not villagers,’ have been the focal points 
of this resistance and counter-mobilisation by tribal (adivasi) communities and forest 
rights activists. Further, recent studies on the Forest Rights Act (Kumar and Kerr, 2012; 
Kashwan, 2012; Sundar, 2011; Varma, 2008; Asher and Agarwal, 2007) identify the 
2002 Ministry of Environment and Forest’s executive orders that resulted in the eviction 
of large groups of tribal and other forest dwellers from forestland across the country, to 
explain the emergence of a national level Campaign for Survival and Dignity. The 
campaign thus emerged out of defensive necessity to protect the land rights of forest 
dwellers. In the face of a recalcitrant forest bureaucracy that refused to implement the 
Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act that provided for greater control over 
natural resources by local gram sabhas (Sundar, 2001), the Campaign for forest rights 
moved to a legislative route once political conditions became favourable with the 
General Election of 2004 that hoisted the Congress and Left parties into a coalition 
government (Kumar and Kerr, 2012).237 After the passage of the act, activists have—
like MKSS—struggled over its implementation (Sundar, 2011). So, without going 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236Also see, Gadgil and Guha (1994: 104) who argue, taking over of forests by the colonial state 
was a watershed act in many ways: political, social and ecological. State control and authority 
over forests were expanded to satiate the colonial state’s commercial interests while 
simultaneously curbing local access and rights of village communities. This ‘radically altered 
patterns of natural resource use’ (Gadgil and Guha, 1994: 104). Since independence, the poor, 
Gadgil and Guha (1994:119) argue, were made to ‘bear the cost of economic development in 
the form of declining availability of natural resources, pollution and physical displacement.’ For 
a more recent analysis of the impact of the commercial orientation of state forest policies on 
tribal’s and other traditional forest dwellers, see Kashwan (2012). 
237In their Common Minimum Programme, the Congress led United Progressive Alliance 
government stated, ‘eviction of tribal communities and other forest-dwelling communities from 
forest areas will be discontinued’ (Singh, 2005). The government’s willingness to prevent 
eviction of forest dwellers, Varma (2008) notes, was also linked to its concerns of national 
security and rising threat from the maoist insurgency in central India. In states like Chhattisgarh 
and Jharkhand, Maoists had overturned state policies, taken control over forests and even 
distributed land titles (Sundar, 2011).  
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further into the details of this similarly successful campaign, I want to draw out some of 
the salient differences between it and the struggles over right to information and work. 
First, even though forest rights activists moved from resistance to engagement, 
their end goal has been to prevent evictions of tribal and forest dwellers from forestland. 
The issues that they are organised around—defending vulnerable people against the 
dispossessive arm of the state—makes them necessarily defensive. This campaign, as 
with dispossession struggles more generally, always begin as defensive struggles 
against the state (Levien, 2013). When they engage the state, it is because they find an 
opening to push changes that weaken the coercive ability of the state and solidify their 
defensive position. This is no criticism; but springs from the very nature of the issues 
that animate them. 
MKSS, in contrast, is organised not to beat back the coercive arm of the state 
but to expand and strengthen the welfare arm of the state. When trying to make some of 
its positive functions work better (rather than trying to put a stop to its negative and 
predatory functions), people have to engage with a state. MKSS/NCPRI’s strategy 
involves more proactive engagement with the state over an extended period of time, an 
engagement that does not end when threats abate. So while both pro-active and reactive 
struggles change scales and oscillate between engagement and resistance (these are, as I 
have argued, strategically shrewd responses to the nature of the Indian state), their 
trajectories have different beginning and end points. 
It is, of course, rare that any struggle/movement is only reactive or proactive, but 
on the whole the distinction between the two holds true. Because the ultimate goal of 
struggles against eviction and dispossession is to defend against the encroachments of 
the state’s coercive arm, they begin with resistance and subside when dispossession is 
prevented. Struggles to expand the state’s welfare arm are, however, different and in 
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principle unlimited in their aims. In taking as their goal increasing the effectiveness of 
the state itself, MKSS’s goals do not aim to defend what exists but to create what does 
not. The last moment in the dialectic is thus always, necessarily, engagement. 
Moreover, the rights MKSS struggles for might be considered meta-rights. The 
right to information is primarily an enabling right, or a right to access other rights 
(Somers and Roberts, 2008: 413). We have seen how it has enabled the right to work, 
but it has also been used more widely in many contemporary social movements and 
rights-based struggles. Generally movements fighting displacement—such as, the Anti-
dam movement or Narmada Bachao Andolan—to get government documents that were 
usually withheld, used the RTI. Moreover, groups have used RTI to gather information 
on planned projects under the controversial Special Economic Zone policy and 
organised public audits to build a broader campaign against land acquisition. More 
recently, forest rights activists in the western state of Maharashtra have used the RTI 
Act to obtain information on land titles. The Right to Food Campaign and the National 
Commission for the Protection of Child Rights has also used the RTI and social audits 
to monitor the implementation of PDS, mid-day-meal programmes, and the 
implementation of the Right to Education Act. The anti- GMO or genetically modified 
campaign of Greenpeace India after an 18-month battle against the Department of 
Science and Technology and Ministry of Environment and Forest obtained access to 
documents pertaining to genetically modified or bt-brinjal. These documents 
highlighted inconclusive tests on the use of genetically modified food, and were later 
used to pressurise the central government that placed a moratorium on the approval of 
bt-brinjal for public consumption. The RTI, because it pro-actively opens up the state, 
has contributed to all these different struggles for improving the state. In the lives of 
ordinary people, RTI has been used to advance many rights that, in everyday life are not 
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separable: from obtaining work to accessing subsidised food grains from the public 
distribution system, trying to educate children in dysfunctional government schools, and 
seeking medical care at under-equipped hospitals. In one moment, people might need 
the right to work, in another to food, education, or health. The RTI makes a contribution 
to each. 
So, while multi-scaled oscillation between engagement and resistance 
illuminated in this study is, I believe, applicable to many social movements in India, I 
believe I have also called attention to an important distinction between movements that 
are, in the last instance, state-engaging and those that are state-resisting. Each 
encounters different arms of the state and develops their strategies accordingly. Keeping 
that in mind can help scholars understand strategic differences across movements as 
corresponding the complementary issues they are fighting, rather than reflecting degrees 
of “radicalism” or “reformism.”   
 
Conclusion 
The long arc of activism for the rights to information and work illuminates a 
different vision of transparency and accountability from that found in the anti-
corruption framing in India and other low and middle income countries that has become 
influential and a potentially powerful tool to increase administrative capacity and 
efficiency of public bureaucracies.238  The alternative framing examined in this 
dissertation is [instead] linked to social justice and emerged from the lived experiences 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 Variously expressed as increasing citizen voice, decentralising governance, supporting good 
administration, increasing political accountability, combating corruption and guaranteeing 
transparency (World Bank, 1992, Shah, 2007). Or more recently in India, the demand for a 
central ombudsman, or ‘lokpal’, with unlimited powers to pursue corruption at all levels of the 
government that was framed and articulated by the headline grabbing middle class campaign 
against corruption: India Against Corruption (Sengupta, 2011; Visvanathan, 2011; Menon and 
Nigam, 2011; Mohanty, 2011). 
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of subaltern citizens. It focuses on the creation of alternative, deliberative platforms that 
make people central to governance. At best, this kind of activism to transform or open 
up the state, though never achieved in full measure, can ensure greater transparency and 
accountability when it incorporates a broader social welfare enhancing aim, rather than 
narrowly corruption combating. What the intertwined struggles for the rights to 
information and work provide is a glimpse of what a more transparent state that works 
for India’s subaltern citizens might look like and some lessons for how to get there. 
Each national context will, of course, determine how the demand for right to 
information is articulated/framed.  
In general, in regions with gross inequality and poverty, poor citizens see the 
state as the ultimate guarantor of welfare. Ordinary people then, do not value the right to 
information as a means to “good governance” or to an ideal liberal state. Pragmatically, 
citizens value this right to the extent that it can be used to pressure state institutions to 
realise the other rights necessary to life. The right to information, then, cannot simply be 
about combating corruption. Rather, insofar as citizens rely on state systems to provide 
basic needs, it pervades all other socio-economic rights—including work, food, 
education, and health. Therefore, by linking various socio-economic and civil-political 
rights advocates of these rights can harness their potential to democratise politics and 
change public priorities in other low and middle-income countries.239 Keeping that in 
mind will, I believe, contribute to social justice struggles of many individuals and 
organisations. In particular, this understanding will benefit those concerned with 
strengthening parts of the state to which the interests of the poor are closely tied. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 See also Drèze (2004). 
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